

Vol. I

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IN THE COURT OF INQUIRY

WRITTEN STATEMENT ON BEHALF OF THE PUNJAB GOVERNMENT

It is respectfully stated:-

The Punjab Government did not hold any enquiry to find out the causes of the disturbances which took place in March, 1953. It is therefore not in a position to make a statement regarding the issues before the court. It is however assist Honourable Court by placing all the material before it. The Advocate General has already made a statement to that effect.

S/-

Advocate General.

6.8.53

STATEMENT RECORDED BY MR. Y. A. MAJID EX-CHIEF SECY.  
TO GOVERNMENT, PUNJAB.

I have been informed by the Punjab Government that the Court of Inquiry set up to enquire into the recent Punjab disturbances desires that before proceeding ex-~~factis~~ I should furnish my statement to the Court by the 15th July which regard to their terms of reference namely (1) the responsibility for disturbances (2) the circumstances leading to the declaration of the Martial Law in Lahore on March 6th and (3) adequacy or otherwise of the measures taken by the Provincial civil authorities to prevent and subsequently to deal with the disturbances. I notice that the Court's desire was communicated to the Punjab Government in its Secretary's letter No. 7/GI dated the 3rd July, 1953 and it was mentioned that my statement was required in terms of the Court's order dated the 1st July, 1953, a copy of which was enclosed. The said order gave a direction to the Secretary to the Punjab Government who was incharge of the Department of Law and order during the disturbances to state his case. I assume that the direction meant for me has been necessitated by the fact that I was Chief Secretary to the Punjab Government at the time of the disturbances. Before proceeding to make my statement, I would like to make clear that the responsibility for running the law and order department of the Punjab Government is not a sole responsibility of the Chief Secretary. In fact, the primary work of that department is done by the Home Secretary, and the Chief Secretary comes into the picture only where the matter involves the general tranquility of the Province. I would, therefore, suggest that the present Home Secretary to the Punjab Government, who also held that the time of the disturbances, should be given a direction to make his statement to the Court. As already explained, the responsibility for the law and order department is shared by the Chief Secretary and the Home Secretary. I am on leave at present and am due to leave Karachi for a holiday in Europe on the . . . . .



10th of this month. I am, therefore, recording this brief statement on the basis of my recollections. This statement must necessarily be inadequate on certain points. I trust that the Home Secretary's statement will be able to fill the gaps and also to make references to office files and standing instructions which must be available in the Punjab Civil Secretariat.

2. I am due back from leave on the 19th October, I do not know whether the Court can wait till then in order to question me personally regarding any matter which may arise during the course of its enquiry. The Court, may, if it considers desirable, send interrogatories through the Pakistan High Commissioner in the U.K. so that I may<sup>be</sup> able to supplement the present statement in respect of any point which I have not been able to deal with.

3. I would at the outset make clear that this statement is an individual's statement and does not essentially represent the viewpoint of the Government of the Punjab. It does take into account such information as I have gathered in my official capacity.

4. I shall first deal with the question of the responsibility for the disturbances. It is well known that the disturbances were caused by the people who wanted their demands against the Ahmadi community to be accepted. Their demands were (1) that the Ahmadis were non-Muslims and should, therefore, be declared a minority community and (2) that Chaudhry Zafrullah Khan should be removed from the position of Foreign Minister. These demands were initially put forward by the Ahrars but were later taken up by groups of Mullahs who constituted themselves into an All Pakistan Muslim Convention whose declared object was to preserve the institution of Khatm-i-Nabuwat. These groups of people had very bigoted beliefs and they whipped the masses into a fanatic zeal by using the slogan of Khatm-e-Nabuwat. The



slogan was a religious or a pseudo-religious one, but they prostituted it by misleading the masses. They declared that the very existence of Ahmadis was an insult to the memory of the Holy Prophet. The leaders of the agitation acted in an anti-social and irresponsible manner and allowed their agitation to transgress limits of the law. It was ironical that the people whose religion tells them to respect the law were employing their own religion for purpose of disobeying the law as a mass movement.

5. The Ahrars who initiated the movement acted in an unscrupulous manner for ulterior purpose. Their party's stock had been very low and they worked out this scheme for attracting public notice and gaining political strength in the country. They were joined by the forces of fanaticism who are opposed to all progress in the country. The intelligentsia were unsympathetic towards the demands put up by these anti-social elements, but it is unfortunate that they did not take up the fight for progress and enlightenment. If they had undertaken the job, we might have been able to prevent the disturbances.

6. It is a pity that the country was not given the correct lead by the leaders of the Muslim League at the time when the Ahrars and their confederates were vociferously putting forward their anti-Ahmadi demands. It was in fact unfortunate that the Hon'ble Prime Minister did not even make clear to the public that he had no intention of dismissing his Foreign Minister and in fact hob-nobbed with the representatives of Mullahs thereby encouraging them in their anti-social activities. My view is that if the correct lead had been given to the public, the Mullahs would not have succeeded in misleading the masses on the basis of Khatm-e-Nabuwwat.

7. I now proceed to deal with the question whether the provincial civil authorities took adequate measures for preventing and subsequently dealing with the disturbances. It would be clear from what I have stated above that no ideological



effort was made by the Provincial authorities for preventing the disturbances. They did, however, constantly appeal to the citizens for preserving the peace. They also passed prohibitory orders, wherever they thought that a projected meeting or a projected procession might lead to a breach of the peace. Such steps could not be described as designed to meet the agitation, but they were intended to prevent the disturbances. When the country was lacking in an ideological resistance against the anti-Ahmedi demands, the civil authorities could hope to prevent disturbances only by show of force or by use of force. They did their best in this behalf and their activity was marked with sympathy as well as firmness. The Police everywhere discharged its duties with courage and tact. All District Magistrates had been given clear orders by the Provincial Government that they should meet the situation with firmness.

8. The situation at Lahore took an unexpected turn within a week of the start of the agitation. Things moved very fast and the crowds bent on lawlessness were so large and widespread that the ordinary Police force available was not adequate for quelling the disturbances. The Army had been called out and was standing by. But it appears to me that the army did not <sup>go</sup> into action or open fire any place before

the Martial Law was actually proclaimed on the 6th March. This failure to go into action or open fire is in my opinion a most important factor. I do not know whether any one can be blamed for this failure, because the matter was never enquired into while I was still Chief Secretary. The army could not be blamed only if the civil authorities had called upon them to go into action on a particular occasion. The civil authorities could be blamed only if they prevented the army authorities from going into action & wherever it was necessary for the army to open fire. Perhaps the failure arose on account of lack of adequate experience regarding the manner in which liaison should be carried out between the army and the Police. In my opinion it is necessary for the safety of the State that steps should be

taken for avoiding such a contingency in the relationship between the Army and the Police at the stage where the army is available in aid of the civil power should be worked out in great detail in the shape of marching orders or firing orders etc., and there should in fact be frequent exercises to work as refreshers.

9. The Ministers of the Punjab Government and the comparatively higher officers were working under a great strain during the disturbances. They frequently conferred with one another and the result was that the Provincial Government was fully informed of the up-to-date situation. There was no time for drawing up detailed reports for submission to the Central Government, but the position was frequently explained on the telephone to the Central authorities. Daily situation Reports were prepared and copies were sent to the Central Government. But quicker information was given on the telephone by the Provincial Ministers to the Hon'ble Minister for the Interior, Government of Pakistan.

10. A meeting of the Punjab Cabinet was held in the Government House, Lahore, under the Chairmanship of His Excellency the Governor on the 5th March. The G.O.C., 10 Div. was also present with a number of Staff Officers. The situation in the Province and particularly in Lahore was reviewed in detail and it was decided clearly that the course of action should be as follows:-

- (a) the Police should handle each situation in a firm matter.
- (b) If the Police found that the situation was beyond its control, the Police should receive adequate support from the army.
- (c) where the above action was not likely to be successful, the army authorities should be given charge of a particular situation or of a part thereof in order to restore Law and order.



11. The General and his Staff Officers were in agreement with the above decisions, but it was not defined in what manner the army would support the Police as at (b) above. The impression left on my mind was that the army Commanders were not keen on supporting the Police while the Civil Government was still in control, but would prefer to taken control of their own that is to proclaim Martial Law.

12. I would like to say at this stage that the above scheme could not be given a fair trial because of two other reasons

(i) The Punjab Government held a meeting with selected citizens of Lahore in the afternoon of the 5th in the hope that they would issue a joint appeal to the public for returning to a peaceful life, and when they found that some of these citizens objected to the issuing of such an appeal, they held a Cabinet meeting towards the evening and decided that the public should not be provoked into violence for a short- while so that the next day which was a Friday might pass off without any serious disturbance.

(ii) The next day at Lahore started in a most ominous manner. The crowds bent on lawlessness were thicker and more violent. There were reports of widespread activity of loot and arson. The Chief Minister of the Punjab Government issued an appeal to the public, which was broadcast on the radio and also through mobile loudspeakers and in this appeal he promised to support the two demands against the Ahmadis.

13. I cannot say who had advised the Chief Minister to issue the above mentioned appeal. I know for a fact that he was in session with his colleagues in the Government House and that a large number of city councillors of Lahore were waiting to meet the Cabinet. There was a lot of telephonic conversation with Karachi. I was not consulted on the point whether the said appeal should be

issued or not. If I had been consulted I would have  
against it because I believed that the demands were  
unjustified. I would have further advised that  
Government should not get panicky but should use  
adequate number of troops for quelling the riots all  
over the town. The troops could have gone into such  
action even while the Civil Government was in power  
and if the mobs had known that the army would  
always be available for quelling riots, I am sure  
they would have returned to a life of peace. The  
Chief Minister sort of threw in his hand and made  
it almost necessary for the army Commander to  
proclaim Martial Law.

Sd/- H.A. Majid C.S.P.  
Commissioner of Development,  
Punjab (on leave).

Karachi,  
the 6th July, 1953.

Chief Secretary is the Secretary to Government in-charge of "law and order". Actually the term "law and order" has been used only in one place in the Rules of Business of the Punjab Government 1951 which are based on the Rules previously in force in the Province. The business of Government has been arranged and classified Secretary-wise under each Minister in the Schedule attached to the Rules. Items Nos. 24 and 25 of the Chief Secretary's subjects are:-

24. Communal and religious questions affecting general tranquillity.

25. All general questions affecting the tranquillity of the Province.

Home Secretary is in-charge of certain subsidiary matters, e.g., the Jails, the operation of the Public Safety Act, control of arms and ammunition, vagrancy etc. He acts as the Chief Secretary's assistant or deputy in the sphere of "law and order". The responsibility for this subject is that of the Chief Secretary. All letters relating to policy and important communications including those to the Central Government are issued under his signatures or with his approval. A reference to the Rules of Business which were in force in 1949, when the



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distribution of work was department-wise and not Secretary-wise will make the position clear beyond doubt. In those Rules these two items are shown as subjects of the General Administration Department which is the Chief Secretary's Department and not of the Home Department.

2. I took over as Home Secretary on December 7, 1951. Shortly afterwards the draft of a circular letter addressed to all District Magistrates and addressed to all Commissioners, Inspector General of Police, and Deputy Inspector General of Police, Criminal Investigation Department, was put up to me by the Deputy Secretary, Home, with a note that the draft represented the decisions taken at a meeting held earlier by the Chief Minister with Chief Secretary, Inspector General of Police, Deputy Inspector General of Police, Criminal Investigation Department and Deputy Secretary, Home. As I had not attended this meeting I marked file to the Inspector General of Police for vetting the draft before its submission to Chief Secretary/Chief Minister.

The Inspector General of Police returned it to me with certain amendments. It was eventually issued with the approval of Chief Secretary/Chief Minister. (D.O. No.10027-51/463-HG, dated December 24, 1951). A copy of this circular is enclosed (Annexure 'A'). It was said in the circular that if timely preventive measures were taken, there would be little or no likelihood of the Ahrars or the Ahmedis disturbing each other's meetings thus endangering the public peace. (The Noting regarding this directive will be found in the Criminal Investigation Department file No.5(3)31-B.B. Volume II - Section B - Communalism - General Sectarian Troubles - Government Instructions.)

The situation, however, did not improve and in May, 1952, and deteriorated to such an extent that it was felt that unless effective and firm steps were taken, a real threat to the tranquillity of the Province would be created. The Deputy Inspector General of Police, Criminal Investigation Department, in consultation with Home Secretary and the Inspector General of Police formulated the following proposals and submitted them to Chief Secretary/ Chief Minister through Home Secretary/ Inspector General of Police on May 20, 1952.

(a) The Majlis-e-Ahrar should be declared an unlawful association under section 16 of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act.

(b) The following prominent workers should be arrested and detained under the Public Safety Act:-

1. Syed Ata Ullah Shah Bokhari.
2. Qazi Ehsan Ahmad Shujasbadi.
3. Muhammad Ali Jullundri.

(c) In case detention was not considered advisable the above three leaders should be restricted to their home villages.

(d) In case it was not considered advisable to declare the Majlis-e-Ahrar as an unlawful association. Its meetings should be banned. for a year or two by orders under section 144 Cr.P.C.

A meeting was called by the Chief Minister on May 27, 1952, to consider these proposals.

At this meeting it was decided that the existing directive which left the discretion with the District Magistrates regarding the banning,.....



otherwise of the meetings sponsored by the Ahrar and the Ahmadis should be superseded and the District Magistrates should be told that whenever either party intended to hold a meeting it should be invariably banned under Section 144 Cr.P.C. The Chief Secretary's D.O.Circular No.6469-84-B.D.S.B., dated June 5, 1952 (Annexure 'B'), the draft of which was prepared by Home Secretary, was accordingly issued. (Nothing regarding the issue of this circular will be found in the Punjab Criminal Investigation Department file No. 16 (2) 94 -Section B - Muslim - Ahrar - Ahrar/Ahmadiya Controversy - Government Policy v 1952).

When action was taken by the District Magistrate on this directive the Ahrar had resort to a clever stratagem. They shifted the venue of their

meetings from public places to mosques that meetings should be held throughout in mosques immediately preceding or after the Widaa prayers where they would have ready-made audiences. At this a meeting was held by Inspector General of Police, Deputy Inspector General of Police, Criminal Investigation Department and Home Secretary on June 19, 1952 at which Legal Remembrancer was also present. As a result of this meeting draft instructions for meeting this peculiar situation were prepared and signalled to all District Magistrates and Commissioners after they had been seen and approved with slight amendment by Chief Secretary. A copy of the signal is attached (Annexure 'C'). The District Magistrates were told what course to adopt in case the Ahrar contemplated holding such meetings in their Districts. It was said in these instructions -

(1) that the District Magistrates should pass appropriate orders under Section 144 Cr.P.C. banning public meetings without mentioning the venue of the meetings;

(2) that they should send for the Imams and other persons connected with the management of the mosques concerned to impress upon them the undesirability of

their becoming a party to the violation of the lawfully promulgated orders and the desecration of places of worship in the furtherance of political programmes;

(3) that it should be made clear to all concerned that in the event of an infringement of the District Magistrate's order, all persons connected with the management of the mosques concerned would be prosecuted for abetment of the offence as well as the actual sponsors and moving spirits of the meeting including the speakers.

It was stressed in this directive that Government did not desire any public meeting which was being held in a mosque or any other place of sanctity or worship to be dispersed by force or interfered with in any way while it was in progress. It was said that no arrests should be made while people were collecting for or dispersing from such meetings and that the proper course to follow would be that cases should be registered and culprits arrested, after the excitement of the meeting was over, at an appropriate time and place. The District Magistrates and Superintendents of Police were asked to remain at headquarters on the Jumatul Widaa day and to pursue the registered cases vigorously. (Noting regarding the issue of this



directive will be found in the Punjab Criminal Investigation Department file No. 16(2) 95 - Section B - Muslims - Ahrars - Action Against Ahrars under Section 188 P.P.C. - 1952).

Simultaneously with the issue of this directive, a notification was issued in a Gazette Extraordinary (Annexure 'D') by the Provincial Government making the violation of orders passed under Section 144 Cr.P.C. banning public meetings as non-bailable and cognizable offences. A model order under Section 144 Cr.P.C. (Annexure 'E') was also later sent to the District Magistrates for their guidance.

Strong action was taken in the Districts, particularly in Shahpur and Gujranwala. In Shahpur Master Taj-ud-Din Ansari and Sh. Hisammud Din, two top-ranking Ahrar leaders were arrested and prosecuted under Section 188 P.P.C. for violating the District Magistrate's orders. In Gujranwala Sahibzada Faizul Hassan, who also belongs to the hierarchy of the Ahrar organization was arrested and prosecuted alongwith Master Taj ud Din Ansari and Sh. Hissamuddin. The Ahrar organization finding that the Government were determined to curb them started making frantic efforts to confuse the issue and to make the Ahrar-Ahmadi

controversy a question for the Muslims in general

(Aamatul Muslemeen).

A meeting was held by the Chief Minister on 27th June, 1952, with Chief Secretary, Home Secretary, Inspector General of Police and Deputy Inspector General of Police, Criminal Investigation Department, to discuss this development in the situation. As decided at this meeting a D.O. Circular No. 176-St(HS)/52, dated 28th June, 1952 (Annexure 'F') was issued to all the District Magistrates, copies of which were sent to the Commissioners also. In the case of Gujranwala and Sargodha which were the two storm centres at that time the letters were sent by special messengers. The motif of the circular was that the Ahrar leaders should be isolated from the public, because, if the Government threw the net wide and drew in persons of other denominations also simply because they were somehow inveigled by the Ahrar into participation in their meetings, the Government would only succeed in arraying a vast section of the public against itself. It was said in this circular that apologies offered by repentent offenders other than those who were prominent members of the Ahrar leadership would be accepted readily so that when the public see

for themselves that action is being <sup>taken</sup> only against the Ahrar leadership their opinion will veer round to the side of the Government and the action taken by its functionaries will meet with general approbation; It was also stressed that as the cases against the Ahrar would be strongly contested and pursued with keen interest in the press and by the public; the law officers of the Districts should scrutinize them carefully before instituting them in courts.

It was at this stage that the Ahrar enlisted the support of the Ulama who did not belong to their organization. Until then they had more or less treated this question as their sole political monopoly. They organized a Convention of All Muslim Parties for July 13, 1952. As the Chief Secretary and the Chief Minister were both away from Lahore at that time and the situation was not free from anxiety, I called a meeting of District Magistrates of some of the more important districts, namely Serghodha, Gujranwala, Lyallpur, Montgomery, Sialkot, Gujrat, Lahore, Rawalpindi and Jhelum for July 5, 1952. The Chief Secretary, however, returned in time to preside over this meeting which was attended besides these District Magistrates by Home Secretary, Inspector



(3) Whether the Muslims were allowed to deliver speeches on Tardead-i-Mirzaist and Musala-i-Khatim-i-Nubbawat in the mosques; and

(4) Whether the Muslims were allowed to hold meetings outside mosques on these two issues.

As the Chief Secretary was away on leave to Karachi I consulted the Inspector General of Police and sent a reply to the letter to the effect that the orders promulgated under Section 144 Cr.P.C. in the Districts applied only to those public meetings which were organized by members of the Majlis-i-Ahrar-i-Pakistan or the Ahmadiya community and that, apart from this, Government had never imposed any restrictions on mosques or other places of worship or on worship and religious ritual. It was also said that besides the Ahrar and the Ahmadis all other political and religious bodies were at liberty to hold public meetings. I added in this letter that three Ulama had seen me in this connection in a deputation on 10th July, 1952, and that I had answered all their queries. On 10th July, 1952, three Maulvis had seen me in my office and put more or less the same questions as those given in Maulvi Muhammad Ali Jullunhri's above mentioned letter.

The replies that I gave them were on the same lines as those given in my reply to Maulvi Muhammad Ali Jullundhri.

The Provincial Government had taken firm and effective action to preserve the public peace in the Province but until then no enunciation of a clear cut and firm policy had been made by the Central Government regarding the demands of the Ahrar which they were using to full advantage to enlist popular support. The Ahrar and the Divines whom they had somehow induced to join hands with them started the propaganda that Government was interfering with the legitimate rights and religious beliefs of the public and were trying to put down with force the Musala-i-Khatim-i-Nubbawat, the very basis of Islam.

This position was discussed by Home Secretary, Inspector General of Police, and Deputy Inspector General of Police, Criminal Investigation Department, early in July, 1952, and Home Secretary wrote a note (Annexure 'H') suggesting that the Central Government should be addressed at the highest level to formulate their policy regarding this question and to make it known to every one in



the country by deed and directive. It was said in this letter that the hydra which the Ahrar were trying to raise should be killed before it was hatched and also that people were saying that the reticence of Central Government on the villification of the Foreign Minister was due to the fact that some of his own Colleagues were behind the agitation. Chief Secretary recorded his own views on Home Secretary's note and submitted it to the Chief Minister who also wrote a minute on it and said that he would personally discuss the whole situation with the Prime Minister. (This noting will be found in Punjab Criminal Investigation Department file No.5(3)31-S.B., Volume II - Communalism - Central - Sectarian Troubles - Government Instructions - Vol. I and a reference to it will also be found on page 41 of Punjab Criminal Investigation Department file No.16(2)94 - Section B- Muslim - Ahrar - Ahrar-Ahmadiya Controversy - Govt. Policy 1952).

The attitude of the Muslim League newspapers throughout this period was most unsatisfactory from the point of view of Government and Government's case suffered considerably from a lack of publicity. In this connection note recorded by me will be of interest (Annexure 'H/I'). This note is contained in the Punjab C.I.D. file No.16(2)103 S.B. Vol.III - Muslim - Ahrar 1952.

The Convention of the Ulema was followed by a short-lived lull which was broken by the firing in Multan on July 19, 1952. Two days after the firing the Chief Minister sent for

Inspector General of Police, Deputy Inspector General of Police,  
( the Chief Secretary was away on leave)  
C.I.D., and Home Secretary/and told them that the Majlis-e-

Ahrar-i-Pakistan had given him an undertaking that they would refrain from indulging in anything unlawful and would actually themselves protect the life, property and honour of the Ahmadis. He added that he had accepted the undertaking and had decided to call off the action against the Ahrar, withdraw the pending cases and release those already convicted. The undertaking of the Ahrar was said to have been given to him through the Director Public Relations, Punjab. This decision was implemented as desired by Chief Minister. Actually up to then only two persons, namely, Master Taj Uddin Ansari and Sh. Hissam Uddin had been convicted. They were both set off free and cases against the Ahrar including the one registered at Gujranwala against Sahibzada Faizul Hassan and others were withdrawn.

In August, 1952, the Central Government issued a Press Communique (Annexure 'I') which was generally understood to be directed against Ahmadis. A press statement was issued by Ch. Zafarullah Khan with reference to this communique. (Annexure 'I/A'.)

Things became quiet after this but gradually there was a recrudescence of anti-Ahmadi speeches and by the beginning of 1953 the agitation regarding the demands had gained momentum. A conference of Ulama was held in Karachi on 16th - 18th January, 1953, which passed resolutions supporting and



reiterating the anti-Ahmadi demands. The Punjab delegates on return became more truculent than ever. The Majlis-i-Amal of the All Muslim Parties Convention gave an ultimatum to the Central Government that unless their demands, i.e. the removal of the Hon'ble the Foreign Minister, the declaration of the Ahmedis as a minority community and their removal from key positions were accepted by 22nd February, 1953, they would launch "direct action" against the Government. The ultimatum was published in the newspapers. The "Zero" hour was later extended by the Majlis-i-Amal and the Central Government were given up to February 27 to accept their demands or to face the "direct action". On 16th February, 1953, when Prime Minister Pakistan came to Lahore, he was met with a strike and black flags.

I was on a fortnight's leave from 10th to 23rd February 1953 for medical treatment when I was urgently summoned by the Inspector General of Police to his office on 20th February. He explained the gravity of the situation and showed me the draft of a letter which he had prepared for issue to the Central Government. I entirely agreed with him after which the I.G. Police and I waited on the Chief Minister.



He approved of the draft and suggested an amendment of the last paragraph. The draft was issued by Chief Secretary. The letter explained the whole position and said that the Central Government should formulate a firm policy regarding the demands and enunciate it. It also said that the Province felt strong enough to implement the policy devised by the Central Government.

On February 26 the Inspector General of Police and Home Secretary were ordered by the Chief Minister to proceed to Karachi alongwith Ch. Muhammad Hassan Chatha, the then Revenue Minister.

At Karachi a meeting of the Central Cabinet was held the same afternoon in which Ch. Muhammad Hassan Chatha also participated. No decision was arrived at in the first Session of the meeting which lasted until about 9 p.m. It was proposed to hold the next session of the meeting on the following day at 7 (or 8) a.m. When I reached the Prime Minister's house I learnt that there would be no meeting and that Ch. Muhammad Hassan Chatha and the Inspector General of Police had already left for the aerodrome and were due to take off for Lahore shortly. I

rushed to the aerodrome and managed to get into the plane which was about to take off and on the way I learnt that when information was received by the Prime Minister at about midnight that the Committee of Action who were meeting in Karachi had decided to launch their "direct action" by picketing his house from 7 a.m. on the following day, he called a meeting at which it was decided to arrest the ring-leaders of the Movement.

Ch. Muhammad Hassan Chatha, the Inspector General of Police and I reached Lahore at 3 p.m. after dropping at Peshawar H.E. the Governor and the Chief Minister of the N.W.F.P. who were also travelling in the same plane. From the aerodrome we were taken straight to the house of the Chief Minister where the Inspector General of Police apprised him of the developments and explained in detail his plan of action. The Chief Minister approved of the Inspector General of Police's proposals. The Inspector General of Police personally informed the Chief Secretary regarding what was proposed to be done and action was started the same evening. A copy of the Inspector General Police's note summarizing the decisions taken is appended ( Annexure ' J ' ).

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A signal was issued to the District Magistrates and Superintendents of Police, Rawalpindi, Gujranwala, Sialkot, Lyallpur, Montgomery, Multan, Sargodha and Shaikhupura (Annexure 'K') to arrest under Section 3, Punjab Public Safety Act, the ring leaders of the agitation specified in the signal. A signal was also issued to the other District Magistrates and Superintendents of Police alerting them to remain vigilant (Annexure 'L'). All the Superintendents of Police were asked to send daily sitreps to the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Criminal Investigation Department. The publication of the Azad and al-Fazl was banned by Chief Secretary for a period of one year. It was also decided to ban the publication of the Zamindar similarly. Actually orders for the same were also issued but I later learnt that as Maulana Akhtar Ali Khan had tendered an object apology, the order was not <sup>and</sup> served/that the question of his arrest had also been postponed.

Khanwaja Nazir Ahmad was warned that no jubilation should be expressed by the Civil & Military Gazette over the arrests and that utmost



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restraint should be observed for the next month or two.

Khalifa Bashir Uddin Mahmood was warned through District Magistrate, Jhang, to instruct his followers to avoid giving provocation.

On the following day, i.e. February 28, 1953, as ordered on the preceeding day I addressed a press conference at which the Editors of all the prominent Lahore dailies were invited. I solicited their cooperation and made it clear to every one present that the policy of Government was to maintain law and order at all costs. In answer to a question put by one of the Editors I told them that the policy of the Provincial Government was exactly the same that enunciated by the Central Government in their communique issued on February 27, 1953. (Annexure 'M'). I explained to them in brief and off the record, without revealing the source, the line which the Central Government had desired us to take in their cypher telegram (Annexure 'O') regarding "the demands". The Editors were, however, more or less unanimous that Government should officially announce their attitude regarding the demands of the agitators.

On the same day circular instructions (Annexure 'N') regarding the handling of the situation were issued by Chief Secretary to all the District Magistrates with copies to Commissioners of Divisions, Inspector General of Police and the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Criminal Investigation Department.

In Lahore the demonstrations started on February 28 when a procession was taken out in the evening. It was intercepted by the Police at the Charing Cross on the Mall. The Inspector General of Police and the Commissioner, Lahore Division, were present at the spot besides the District Magistrate and the Senior Superintendent of Police, Lahore and other subordinate officers. The processionists eventually dispersed without any untoward incident happening. In the evening the Chief Minister held a meeting to which Inspector General of Police and Chief Secretary were called. Home Secretary was not present at this meeting.

On the following day, i.e. 1st March, 1953, I went to the Inspector General of Police's house in the evening, about an hour or so before sunset to get information from him regarding the

situation when I learnt that he had gone to the Charing Cross. I also went there to see what was happening. The processionists were shouting slogans against the late Prime Minister and the Punjab Ministry and were demonstrating physically in a manner which resembled the Bhangra dance of the Sikhs. The whole show was shameful. At one time it appeared that the crowd would break through the police cordon and actually the Police got into position for tear-gassing, when the mob seemed to change its mind and started melting away. Some members of the crowd had obviously come prepared for the tear gas as they were carrying pieces of cloth soaked in water. Some "volunteers" were also arrested. The District Magistrate and Senior Superintendent of Police, Lahore, with their officers were present at the spot.

On 2nd March 1953 the Chief Minister sent for the Chief Secretary and the Home Secretary when the happenings of the previous evening were intimated to him. He desired that the Commissioner, Rawalpindi Division, who was at Lahore as he was functioning as the Rehabilitation Commissioner (General) also should be asked to reach Rawalpindi immediately and that the new District Magistrate, Rawalpindi,



(Mr. Ansari) should take over from Mr. Ikramul Haque as early as possible as the letter had been

appointed Joint Secretary in the Provincial Food

Department. The same evening the largest process-

sion until then was taken out. It was led by

Maulana Akhter Ali Khan. It came in waves from

the side of the Abbott Road and was as usual

intercepted at the Charing Cross. I had come

to spot with the Inspector General of Police and

the Commissioner, Lahore Division, to see things

for myself. The Deputy Inspector General of

the District Magistrate,  
Police, Lahore Range/ and the Senior Superintendent

of Police, Lahore with officers of their staff

were also present at the scene handling the

situation. The demonstrations were much uglier

than those of the previous evening and some

members of the mob were carrying torn sign-posts,

pieces of sugar-cane, etc., which they started

throwing at the Police and the Superintendents

of Police, Messrs. Zulqarnain Khan and Taylor

received minor injuries. The assembly was

declared to be unlawful by the District Magistrate

Lahore and eventually a mild lathi charge was also

made. Maulana Akhter Ali Khan and a large

number of other persons, many of whom

had come from other Districts to court arrest were arrested and removed.

An Army Officer sent by the General Officer Commanding, 10th Division, contacted the Inspector General of Police at the spot and told him that the General Officer Commanding wanted to know if his help would be required.

When the mob finally cleared off, a meeting was held at the Civil Lines Police Station which was attended by the Commissioner, Lahore Division, Inspector General of Police, Home Secretary, Deputy Inspector General of Police, Lahore Range, District Magistrate, Lahore, Senior Superintendent of Police, Lahore and the Superintendent of Police of the Criminal Investigation Department. As decided at this meeting a signal (Annexure 'F') was sent the same night to all the District Magistrates and Superintendents of Police, Commissioners of Divisions, and Deputy Inspectors General of the Police Range to take firm action to suppress the agitation at the source as volunteers were being sent from outlying districts for the so-called "direct action" at Lahore. This signal<sup>was</sup>/later followed by another signal to all District Magistrates

that persuasion should be used in the first instance to dissuade people from going to Karachi but that if persuasive methods failed they should take appropriate preventive action (Annexure 'P-I'). It was also decided that the General Officer Commanding should be asked to stand by with his troops to come to the aid of the civil power as and when needed. The General Officer Commanding was contacted by the Inspector General of Police on the telephone. He insisted that this requisition must come from the Government. He was asked either to come himself or to send his representative to the Civil Lines Police Station to tie up the arrangements with the civil officers present there. He accordingly sent his G.S.O.I. (Lt. Col. Sheeroon Khan) with two other Military officers and they also said that as later on there would be the question of the cost of troops to be employed in aid of civil power, the requisition for the same should come from the Provincial Government. The civil officers present considered that it was not necessary for Government to do so and that the local District Magistrate was competent to ask for aid from the army if he considered such a step



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necessary! Government instructions on the subject were consulted by the Commissioner, Lahore Division, and he was of the opinion that under the instructions, Government could, if there was time, request the local Military Commander to render necessary help to the civil power in the maintenance of law and order. The Inspector General of Police felt that as time was being lost unnecessarily in these technicalities he was prepared as the Liaison Officer of the Punjab Government with the Army to write the necessary letter himself. Eventually a letter was drafted (Annexure '2') which the General Officer Commanding was told that he should stand by to help the civil power in the maintenance of law and order in Lahore and that the actual number of troops, the manner and place where they would be needed, etc., would be communicated to him by the District Magistrate. The letter<sup>issued</sup> should under the signature of Home Secretary and its copies were endorsed to all the Officers who had attended the meeting, i.e. Inspector General of Police, Deputy Inspector General of Police, Lahore Range, District Magistrate, Lahore, Senior Superintendent

of Police, Lahore and Commissioner, Lahore Division.

The District Magistrate, Lahore, promulgated an order under Section 144 Cr.f.C. prohibiting processions in the specified parts of the Lahore Corporation.

The same evening a meeting of the Cabinet was held at Chief Minister's house which was attended by Chief Secretary and all the officers who were present at the meeting held at the Civil Lines Police Station. The Cabinet was apprised of the earlier happenings and the action taken. The Cabinet approved of the steps taken.

Troops patrolled in vehicles in the Civil Lines and the City area of the Corporation (except the walled City) on the morning of 3rd March. There was no patrolling in the evening. That day there were two incidents of lathi-charging: one near the Tollinton Market and the other near the General Post Office, by the Police. No casualties were reported.

On the following day, i.e. the 4th March, 1953, the Chief Minister held a meeting of the Cabinet at which the Chief Secretary,

Home Secretary, Inspector General of Police and the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Lahore Range, were also present. At this meeting the Chief Minister ordered Deputy Inspector General of Police, Lahore Range, to proceed to Sialkot as there had been firing there. The Inspector General of Police read out the report of a speech delivered on the preceding night by Abdus Satter Khan Niazi, M.L.A., at the Wazir Khan Mosque. As it was felt that this speech was of a highly objectionable nature and was calculated to aggravate the situation, it was necessary in the interest of public peace and order that Abdus Satter Khan Niazi should be arrested. I accordingly issued an order under Section 3, Punjab Public Safety Act, the same day. Abdus Satter Khan Niazi remained throughout in the Wazir Khan Mosque except for some time when he came out to deliver another fiery and objectionable speech outside the Delhi Gate. The order of arrest could not be served on him as, according to the Criminal Investigation Department reports, the mosque swarmed with agitated masses. On this day besides the speech of Abdus Satter Khan Niazi, speeches in the same vein were delivered by other people like Maulvi Yusuf of Sialkot and it was public



ly said that the Police had desecrated the Holy Quran by trampling over it when a lathi charge was made at a procession near Cank Dalgren in which incident, it was also alleged, a young boy was mercilessly beaten to death. The official information that I received was that a procession had been dispersed at this place with tear gas and lathi charge but that no one was killed and the allegation that the Holy Quran had been desecrated was a preposterous lie. Besides this incident another incident was reported on this day- that of a lathi charge in front of the University Hall.

On the whole situation appeared to be tense but not dangerous and it was felt that, when the excitement caused by the false propaganda and the fiery speeches delivered by Abdus Sattar Khan Niazi and others was over, normality would prevail. But just before sunset the Senior Superintendent of Police and the District Magistrate Lahore rang me up to say that the City Deputy Superintendent of Police had been mobbed and murdered in or near the Wazir Khan Mosque and that some members of the Police party who were accompanying the Deputy Superintendent of Police

were also missing. The District Magistrate and the Senior Superintendent of Police said that they were going to the Kotwali Police Station. I went to the Inspector General of Police's residence from where both of us went to the Civil Lines Police Station and then to the Kotwali. The Inspector General of Police informed the General Officer Commanding of this development on the telephone and requested him to come to the Kotwali too. The General Officer Commanding with his G.S.O.I reached there shortly afterwards and held a meeting with the civil officers. The Commissioner, Lahore Division, on the previous day had been directed by the Chief Minister to proceed to Sialkot as the situation there was causing alarm. I rang him up and informed him of what had happened in Lahore and as requested by the Inspector General of Police, asked him to send the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Lahore Range, who had gone to Sialkot earlier that day, immediately to Lahore. The Deputy Inspector General of Police reached Lahore with admirable promptitude. The District Magistrate clamped a curfew on the City (except the Walled City) and a part of the Civil Lines of Lahore and there was heavy patrolling by Police and troops of the area to which the curfew had been applied. The curfew

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was called at many places and the police had to open fire that night on three occasions.

As desired by the Chief Minister on the telephone I issued from the Kotwali an appeal asking people to help Government in the restoration of law and order (Annexure 'R') and a warning on behalf of District Magistrate, Lahore against rumour-mongering: (Annexure 'S').

The Inspector General of Police and Home Secretary were summoned by the Chief Minister to his residence at about 11 p.m. where the other Ministers were also present. The position was explained to them and on the way back the Inspector General of Police and Home Secretary visited on H.B. the Governor also to apprise him of the developments.

That night literally thousands of people were shouting themselves hoarse from their houses tops. The effect produced by their slogans, shrieks and shouts was extremely weird and the sound was carried far by the night breeze causing alarm even in places miles away from the scene of unrest. The Senior Superintendent of Police Lahore received a telephone call from



Government House that as the mobs were very near the guard there should be doubled. When the Inspector General of Police and I went to the Govt. House later there was no sign of a mob or crowd anywhere near it.

The same night at about 2 a.m. the Chief Minister held another meeting with the Inspector General of Police, the General Officer Commanding, Home Secretary, District Magistrate and Senior Superintendent of Police, Lahore, when he discussed the situation with the General Officer Commanding and the civil officers.

The 5th March was a tumultuous day.

The Order under Section 144 Cr.P.C. was defied all over the town and crowds threatened and abused persons moving about in vehicles. Some Omnibuses belonging to Government were completely burnt. Two Constables received injuries in the Hospital where they had gone with the wound for medical examination. Two Post Offices were looted and burnt and a third was saved by the timely arrival of the Police. An Ahmadi was murdered and some private concerns were also looted. Police parties were fired upon at two places and brick-battled at many.

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One Police vehicle was set upon fire and the front glasses and window panes of six others were smashed. Police had to fire at several places during the day. One Military Patrol was brick-battled outside the Lohari Gate and it fired a few rounds resulting in injury to one person.

On the morning of the 5th March, H.E. the Governor held a meeting of the Cabinet which was attended by Chief Secretary, General Officer Commanding, 10th Division, and his Staff Officers, Inspector General of Police, Deputy Inspector General of Police, Lahore Range and Home Secretary, District Magistrate and Senior Superintendent of Police, Lahore were also present during a part of the discussions. The decision taken at this meeting were drawn up in the form of Minutes, a copy of which is attached (Annexure 'S/I'). H.E. the Governor was most vehement that force should be applied in strong measures as his experience in Bombay was that if during riots a large number of rioters are killed the trouble is nipped in the bud and does not spread. Strong action was taken as a result of this decision by the Police who were active throughout the morning.

In the same meeting it was decided that a

meeting of public spirited citizens representing all the political parties should be called and addressed by H.E. exhorting them to use their influence to restore sanity in the City. The Chief Secretary was asked to draw up a <sup>draft</sup> statement for issue under the signatures of these gentlemen but <sup>he</sup> as ~~was~~ summoned to the Secretariat in connection with the strike of the officials, he asked me to do so. The draft prepared by me was considered by H.E. to be too condemnatory of the "demands" to have by any chance of acceptance by the representatives of the public. Chief Secretary attempted a draft but then the idea of a draft was given up. This meeting was held in the afternoon at which the Inspector General of Police was desired by H.E. the Governor and the Chief Minister to explain the situation. Immediately after the Inspector General of Police had finished the non-official members started speaking. When two of them, namely, Mr. Ahmed Saïd Kirmani, M.L.A., and Maulana Abul Ala Maudoodi had spoken the officers present, i.e. Chief Secretary, Home Secretary and Inspector General of Police were told to leave the meeting. Maulana Abul Ala Maudoodi characterized the situation as a war between the public and the Government and he



stated categorically that unless the Government were prepared to consider the demands of the public and say so he would not be a party to any statement that was prepared. It was learnt later that the Maulana had stayed on longer than the others preparing a draft which was not accepted by H.E. and the Chief Minister. It was on this day or the following one that Maulana Mawhoodi's Masala-i-Qadian came out.

Earlier on the same day some members of the Bar including Mr Qidwai had also been summoned, probably at their own request to the Governor's House where they saw H.E. the Governor and the Chief Minister. They were asked to go to the mosque, particularly the Wazir Khan Mosque and use their good offices with the masses to refrain from lawlessness. I learnt later that one of them, namely Mr. Qidwai did go to the Wazir Khan Mosque where he was arrested by the Martial Law Authorities two days later. He was eventually let off for some reason or the other.

In the evening H.E. the Governor again held a meeting which was attended by the Chief Minister and his Cabinet, the General Officer Commanding, 10th Division, and his Officers:

Brigadiere Haq Nawaz<sup>and</sup> F.R.Kallu, Chief Secretary,

Inspector General of Police, Deputy Inspector

General of Police, Lahore Range, Home Secretary,

and Superintendent of Police, Criminal Investigation

Department (Malik Habibullah). At this meeting H.E.

desired that there should be a lot up in firing and

that in case of ordinary, technical violations of the

Curfew Order no action should be taken. A suggestion

was made at this meeting by Brigadier Haq Nawaz that

Army Units should be stationed at all Police Stations

situated in the more troubled areas but this sugges-

tion was later not approved by the General Officer

Commanding. The General Officer Commanding, 10th

Division, suggested at the meeting that a statement

should be issued by Government exhorting the public

to maintain law and order and not to listen to

rumours and that posters containing this statement

should be thrown<sup>from</sup> the air.

Earlier on this day at about 11 a.m. news

had been received in the Governor's House that there

was a strike in the Civil Secretariat and that some

of the Clerks had come out of their offices and were

shouting slogans in the Secretariat compound. The

Chief Secretary and the Inspector General of Police

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at this point to the Secretariat where the Inspector General of Police tried to address them with little effect. As Curfew had been imposed on the City from 3 p.m. that day the Secretariat was closed at 2 p.m. and all the officials including those who had struck work left the office.

On the following day, i.e. 6th March, I picked up Chief Secretary from his residence and we went together to the Secretariat. On reaching there we found that various groups of officials were standing about in the compound. C.S. went to his office and tried to talk to one of the groups at which all the groups gathered around me and started shouting slogans. They were demanding that firing should cease. There were also some shouts regarding the acceptance of the demands. I told them that if they had anything to bring to the notice of Government or if they had any representation to make they should do so in the recognized manner, i.e. by writing in a deputation on their officers. They did not seem to like this idea probably because they felt that the members of the deputation would be victimized later. So I told them that if they did not want to wait on their officers in a deputation they should



make a written representation and resume work. After this I joined the Chief Secretary in his office. A little later Assistant Secretary (General) brought the written demands of officials who were making these demonstrations and handed them to the Chief Secretary. When the Chief Secretary and I left in my car for the Governor's House we found that the main gate had been shut and a sizeable crowd was barring over way. I tried to address the crowd again but quite in vain. A little later the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Lahore Range, also came in and he also made a futile attempt to talk to these people. They tried to push back our car and suggested that we should convey their demands to the Chief Minister and the Governor on the telephone. At this I got down from the car and told these people that if they stopped us like that the rumour would get afloat that we have been detained forcibly and that the results of such a rumour would be disastrous for them because the Army and the Police <sup>would</sup> come and take action in which case they would themselves be responsible for the consequences. This produced the desired effect and we were allowed to go. When Chief Secretary and I reached the Government House after dropping Deputy

Inspector General of Police, Lahore Range, at the Civil Defence Office, it was in a state of turmoil. A large number of people including the Councillors of Lahore were present there and the usual decorum that prevails in the Governor's House was lacking. H.E. the Governor, the Chief Minister and the Cabinet were assembled in H.E.'s office. I went in and briefly told them what had happened in the Secretariat. Then information started coming in regarding the various incidents that were taking place in the City. The electric current of the Governor's House was cut off and information was received by someone on the telephone from Mr. S.S. Jafri, C.S.P., that some shops in Anarkali were ablaze. The Telegraph Office and the Telephone Exchange were reported to have struck. The Inspector General of Police and the Senior Superintendent of Police who had come from the Kotwali said that the Kotwali was more or less besieged and that the situation was alarming. The Inspector General of Police told that the Senior Superintendent of Police was of the opinion that the City could not be held with the mere use of force and that there should be some public appeasement also and the Government should issue a state-

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ment. The Inspector General of Police added that he had brought this to the notice of H.E./Chief Minister. The Deputy Inspector General of Police, Lahore Range also reached the Governor's House a little later.

On the previous night I had given the whole situation very deep thought. The situation was highly dangerous. Subversive elements were obviously exploiting the religious sentiments of the people to disrupt the Government. In my opinion the situation could be brought under control by taking the following action:-

(1) Majlis-i-Ahrar-i-Pakistan and Jamiat-i-Islami should be declared unlawful;

(2) The Ulama and the Maulvis who were prepared to see reason and support Government in the restoration of law and order should be induced by all possible means to come out into the open and even released if they were <sup>under</sup> arrest to condemn the lawlessness that had been spread under the cloak of Khatir-e-Nabbuwar;

(3) That a member of the Central Cabinet should immediately come to Lahore; and

(4) That as decided in the meeting held on the morning of the 5th, the control of the City



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should be entrusted wholly to the Army.

I mentioned about my possible to the Chief Secretary when we were going to the Secretariat from his house. He did not make any comments. I mentioned them to the Inspector General of Police also later at the Governor's House. He considered that the situation was too acute and time too short to allow of their implementation.

While this confusion and panic was prevalent in the Governor's House on the morning of the 6th as stated above and the intelligence regarding various incidents that were taking place in the City was coming in I walked into the Governor's Secretary's room and found that H.E. the Governor, the Chief Minister and probably one other Minister were present there probably wanting to talk to Karachi. I told them about my plan and suggested to them that they should get into touch with the Centre immediately as the telephone might go out of action at any time. I did put them through to Karachi on the Military Trunk Line. By then the Inspector General of Police had also come into the room and when the telephone call was through he and I left the room. After some time we learnt that the call<sup>had ended</sup> /.

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abruptly. We did not know what had been said on the telephone. I was then called by the Chief Minister who asked me to prepare a statement immediately. I told him that I was not a very good Urdu draftsman and that I would get hold of Khan Zulqarnain Khan, Superintendent of Police (A), Criminal Investigation Department, who is a good writer of Urdu. The Chief Minister gave me points in English for the preparation of this statement. I brought in Khan Zulqarnain Khan and communicated these points to him in the presence of H.E. and the Chief Minister. He moved into the office of the Confidential Assistant to the Governor's Secretary and started preparing a draft. The Chief Minister after some time required the draft to be put up to him immediately

When the Chief Minister saw this statement he considered that it would prove completely ineffective and ordered the following words to be added to it:-

The words "ابن تاشک کے ساتھ" after the words "پنجاب کے لوگوں کی طرف سے" and the words "at the end." This statement was eventually being cyclostyled,

when the Chief Minister again desired that the following should also be further added to it:-

"صوبائی حکومت کا ایک وزیر طباطبائی کے ذریعے ان مطالبات اور ہماری تائید کے ساتھ آج ہمارے جی پی جی جاتا ہے اور ہماری ہر ذمہ داری سفا رہی ہے کہ جو یہی الفاظ کو وزارت سے مستغنی ہونے پر فوراً اجبور کیا"

This was cyclostyled on a separate piece of

paper and pinned on to the statement previously

cyclostyled. H.E. and the Chief Minister were

very keen that the statement should reach the

mosques well before the Juma Prayers and desired

it to be thrown from the air into the mosques.

H.E. the Governor made me read out this statement

on the telephone, from his office where the Chief

Minister and the Cabinet were present, to Kahaleefa

Shuja Uddin who had been named as the 4th



Dictator of the Majlis-e-Amal in a leaflet issued either that very day or a day previously. After that had been done he desired that copies of the statement should be sent to the Khaleefa Sahib at his house immediately. H.E. made repeated enquiries whether his orders had been complied with or not. Malik Habibullah, Superintendent of Police, Criminal Investigation Department, was deputed by me to send the statement to the House of the Khaleefa Sahib. H.E. the Governor also asked the Inspector General of Police to get the statement broadcast from loudspeakers vans in the City. The Inspector General of Police arranged this through the Senior Superintendent of Police, Lahore. H.E. and the Chief Minister also desired that the statement should be flashed to the Districts. I translated the statement standing in the verandah in front of the office of the Secretary to the Governor. When I was dictating the translation the Chief Secretary wanted to know why the statement was being translated at which I informed him that I had been ordered to signal the statement to the Districts. As I could not send the statement to the Criminal Investigation Department wireless

station by any other means I eventually asked Khan Zulqarnain Khan to communicate it to the station on the telephone for being signalled. (Copies of the translation of the statement, my endorsement thereon containing H.E./Chief Minister's orders and Khan Zulqarnain Khan's compliance reports will be found at annexure 'T').

Martial Law was declared by the Central Officer Commanding shortly afterwards. An alert was sent to all the District Magistrates vide copy attached (Annexure 'U') that Martial Law had been proclaimed in the entire area of the Corporation of the City of Lahore and that they should remain vigilant. The District Magistrates were also asked to wire public reactions to the appeal of the Punjab Ministry signalled to them earlier.

On the following day the District Magistrates were again asked to keep Government in touch with the latest developments in their Districts on the telephone, telegraph, Police or Military wireless whichever means were available, particularly if they required additional force. They were also asked to

intimate the trends of the agitation, whether it was slackening or intensifying (a copy of the signal is placed below - Annexure 'V').

A press communique on the situation was issued by the Pakistan Government on the 6th March, 1953, copy attached (Annexure 'W').

After the Secretary, Ministry of Defence and the Cabinet Secretary, Pakistan, had visited Lahore, the Chief Minister issued a statement saying that his statement of the 6th March had been issued as an appeal on behalf of his Ministry and himself to the people of the province to help in the maintenance of law and order and that his appeal had proved futile.

It was said in this statement that both the Central and the Provincial Governments were resolved to suppress lawlessness by every means at their disposal. A copy of this statement is enclosed (Annexure 'X'). It was signalled to all the District Magistrates on 10th March, 1953, for being given wide publicity. The District Magistrates had been asked earlier (on 9th March, 1953) to stop giving publicity to the Chief Minister's statement of the 6th March as the statement had been made on the



understanding that it would lead to a cessation of lawlessness whereas in fact lawlessness had continued to such an extent that Martial Law had to be introduced in Lahore.

The situation reports sent to the Central Government regarding the events up to the imposition of the Martial Law are attached as annexures 'Y/I', 'Y/2' and 'Y/3'.

A copy of a code telegram received from the Central Government in the Ministry of the Interior on the morning of 6th March, 1953, is also attached (annexure 'Z') as it is relevant to the issues involved. It said that ill-advised or hasty requests by local authorities for declaration of Martial Law should be resisted and that Military should be used in aid of Police. This telegram was seen by H.E. and the Chief Minister.

3d/- S. Ghia Uddin Ahmad  
Home Secretary to Government, Punjab

Dated, Lahore,  
the 23rd  
July, 1953.

CONFIDENTIAL ANNEXURE 'A'

D.O.No.10027-51/463-HG.

PUNJAB CIVIL SECRETARIAT.

Dated Lahore, the 24th December, 1951.

Subject:- Ahrar-Ahmadiya Controversy.

Dear Sir,

As you are aware, the Ahrar-Ahmadiya controversy has been brewing for sometime past in the province and certain incidents of personal violence which occurred recently have caused grave concern to the administration. It has been Government's firm policy that the legitimate rights of any community or sect to practise its religious beliefs should not be unduly restricted and that no discrimination in this respect should be made between different parties. It is, nevertheless, important that religious controversies should be discouraged or at any rate they should not be allowed to the extent of endangering the public peace and tranquility. This letter is particularly desired to invite the attention of district officers to meetings held by the Ahrars on by the Ahmadis.

2. Government feel that wherever the District authorities are vigilant and are able to enforce timely preventive measures, there is little or no likelihood of the Ahrars or of the Ahmadis disturbing each others meeting. Clashes have occurred only where the local authorities have failed to adopt a firm attitude or have otherwise failed to assess dispassionately the rights or wrongs of the parties concerned. If both parties are dealt with firmly and justly without any discrimination whatever, there is no reason why this increasing menace of vilification by one Muslim sect of another should not be brought under proper control.

Yours sincerely,  
S.Ghias Uddin Ahmad.  
Home Secretary to Government, Punjab.

To

All Deputy Commissioners in the Punjab (By name).

P.T.O.

No. 10027-51/464-HG., dated Lahore, the 24th December, 1951.

Copies are forwarded demi-officially to all Commissioners of Divisions in the Punjab, for information.

S. Ghias Uddin Ahmad,  
Home Secretary to Government, Punjab.

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No. 10027-51/465-HG., dated Lahore, the 24th December, 1951.

Copies are forwarded demi-officially to:-

(1) Khan Qurban Ali Khan, P.S.P., Inspector General of Police, Punjab, with the request that similar instructions may be issued to all Superintendents of Police in Punjab: and

(2) M. Anwar Ali, Esquire, P.S.P., Deputy Inspector General of Police, Punjab, Criminal Investigation Department, for information.

S. Ghias Uddin Ahmad,  
Home Secretary to Government, Punjab.



CONFIDENTIAL.

D.O.No.6469-84-EDSB.

Punjab Civil Secretariat.

Dated Lahore, the 5th June, 1952.

Subject:-Ahrar-Ahmadiya controversy.  
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Dear Sir,

I am directed to address you in continuation of the Home Secretary's demi-official letter No.10027-51/463-HG., Dated December 24, 1951, addressed to all the Deputy Commissioners on the subject cited above.

2. Government have noticed with concern that the Ahrar-Ahmadiya controversy instead of abating has now increased to an extent which if not checked immediately and firmly will continue a real threat to the public peace. The trend of speeches delivered at the Ahrar Conferences is generally marked by a deplorable lack of self restraint and healthy tone. The speeches made recently by some of their leaders were particularly inflammatory. On the other hand the Ahmadiya community, in spite of the undisguised hostility of a section of the public or probably because of it, insist on holding their tableeghi conferences frequently and in public. This attitude only succeeds in provoking fresh outbursts against themselves. After careful consideration, Government have decided that in the general interest of the public peace and tranquillity, neither the Ahrar nor the Ahmadias should be permitted to hold public meetings under any name or garb. You should, therefore, take preventive action under Section 144 Cr.P.C., whenever either party intends to hold a public meeting. This directive supersedes the one referred to above which left the discretion for taking preventive action with the Deputy Commissioners. Now preventive action will be taken regarding Ahrar/Ahmadi meetings invariably and without any exception until these orders are modified or withdrawn. The action taken by you and the reactions thereto should in all cases be reported to Government, as early as

possible for their information.

Yours sincerely,

H.A. Majid,

Chief Secretary To Government,  
Punjab.

To

All Deputy Commissioners in the Punjab (by name).

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No. 6486-87-BDSB., dated Lahore, the 5th June, 1952.

Copies are forwarded demi-officially to all Commissioners in the Punjab, for information.

H.A. Majid,

Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab.

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No. 6483-89-BDSB., dated Lahore, the 5th June, 1952.

Copies are forwarded demi-officially to -

(1) Khan Qurban Ali Khan, P.S.P., Inspector General of Police, Punjab, with the request that similar instructions may be issued to all Superintendents of Police in the Punjab; and

(2) M. Anwar Ali, Esquire, P.S.P., Deputy Inspector General of Police, Criminal Investigation Department, Punjab, for information.

H.A. Majid,

Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab.

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Enforcement by the Inspector General of Police, Punjab.

No. 6490-6509-BDSB., dated Lahore, the 5th June, 1952.

Copies are forwarded demi-officially to all Superintendents of Police in the Punjab, including the Additional Superintendents of Police, Sdru, and all Range Deputy Inspector General of Police in the Punjab, for information.

Muhammad Khuda Bakhsh,  
for Inspector General of Police, Punjab.



ANNEXURE 'C'

Wireless message addressed to all District Magistrates and Commissioners of Divisions (except the District Magistrate, Lahore and the Commissioner, Lahore Division. Their copies are being sent to them by special messengers vide No.169-St(HS)52, dated 19-6-52.)

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No.168-St(HS)52, dated the 19th June, 1952.

\*\*\*\*\*

It has been reported to Government that Ahrars want to hold anti-Ahmadi meetings in mosques immediately preceding or after the Jumatul Widaa prayers, because they think that such meetings are not liable to be banned by District Magistrates. If the Ahrar contemplate doing so within your district, you should immediately pass an appropriate order under section 144 Cr.P.C. banning public meetings on the day without making any mention of the venue of the meeting. You should then send for the Imam and the persons connected with the management of the mosque and impress upon them that they should not become a party to this violation of your order and the desecration of a place of worship in the furtherance of the activities of a political party. It should be made clear to them that in the event of an infringement of your order you will not hesitate from prosecuting the persons connected with the management of the mosque for their abetment of the offence as well as the actual sponsors and other moving spirits of the meeting including the speakers. Government are aware that a public meeting may be dovetailed into a prayer congregation or that the complexion of an assemblage gathered for prayers may change into that of a public meeting by the tone and trend of speeches just before or after the prayers or the Khutba. But Government are advised that such facts will not afford any legal protection to those responsible for the meetings from the consequences of a violation of your order. A gazette extraordinary is under issue today notifying the violation of orders under Sec. 144 Cr.P.C. banning public meetings as non-bailable and cognizable offences. You will receive copies thereof in due course; meanwhile you should proceed



on this basis. Government will also send you shortly a model order under Sec. 144 Cr.P.C. for issue by you on such occasions. Lastly it should be noted carefully that Government do not desire any public meetings which are being held in mosques or other places of sanctity or worship to be dispersed by force or to be interfered with in any way while they are in progress. Nor do they desire that any arrests should be made while people are collecting for or dispersing from such meetings. The proper course to follow would be that a case should be registered and the culprit should be arrested after the excitement of the meeting is over at an appropriate time and place. The cases registered should be prosecuted vigorously. You and your Superintendent of Police should remain present at headquarters on Friday and also at the time selected for effecting arrests, if any.....CHIEF SECRETARY.

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ANNEXURE 'D'.

EXTRAORDINARY ISSUE.

THE PUNJAB GAZETTE

LAHORE, THURSDAY, JUNE 19, 1952.

-----  
HOME DEPARTMENT

GENERAL

NOTIFICATION

The 19th June, 1952.

No. 5563-52/5271-HG.- In exercise of the powers conferred by section 10 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1932, the Governor of the Punjab is pleased to declare that any offence punishable under section 188 of the Pakistan Penal Code by reason of disobedience of an Order issued under section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, banning the holding of public meetings when committed at any place within the Punjab, shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, be cognizable and non-bailable.

S. Ghias Uddin Ahmed,

Home Secretary to Government, Punjab.

CONFIDENTIAL

D.O.No.183-St(HS)/52.

Punjab Civil Secretariat,  
Home Department,  
Lahore.

8th July, 1952.

Dear Sir,

Please refer to my endorsement No.181-St(HS)/52, dated July 5, 1952, with which the decisions taken at a conference of Officers held in Lahore on July 5, 1952. were forwarded to you.

2. A copy of the model order mentioned in decision No.1 and promised in the Chief Secretary's wireless signal No.168-St(HS)/52, dated June 19, 1952, is sent herewith for your guidance.

Yours sincerely,

S.Ghias Uddin Ahmad.

To

All District Magistrates in the Punjab (by name).

\*\*\*\*\*

No.184-St(HS)/52, dated Lahore, the 8th July, 1952.

Copies are forwarded alongwith the enclosure to all Commissioners of Divisions (by name) in the Punjab, for their information.

S.Ghias Uddin Ahmad,

Home Secretary to Government, Punjab.

\*\*\*\*\*



WHEREAS, reliable information has been received that, in connection with the sectarian feelings existing between Majlis-e-Ahrar-e-Islam of Pakistan and the Ahmediya community, preparations are being made to hold public meetings to agitate the said feelings;

AND, WHEREAS, there are sufficient grounds to believe that such public meetings are likely to cause disturbance of the public tranquillity and danger to human life unless prevented immediately;

NOW, therefore, I \_\_\_\_\_ District Magistrate \_\_\_\_\_ hereby direct under section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, that no person shall organise or participate in any meeting of the nature mentioned above within the limits of the \_\_\_\_\_ district.

This order shall have effect forthwith and shall remain in force <sup>for a</sup> period of two months.

Dated \_\_\_\_\_ District Magistrate.....

CONFIDENTIAL.

D.O.No.176-St(HS)/52,  
Punjab Civil Secretariat,  
Home Department,  
Lahore.

28th June, 1952.

Dear Sir,

I am desired to address you in continuation of the Chief Secretary's Wireless message No.168-St(HS)/52, dated June 19, 1952, on the subject of the Ahrar-Ahmadiya controversy and to say that Government desire that if your order under Section 144 Cr.P.C. has been violated by the Ahrar you should proceed only against the prominent members of the Ahrar leadership who may be among the offenders and ignore others of lesser importance or those who do not belong to the Ahrar party. Local persons should be particularly left out unless they belong to the hierarchy of the Ahrar organization. The intention is that we should isolate the Ahrar leaders from the rest of the public. If we throw our net wider and draw in people of other denominations also simply because they were somehow or the other prevailed upon or inveigled into participation in their meetings by the Ahrar we shall only succeed in arraying a vast section of the public against the administration. By taking action against <sup>who</sup> people/in the excitement of the moment allowed themselves to be made use of by the Ahrar leaders, in some cases quite unwittingly and inadvertently, we shall force them to joining hands with the Ahrar. If any of these people feel repentant and offer apologies you should accept them readily. In the case of such people even if they do not apologize cases should not be instituted against them or if they have already been instituted they should be withdrawn forthwith. When the public see that only the more important and prominent Ahrar leaders are being proceeded against their opinion will immediately veer round to the side of Government and the action

taken by the functionaries will meet with general approbation.

2. The cases that you may institute against the Ahrar for the violation of your orders will be very hotly contested and pursued with keen interest in press and public. The object desired by Government as well as the and the correctness justification of your action will depend on their success. You should, therefore, get them thoroughly examined by your law officers from the point of law as well as fact before instituting them in Courts.

I am,

Yours sincerely,

S.Ghias Uddin Ahmad.

To

All District Magistrates in the Punjab (by name).

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No.177-St(HS)/52, dated Lahore, the 28th June, 1952.

Copies are forwarded for information to all Commissioners of Divisions in the Punjab (by name).

S.Ghias Uddin Ahmad,

Home Secretary to Government, Punjab.



CONFIDENTIAL.

Decisions taken at a Conference of Officers held under the Chairmanship of the Chief Secretary in his Office on Saturday, July 5, 1952.

PRESENT.

- (1) Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab (in the Chair).
- (2) Inspector General of Police, Punjab.
- (3) Deputy Inspector General of Police, Criminal Investigation Department.
- (4) Home Secretary to Government, Punjab.
- (5) Additional Deputy Commissioner, Punjab.
- (6) District Magistrate, Gujrat.
- (7) do. Lahore.
- (8) do. Rawalpindi.
- (9) do. Shahpur at Sargodha.
- (10) do. Gujranwala.
- (11) do. Lyallpur.
- (12) do. Montgomery.
- (13) Additional District Magistrate, Sialkot.
- (14) Director, Public Relations, Punjab.

DECISIONS.

(1) The orders under Section 144 Cr.P.C. should be amended wherever necessary so as to make them applicable specifically to the public meetings organized by the Ahrar or the Ahmadis only without making any mention of the venue of the meeting. The model order promised by Government would be sent to the District Magistrates as early as possible but District Magistrates concerned need not defer the issue of revised orders to await the receipt of the Government draft.

(2) If any members of the Ahrar party or the Ahmadiya community deliver violent or inflammatory speeches at any public meeting not organized by their respective organization a reference should be made to Government for action under Section 153 P.P.C. or the Public Safety Act. Pending the receipt of Government orders the culprits should <sup>not</sup> be arrested unless it is considered to be absolutely necessary.

(3) No action should be taken to disperse meetings organized by the Ahrar or the Ahmadis even outside mosques unless it becomes an imperative necessity to do so for the maintenance of law and order. Meetings being held in mosques are in no case to be interfered with in any way and action should be taken regarding all meetings whether held

inside a place of worship or in other public places by the registration of regular cases against the prominent leaders of the two groups only.

(4) The Government propaganda machinery should be accelerated so that the interested parties cannot dupe the public and the true significance and nature of the action taken by Government is explained to the common man. Pamphlets, leaflets and posters should be prepared and distributed to the District Magistrates for dissemination throughout their districts. Propaganda through newspapers should also be intensified and the papers which are generally pro-Government should be asked to cooperate in this matter also because their attitude is anything but favourable towards Government in this matter.

(5) Maulvis and Khatibs of the various mosques should be connected by the District Magistrates and the true picture of the whole situation should be laid before them so that the interested parties cannot play upon their religious sentiments and mislead them into inveighing against Government.

(6) The Convention called for 13th July, 1952, in Lahore should not be interfered with in any way. The speeches delivered and the decisions taken there should be examined later to see what action, if any, is called for. This Convention may actually prove to be useful from the point of view of Government if the intending participants are contacted by the District Magistrates or the Director, Public Relations and prevailed upon to denounce preaching of violence and defiance of law. The Deputy Inspector General of Police, Criminal Investigation Department, will make an effort to intimate the names of the intending participants to the District Magistrates concerned.

(7) In all action taken in this connection by officers on their own initiative or in accordance with the Government instructions issued from time to time it should be borne in mind that the ultimate object is to



kill the threat to law and order created by the Ahrar-Ahmadi controversy by isolating these two organizations from the rest of the public. This will destroy the unfounded bogey of interference with the religious and political rights of the public by Government which the Ahrar have created in their desperate effort to regain their lost power.

\*\*\*\*\*

No.181-St(HS)/52, dated Lahore, the 5th July, 1952.

Copies are forwarded for information,  
guidance and necessary action to:-

- (1) all the above mentioned officers who attended the conference;
- (2) all the remaining District Magistrates in the Punjab; and
- (3) all the Commissioners of Divisions in the Punjab.

S.Ghias Uddin Ahmad,  
Home Secretary to Government,  
Punjab.



SECRET.

I am submitting the main policy file regarding the Ahrar-Ahmadi controversy to HCM as I feel that the time has come when Central Government should be addressed at the highest level to formulate their policy regarding this question, unless that has already been done, and to make it known to us the people of the country by deed and directive.

2. This province is no doubt the stronghold of the Ahrar and contains the largest number of Ahmadis in any one Province of Pakistan but the fanaticism and the philosophy of hatred which the Ahrar are preaching under the cloak of religion for their own political reascitation, if not curbed and killed now will not remain confined to this province or to the Ahrar and Ahmadis. This Government have taken certain steps to ensure that the conditions will not be created either by the Ahrar or the Ahmadis which will imperil the public peace and order. These steps have been taken after due deliberation and after all other methods had been tried to ensure that the Ahrar will desist from their evil course. There is no doubt that the Ahrar are the aggressors in this matter and are the originators and authors of the whole dispute. They are now feeling frustrated and seeing their political doom they are making desperate effort to exploit the sentiments of the Muslims by distortion of facts and misrepresentation of Government's intentions and actions. It will become evident to every one before long that Government only wanted to ~~snuff~~ snuff the Ahrar for curbing the agitation sponsored by them and that there is no question whatever of Government interfering with the legitimate religious or political activities of any party or group of people. The honesty and the bona fides of this Government do not require any vindication but I feel that we have a right to ask for the co-operation of the Central Government to facilitate us in the discharge of the administration of this province, particularly in matters which properly speaking are within their scope and sphere.

3. The Ahrar are using three slogans now to enlist



popular feeling in their support:-

- (1) Propagation of the Musala-e-Khatm-e-Nabuwat;
- (2) The declaration of the Ahmadis as a minority; and
- (3) The removal of Ch. Zafarullah Khan.

4. As for as (1) is concerned, the Central Government should tell us unequivocally what line to pursue. This demand means nothing else but what the Ahrar and many other Muslims call "Radd-e-Mirza'iyyat" - repudiation of Mirza'iyyat. Should we allow, encourage or connive at activities which aim at physical or religious annihilation of a minor section of our people? The orthodoxy of the Ahmadis is heterodoxy of the non-Ahmadis and if the latter class are allowed to inveigh against the Ahmadis will they also be given the right to declaim from pulpit and platform that what they believe is the truth and the rest all blasphemy. If we concede this right to one section of the public are we prepared to allow the Christians to preach what they piously believe regarding our Prophet (Peace be on him) and shall we be prepared to risk public demonstrations by the Shias of their sentiments towards some of the most illustrious of the Sahaba. Is it the intention to make this country a battlefield for warring groups and religions with the ultimate object that the vanquished will either perish or will be converted. The hydra which the Ahrar are trying to raise should be killed before it is hatched otherwise it will devour our freedom and all else that we cherish. This is a matter on which the Centre should give us a lead. This religious belief cannot be enforced by the Ahrar and other non-Ahmadis on the Ahmadis without creating problems of law and order. We should, therefore, whether considerations of law and order should be given paramount importance or whether we should give priority and precedence to the religious beliefs and the susceptibilities of the majority of our people. All the above points can be settled and the questions answered competently by those who are framing our Constitution and whose scope is not limited like that of the Provincial Government.

5. The second plant of the Ahrar is that the Ahmadis



should be declared a minority. This is a matter entirely for the Central Government to decide and they should not leave it undecided any longer. If they feel that the demand is just and in accordance with what they have in mind regarding the future destiny of this country they should concede the demand forthwith. If on the other hand they consider the demand to be preposterous they should issue an authoritative statement in unambiguous terms. It is for the Centre to decide whether they should give in to this pressure created by the Ahrar to undo Pakistan against the creation of which they had done their utmost until the proverbial last minute. Whatever the decision of the Centre, it should be made known to every one as early as possible. ✓

6. The third demand of the Ahrar is again a matter regarding which the Centre should tell the public what their view is. If they still repose confidence in the Hon'ble the Foreign Minister which I am sure they do, what is preventing them from saying so openly to quell the campaign of vilification being carried on against him. The man in the street is now feeling, though quite unjustifiably, that some of the Hon'able the Foreign Minister's own colleagues are behind this agitation otherwise the complacency with which they are ignoring the insults heaped on him cannot be accounted for. ✓

7. If HCM approves of my suggestion for addressing the Central Government he may kindly send an appropriately worded letter to HFM. HCM may also like to discuss the entire situation with H3 the Governor.

8. I am not burdening this note with the action that is being taken to give a fillip to our propaganda so that we shall not lose our case by default and the public will know the real and true facts and the steps that are being taken to implement the policy of this Government to finish the Ahrar-Ahmadi controversy as a source of danger to the law and order of the province. HCM is being informed of the up to date position verbally and otherwise but I am mention here that the Ahrar, as a clever move, have convened a convention of the various



religious organisations in the 13th of this month to consider the question of "Khatm-e-Nabuwwat". I have also called a conference of the DMS who are mainly concerned with this matter for tomorrow. The recommendations formulated at our conference will be submitted to HCM immediately. In view of the Convention called for the 13th, I would request HCM to consider the desirability of prevailing upon CS and IGP to postpone their leave for the present. They may proceed on leave when this agitation has blown over.

9. CS may please see before the file goes by special CID messenger to HCM at Nathia Gali.

Sd/- S.Ghias Uddin Ahmad.

4-7-1952.

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HCM may kindly see from overleaf.

I think it has become imperative now that we should intensify our propaganda because otherwise we shall lose our edge by default. It has become very necessary that the man in the street should be told again and again <sup>what</sup> we have really done and the reasons for our various actions.

I sent for the DPR this morning and told him to accelerate his machinery and flood the province with propaganda material. I impressed upon him that one or two press notes will not meet the situation because the Ahrar have manoeuvred to confuse the issue in order to enlist popular support.

As desired by HCM, I spoke to Maulana Akhtar Ali Khan and the Editors of his group on July 1st and explained the whole situation to them and answered all the questions which they could think of for dispelling their apprehensions and misgivings. They went back completely satisfied but I am sorry to say that with the exception of one paper they did not express approbation of Government's action even in a mild form. I again spoke to Maulana Akhtar Ali Khan yesterday as desired by HCM on the telephone and after having been ~~convinced~~ <sup>convinced</sup> once again about the bona fides of whatever we have done he has virtually upheld in today's paper all that the Ahrar have been saying. The other paper of his group have ~~done~~ likewise. (Relevant cuttings from these papers are placed below). Messrs: Hamid Nizami and Mazhar Ali Khan were also called by me yesterday. I made it clear to them from the very outset that my intention in calling them was only to explain the whole position to them and nothing else and that they were quite free to put their own interpretation on what I told them. They both considered that whatever this Government had done was worthy of popular support and calculated to strengthen the integrity of the country. Mr. Hamid Nizami, however, said that he feared if he were to say so in his organ, the newspapers favoured by the Government as well as the Muslim League would be the first to denounce him as an Ahmedi for increasing their own circulation.

He also said that the very purpose for which curbing action was being taken against the Ahrar would be defeated unless the newspapers also co-operated with Government and did not help in the spread of the virus through their columns. Mr.

Mazhar Ali Khan said that the root cause of this trouble was that Government had themselves made religion their source of slogans and strength. He added that if one group could exploit religion how could the others be denied its use for furthering their own ends.

5. A conference of DMs who are mainly concerned in this matter has been called for tomorrow after which a directive will be issued to all the DMs for organising field publicity in their districts for which the DPR will give them the necessary help and guidance. Other recommendations formulated at this conference will be submitted to HCM immediately for his orders.

Sd/- S. Ghias Uddin Ahmad,

4-7-1952



Communique issued by the Pakistan Government on Tuesday the 14th of August, 1952.

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"The Government of Pakistan have decided that no member of any provincial or Federal Council of Ministers should use his official position in propagation any sectarian creed among those persons who come in contact with him. Every Governor is being asked to communicate this decision to all the Ministers concerned, and it is hoped that no Minister will in future depart from his rule.

"The Government of Pakistan have received frequent complaints that certain officials of the Central and Provincial Governments belonging to a particular sect abuse their official position in propagating their sectarian creed among their subordinates and other persons who come in contact with them in their official capacity. The Government take a serious view of this matter and have accordingly decided to stop this undesirable activity at once and to prohibit in future the propagation of any sectarian creed in this objectionable manner.

"The Government Service Conduct Rules are being amended in this behalf.

"The Government wish to make it known that drastic action will be taken against any person who offends against this rule, irrespective of the sect to which he may belong. The provincial and State Governments in Pakistan have also been asked to take similar action".

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'DAWE'  
August 17, 1952

SECTERIANISMZafrullah welcomes Government order.

The Foreign Minister, Chaudhri Muhammad Zafrullah Khan, has issued the following statement:-

"I, as a Muslim, am a passionate believer - in accordance with the teaching of Islam as set out in the Holy Quran and illustrated in the life of the Holy Prophet - in the freedom of conscience. In my view the exercise of official pressure or influence is just, as much interference with freedom of conscience as direct persecution or coercion. On the other hand it is a duty inculcated by Islam upon every Muslim that he should, both by example and precept, illustrate the teaching of Islam in his life. It is a duty which the Muslims during their period of decline have sadly neglected with consequences affecting their individual and national lives which are only too glaring.

"My own beliefs have never been a matter of secrecy for those who have known me, whether personally or by repute, though recently persistent attempts have been made in certain quarters to distort them and to misrepresent them gross fashion. As I have said above I consider it dishonest and wholly opposed to the teachings of Islam that a person should use his official position or authority, whether directly or indirectly, to impose his own religious views upon others or to force or persuade any person by use of such influence or authority to abjure what he believes in. This is widely taught and accepted in the community to which I have the honour to belong and I would be most surprised and deeply pained if I found that any person belonging to that community acted in contravention of this wholesome principle.

"It is true that our views and doctrines are propagated as widely as our very limited resources permit. This is done in discharge of the obligation resting upon all right-



thinking people to endeavour earnestly and continuously to propagate by word and conduct what they sincerely believe to be the truth so that righteousness and beneficence may be widely spread and established. To have recourse to anything which would savour of pressure or coercion or the employment of unfair means would defeat the very object itself. The person in respect of whom any such method is employed is bound to react adversely and to feel that he is not being invited freely and cheerfully to study, ponder and reflect over fundamental truth but is being sought to be dragooned into outward profession of acceptance of creed which his conscience rejects.

"There is another aspect of the matter. Members of a community which is itself the subject of misrepresentation and even persecution at the hands of a certain section of those who claim to the overwhelming majority cannot afford to have recourse to such methods. While they are denounced and held up to ridicule and hatred for what they do not profess and have not done they cannot hope to escape punishment and severe condemnation if they in their turn would begin to adapt and use methods which are contrary not only to Islam but to good sense itself and would defeat the very purpose in view.

"I welcome the announcement made on behalf of the Government which I hope will be taken to heart by all sections of the people of Pakistan and would help to restore an atmosphere of calmness, serenity, reflection and wide tolerance in all matters pertaining to faith and conscience.

"Faith and belief are the sublimest subjects with which the human mind may be concerned and which it may be swayed. In this sphere the most scrupulous caution is necessary lest in the eyes of God any of us should become guilty of seeking to make a man declare that he believes in something which his conscience does not accept or that he has ceased to believe in something which his heart and conscience are passionately devoted to. Any person who indulges in any such activity, whether he is a Minister, an official or an individual in private life, is seeking to manufacture hypocrites.\*



SECRET.

At a meeting held in the house of the Hon'able Chief Minister today, at which HMR, HS, IG of Police, ADIG CID and SP(A) CID were present, the following decisions were taken:-

(i). All active Ahrar workers and other individuals who have been responsible for espousing the "direct action" movement (vide list attached) should be arrested tonight throughout the province. ✓

ii). The arrests should be made under section 3 of the PFS initially by DMs/SFs (other than Lahore) on their own initiative. At Lahore, the orders of detention should be issued under the authority of the Punjab Government. Orders for further detention of the individuals in outlying districts will be sent in due course by Government. ✓

iii). The following newspapers should be banned:-

- (a) The "Zamindar".
- (b) The "Azad". ✓
- (c) The "Al-Fazal".

iv). Khawaja Nazir Ahmad, who controls the policy of the "C & M G" should be sent for by HS and told that he should see that the arrests are not made a matter for jubilation and that utmost restraint is exercised in the next month or two. ✓

(v). Khalifa Bashiruddin Mahmood should be warned personally by DM Jhang and told that he should advise members of his community, particularly his secretariat staff, to avoid causing provocation. ✓

vi). Information about volunteers who leave Lahore should be sent to the Sindh as well as to the Karachi Police so that arrangements for their arrest en route can be made.

vii). HS should hold a press conference on the 28th and explain the Government point of view and appeal to the newspaper to emphasise the need for patience and restraint.

viii). A circular letter should be issued to all District Magistrates and Superintendents of Police giving the background of the action taken by the Central and Provincial Governments. These officers should also be asked to enlist the help of the

sane elements in making the public appreciate the importance of maintaining law and order.

Sd/- Anwar Ali

27-2-1953

CS



WIRELESS SIGNAL.

27-2-1953

From

Home Secretary to Government, Punjab.

To

District Magistrates & Superintendents of  
Police Rawalpindi, Gujranwala, Sialkot,  
Lyallpur, Montgomery, Multan, Sargodha and  
Sheikhupura

No.S/622/53 (.) In view of the worsening of the Anti-Ahmadi agitation please arrest the following under section three Public Safety Act for a period of fourteen days (.) Orders for further detention will be issued by Government and sent in due course(.) Action should be taken on night between 27th & 28th February by either of you whoever is at headquarters and compliance report sent(.) Letter follows(.) For SPs only(.) Until further orders you should signal daily sitreps to DIG CID(.) The sitreps should be brief and shall contain all important available information and general reactions to the action taken by Government particularly if there is any active attempt to organise and sent volunteers to Lahore or Karachi or to launch civil disobedience locally or to collect funds in this connection(.)

Rawalpindi.	M.Ghulam Ullah Khan Khatib Purana Qila Mosque, Rawalpindi.
Gujranwala.	M.Muhammed Ismail of Gujranwala City.
Sialkot.	1.Qazi Manzur Ahmed of Rangpura Sialkot City. 2.Wali Muhammad Jernail, Sialkot City.
Lyallpur.	1.Ghulam Nabi Janbaz of Lyallpur. 2.Ghazi Muhammad Hussain Salar of Tardianwala. 3.Maulvi Obaidullah of Lyallpur.
Montgomery.	1.Maulvi Habibullah of Jamia Rashidia Montgomery. 2.Maulvi Lutfullah Khan of Montgomery.
Multan.	1.Muhammad Ali Jullundri of Multan. 2.Qazi Ehsan Ahmad Shujabadi district Multan. 3.Sh.Muhammed Saeed of Khanewal district Multan.
Sargodha.	Maulvi Abdullah of Sargodha.
Sheikhupura.	Qazi Muhammad Amin of Sheikhupura.

SD/- Habib Ullah Malik.

for Home Secretary to Government, P.D.



WIRELESS SIGNAL

From

Home Secretary to Government, Punjab.

To

Districts Magistrates and Superintendents of  
Police Gujrat, Jhelum, Campbellpur, Jhang,  
B.G.Khan, Mianwali and Muzaffargarh.

No.2496-509/EDSB. Government have ordered the arrests of certain members of the Ahrar organisation and also some non-Ahraris in connection with the anti-Ahmadi agitation in districts other than yours stop. Please maintain vigilance and immediately report to Government if anything of importance happens or is expected to take place stop You should remain as far as possible at the district headquarters stop

(For SP only) Until further orders you should send daily stirrup to DIG CID

Sd/- Habib Ullah Malik

for Home Secretary to Government, Punjab.

Communique issued by the Government of Pakistan on  
February 27, 1953.

"The public is aware of the main features of the growth of sectional agitation in respect of the Ahmadiyya community in certain parts of the country. Sponsors of the agitation have now thrown a challenge to the Government that unless their demands are met, they will resort to 'direct action'.

"This agitation was started by the Ahrars and, although it has subsequently received some support from certain other elements, the agitation is still being led and fostered by the Ahrars. It is matter of public knowledge that the Ahrars, before the creation of Pakistan, were the consistent and bitter opponents of the Muslim freedom movement and refused to join hands with those leaders and organisations that were striving for the attainment of Pakistan. Many of the Ahrar leaders joined and worked in close co-operation with the Congress and other bodies which were ranged against the Quaid-i-Azam in the struggle for freedom by Muslims in pre-partition days. Nor have the Ahrars abandoned their disruptionist activities after Pakistan was established. There is reliable evidence to show that the Ahrars have not reconciled themselves to the establishment of Pakistan. The Ahrar leaders, inspired and aided by the enemies of Pakistan, have taken every opportunity to create dissensions among Muslims and to undermine confidence in the stability of Pakistan. The present agitation is clearly designed to disrupt Muslim solidarity and to do the utmost damage to the vital interests of the country by fomenting internecine dissensions under the cloak of a religious movements".

"Hitherto, this agitation was mainly carried on the form of inflammatory public speeches or writings in a certain section of the press resulting in isolated instances of lawlessness and breaches of the peace. It appears that the sponsors of this agitation have now planned disturbances on a large-scale throughout the country in order to force the Government and the people to yield to their dictation. They have, therefore, decided to embark upon direct action unless their demands are immediately conceded.

"No Government worthy of its name can allow itself to be coerced by direct action on the part of any action of the community. It is, therefore, the intention of the Government to maintain law and order with all the resources at its command. The Government must warn all concerned that if in pursuance of the ultimatum issued by the sponsors of the agitation, the public peace is disturbed, the law must take its course and those responsible for breaking it must face the consequences.

"The Government, however, hope that wise counsel will prevail and the sponsors of the threat to public tranquility will abandon their project and refrain from doing anything likely to encourage the disruptive elements in the country to create disturbances or undermine the solidarity of the people at a time when the country is faced with serious internal and external problems. The Government appeal to all sections of the people not to countenance any unlawful activities and to see that nothing is done that might in any way, prejudice the safety or stability of Pakistan".



ANNEXURE 'N'.SECRET.

D.O.No.2514-29/HDSB.

PUNJAB CIVIL SECRETARIAT,  
LAHORE.

28th February, 1953.

Subject:- Ahrar Agitation against the Ahmadis.

Dear Sir,

I am directed to enclose for your information a copy of the press communique issued yesterday by the Central Government regarding the Ahrar sponsored agitation against the Ahmadis and to say that in pursuance of the policy and the decision enunciated therein which were arrived at in consultation with the Provincial Government, this Government has ordered the arrest of the ring leaders of the Ahrar party and some other persons who were playing an active role in this agitation. Similar action is under way in other provinces also. The publication of the "Azad" and the "Al-Fozal", the party organs of the Ahrar and the Ahmadiyya community respectively, has also been banned by this Government for a period of one year.

2. As you are aware the prime movers of this agitation had thrown an open challenge to the Government that if their demands were not accepted by the date appointed by them they would launch "direct action" against the Government. As no Government can countenance such a threat of open defiance to its authority, the Central Government has decided that all moves calculated to create a disruption or disturbance should be put down firmly.

3. After giving this background in brief I am to say that you should keep a vigilant eye on the situation in your district.

For the present the Provincial Government do not desire that the District Authorities should order further arrests unless local circumstances create an absolute necessity for such action and it is felt that there would be no time for prior consultation with the Provincial Government.

4. As it is feared that the agitators might start sending individual volunteers or bands of them either to Lahore or to



Karachi to offer themselves for arrest, you should take the following steps immediately:-

- (a) You should enlist the help of the saner elements in your district to influence public opinion and thought on the right lines. It should be impressed upon them that whereas the Government do not in any way want to interfere with or curb the legitimate rights - religious or secular - of the citizens, they will not give any quarter to those whose intention is to jeopardise the public peace or embarrass Government.
- (b) You should also warn the leading members of the Ahmadiyya community in your district that they should scrupulously desist from saying or writing any thing which may tend to aggravate the situation or provoke the followers of the other sects. They should particularly be asked to refrain from expressing any jubilation over the action which has been taken by Government, as it may create an erroneous impression of partisanship against the Government.
- (c) The Superintendents of Police are being asked to send daily situation reports to the Deputy Inspector General of Police, CID. In addition to these situation reports, if any thing of importance or unusual nature in this connection comes to your notice, you should immediately inform the Home Secretary either on the Police Wireless or on the telephone.
- (d) Until the situation sufficiently calms down, you should, as far as possible, remain at your headquarters.

5. Government are arranging to give wide publicity to their attitude towards this agitation and the steps which are being taken to curb it. Within your own administrative sphere, you should also try to acquaint the public with the Government's stand-point. The Central Government's communique should be adopted as the basis of local publicity.

6. The point that needs special emphasis is that this agitation has been created and fomented by the Ahrar party for their own ends and that the action taken by Government is mainly directed against that agitation.

Yours sincerely,

Sd/- H.A. Majid.

All District Magistrates,  
in the Punjab (by name)

No. 2530-36/HDSB, dated Lahore, the 28th February, 1953.

Copies are forwarded semi-officially to:-

- (1) All Commissioners of Divisions in the Punjab (by name).
- (2) Inspector General of Police, Punjab (by name).
- (3) DIG CID, Punjab (by name).

Sd/- H.A. Majid.

Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab.



ANNEXURE 'O'.

Transcription of most immediate top secret OTP cypher telegram No.1104, dated the 27th February, 1953, from FOREIGN KARACHI TO PUNJAB LAHORE.

Telegram No.1104 dated 27th February, Top Secret,  
Addressed to all Provincial Governments.

From Secretary Interhome. Anti-Ahmadi agitation.

2. The following is the attitude of the Central Government towards demands that Ahmadi should be declared a non-Muslim minority community and should be removed from all key posts in Government :-

(1). The Ahmadis or indeed any section of people cannot be declared a minority community against their wishes. It is not part of functions of Government to coerce any group into becoming a minority community.

(2). Ahmadis cannot be removed from key posts under Government only on the ground that they are Ahmadis. Nor can demand for the removal of Honourable Minister for Foreign Affairs be entertained on the ground that he is an Ahmadi. There is a constitutional machinery provided for the removal of any Minister for office. So long he continues to enjoy confidence of his colleagues and elected representative of people in the Central Legislature he cannot be removed from office. No Minister can be removed from office merely because a section of people demands under threat of direct action that this be done. No Government servant whether Muslim or non-Ahmadi can be removed from any post under Government because of religion he professes.

(3). The demand for the removal of Ahmadis from key positions in the Government arises apparently from an apprehension that they might misuse their positions to propagate their particular religion creed. To remove this apprehension, Government have already issued strict instructions prohibiting the propagation of any sectarian creed by any Minister or any officer of Government. All Government officers have been warned that drastic action will be taken against any person who offends against this rule irrespective of sect to which he may belong.

Government have also recently authorised an amendment of Government Servant's Conduct Rules to the effect that any officer who misuses his official position in any way to influence the religious beliefs of the associates or subordinates will be liable to dismissal. Government intend to enforce this rule strictly and urge all Provincial Governments to do likewise.

3. Central Government do not repeat propose to make an official declaration on the lines of paragraph 2 above unless the situation demands that such a declaration should be made. ✓  
But Provincial Governments are requested to organise intensive publicity on these lines immediately and to give proper guidance to the press.

4. A press communique is being issued today following the arrest of prominent leaders of agitation in Karachi. Copy of the communique is being telegraphed en clair separately. It is necessary to isolate the Ahrars from other comparatively lukewarm sponsors of agitation and to concentrate attack on Ahrars for the present. Action against others will depend on shape of future events. Meanwhile, the line taken in communique in respect of Ahrars should be reinforced by full publicity of their past misdeeds and present disruptionist activities.

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WIRELESS MESSAGE.

From

The Home Secretary to Government, Punjab.

to

(1) All SPs in the Punjab including Addl. SP Qasur excluding SSP Lahore.

2) All DCs in the Punjab including SDM Qasur and excluding DM Lahore.

For information:- 1) All Commissioners of Divisions in the Punjab excluding Commissioner, Lahore Div.

2) All DIG of Ranges, excluding DIG Lahore Range.

\_\_\_\_\_

No. Special-1/HS/53(.) The Ahrar agitation is now taking the shape that volunteers are being sent from the outlying districts to Lahore for the so-called "Direct Action"(.). Government's intention is that the agitation should not be allowed to spread from the outlying districts to Lahore and that local action should be taken to suppress it at the source(.). You should therefore take firm action to ensure that volunteers do not come to Lahore(.). Government leave it to your discretion to take what steps you consider necessary including the promulgation of prohibition under section 144 Cr.P.C(.). Mass arrests of volunteers should be avoided (.). As already instructed you should enlist the support of saner elements of your district in influencing the public opinion in favour of Government's action(.).

Sd/-

for Home Secretary to Government, Punjab.

No. Special-2-4/HS/53, dated Lahore, the 1st March, 1953.

Copies sent to :-

- 1) SSP Lahore & DM Lahore for similar compliance; and
- 2) DIG Lahore Range for information.

Sd/- Habib Ullah Malik

for Home Secretary to Government, Punjab.

From

Home Secretary, Punjab.

To

All DMs in the Punjab.

All SPs and Range DIGs in the Punjab  
(including Addl. SP Qasur).

No.2911-44-BDSB/ 4-3-1953.

In continuation of DIG/CID's signal 2563-82/BDSB, dated 1.3.53 to all SPs and Range DIGs in the Punjab persuasion should be adopted in the first instance to dissuade batches of volunteers from proceeding to Lahore or Karachi. If persuasive methods fail then appropriate preventive action should be taken.

Sd/-

Home Secretary to Government,  
Punjab, Lahore.

No.2945-47/BDSB, dated Lahore, the 4th March, 1953.

A copy is forwarded by post to :-

- 1) Asstt. Inspector General of Govt. Railway Police, Lahore.
- 2) Senior Superintendent of Police, Lahore.
- 3) DIG Lahore Range, for information in continuation of DIG/CID's enst. No.2583-84/BDSB, dated 1.3.53.

Sd/- Habib Ullah Malik  
for Home Secretary to Government, Punjab.

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SECRET/IMMEDIATE.

D.O.

PUNJAB CIV.

Dated Lahore,

My dear,

As outbreak of serious disorder is Lahore and it is felt that the civil authority may not be able to cope with the situation, I am desired by the Provincial Government to address you and request for the aid of troops to help the District Magistrate, Lahore, in the prevention and suppression of disorder. The number of troops, the period for which they would be employed on this task and the manner in which they would be posted would be communicated to you or to the officer nominated by you, by the District Magistrate, Lahore. As there is not enough time to make this request through the Central Government, this letter is issuing direct to you.

I am,  
Yours sincerely,

Sd/- S.Ghias Uddin Ahmad.  
Home Secretary to Government, Punjab.

Major General Muhammad Azam Khan,  
GOC 10 Div. Lahore Cantt.

No.390-94/A/BDSB, dated Lahore, the 2nd March, 1953.

A copy is forwarded, for information and immediate action to:-

- (1). The District Magistrate, Lahore,
- (2). The Commissioner, Lahore Division.
- (3). The Senior Superintendent of Police, Lahore.
- (4). The Deputy Insp. Genl. of Police, Lahore.
- (5). The Inspector General of Police, Punjab, Lahore.

Sd/- S.Ghias Uddin Ahmad.  
Home Secretary to Govt. Punjab.



A cutting from the Pakistan Times of  
the 5th March, 1953.

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#### GOVT'S APPEAL

The following appeal<sup>or</sup> has been issued by the  
Punjab Government in Lahore on Wednesday night.

The Punjab Government appeals to the citizens of  
the Province that they should now allow themselves to be duped  
and misled by persons who are trying to exploit their senti-  
ments for their own ulterior ends. The people of this  
Province have traditions of robust common-sense and patriotic  
good sense behind them. Let them not do anything today for  
which they might have to hang their heads in shame tomorrow  
before their country, the nation and the world at large.

The safety of the realm depends on the preservation  
of law and order and Government is determined to safeguard them  
at all costs. - AFP.

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ANNEXURE 'S'.

Cutting from the 'C & M.G.'  
of the 5th March, '53.

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RUMOUR-MONGERS TO BE PROSECUTED.

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The District Magistrate, Lahore, issued the following warning late on Wednesday night, says the APP.

"It has been brought to my notice that mischief-mongers are busy spreading rumours to create panic among the Public. They are hereby warned that persons caught spreading rumours will be arrested and prosecuted".

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Minutes of the Cabinet meeting held in the forenoon of March 5th, 1953.

PRESENT.

- (1). His Excellency the Governor- (In Chair)
- (2). HCM
- (3). HMA
- (4). HMD
- (5). HMPW
- (6). MMR
- (7). HMR&C
- (8). HME
- (9). Cs - Cabinet Secretary.

(GOC 10 Div. and his Staff Officers, IGP, DIG Lahore Range and HS were also present. (DIG Lahore Range, DM Lahore and SSP Lahore were also present during some of the discussions).

DECISIONS.

(1). The curfew already imposed by the District Magistrate, Lahore, on the area prescribed in his Order under Section 144 Cr.P.C. should be amended to provide that the hours of the curfew shall be 3.30 p.m. to 6.00 a.m. on the days to which the Order applies.

ACTION DM LAHORE.

(2). In view of the deterioration of the situation in Lahore and general flare-up in the City, in the first instance, the Police should take very strong action using any amount of force that may be necessary to quell disturbances. Police patrols will be supported by Military contingents under their own commanders.

ACTION IGP/GOC 10 Div.

(3). If the Police cannot cope with any particular sector, the senior Police Officer present should hand over charge of the situation in that sector to the Army Commander accompanying him.

ACTION IGP/GOC 10 DIV.

(4). If the above measures fail to restore law and order and the Police cannot keep the general situation under control with this partial aid by the Military, the Military will be asked to take over charge of the city. ACTION IGP/GOC 10 DIV.

(5). Special arrangements for the provision of food and other necessary comforts for the Police force on duty should



be organised, if necessary with Military aid, at the expense of the Provincial Government. ACTION IGF

(6). All steps should be taken to keep the normal of the Police force high. They should be told that suitable awards will be given for gallantry and distinguished and conscientious discharge of duty. They should also be informed that in the case of casualty while on duty, adequate compensation will be given to the next of kin. In the case of the late Syed Firdaus Shah, Government will award 2 squares of land in a Colony District to his heirs. ACTION IGF.

(7). Efforts should be made, as far as possible, to isolate the students from the rioters. ACTION -

Authorities in charge of the Situation: respective Military & Police Commanders & Magistrates on duty.

(8). The arrivals in Lahore should be screened at points of entry. ACTION IGF

(9). The public-spirited citizens representing all Political parties will be addressed by his Excellency the Governor to day and exhorted to use their influence to restore sanity in the city. HMR will convene the meeting. ACTION HMR.

(10). A joint Police/ Army Headquarters should be opened in the Committee Room of the Lahore Gymkhana. ACTION 135/GCC  
10 DIV.

Sd/- H.A. Majid  
Secretary Council of  
Ministers.  
5-3-1953.

ANNEXURE 'T'.

Please give immediate and wide publicity to the following appeal issued by the Honourable Chief Minister, Punjab, on behalf of himself and his colleagues.

"The Chief Minister of the Punjab makes this announcement on behalf of himself and his Ministry that their Government is prepared to open immediate negotiations with the leaders of the Tahaffuz-i-Khatim-i-Nabuwwat Movement and they appeal to the masses that they should help them in the maintenance of law and order in the country. They assure the public that the Army and the Police will not take any repressive steps unless they are absolutely essential for the protection of any one's life or property. The Provincial Government is in touch with the Central Government and Mian Muntaz Muhammad Khan Maultana in the capacity of the President of the Provincial Muslim League is putting up these demands on behalf of the people of the Punjab with his support because they are the whole nation's demands. A Minister of the Provincial Government is proceeding to Karachi by plane with these demands and the support of the Chief Minister and the other Ministers of the Punjab today, together with their strong recommendation that Chaudhri Zafarullah Khan should be asked to resign forthwith".

As desired by His Excellency and HCM, will IGF kindly arrange to get this signal flashed to all the District Magistrates in the Province?

Sd/- S. Ghias Uddin Ahmad  
6-3-1953.

I have dictated the above signal on the telephone to the Wireless operator in the Wireless Station and this is being flashed to all DCs in the Punjab.

Sd/- Zulqarnain Khan:  
6 - 3 - 1953.

ANNEXURE 'U'IMMEDIATE.WIRELESS MESSAGE.

Deputy Commissioners

- |                 |                      |
|-----------------|----------------------|
| (1) Sialkot     | (8) Campbellpur      |
| (2) Gujranwala  | (9) Mianwali         |
| (3) Sheikhupura | (10) Montgomery      |
| (4) Gujrat      | (11) Lyallpur        |
| (5) Shahpur     | (12) Jhang           |
| (6) Jhelum      | (13) Multan          |
| (7) Rawalpindi  | (14) Muzaffargarh    |
|                 | (15) Dera Ghazi Khan |

Martial law has been proclaimed by the General Officer Commanding Lahore in entire area of the Corporation of City of Lahore. You are alerted to remain vigilant. Also please wire public reactions to the appeal of Punjab Ministry signalled to you earlier.

Home Secretary Punjab



WIRELESS MESSAGE.

From

Home Secretary to Govt.. Punjab..

To

All District Magistrates in the Punjab..

No.S/704/53(.) Please keep Government in touch with the latest developments in your district on the telephone, telegraph, Police or Military wireless whichever means is available particularly if you require additional force(.). The trends of the agitation and its slackening or intensification may also be reported.

HOMESTC

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Sd/-S.Ghias Uddin AhmadHome Secretary to Government, Punjab.  
7-3-1953

ANNEXURE 'F'

Copy of the press communique dated the 6th  
March, 1953.

In their press communique dated the 27th February, the Government of Pakistan stated that no sponsors of the sectional agitation in respect of the Ahmadiys Community had thrown a peremptory challenge to Government that unless their demands were met, they would resort to 'direct

(Continued.....)

action'. The communique made it clear that this agitation had been originally started in Pakistan by the Ahrars, and that although it subsequently received some support from certain other elements, it was still being led and fostered by Ahrars. Communique explained that the Ahrars were the consistent and bitter opponents of the Muslim freedom movement before the creation of Pakistan, when many of their leaders had joined and worked in close co-operation with the Congress and other bodies which were ranged against the Quaid-i-Azam in the Muslim struggle for the attainment of Pakistan. There was reliable evidence to show that the Ahrars had not even now reconciled themselves to the establishment of Pakistan. Ahrar leaders, inspired and aided by the enemies of Pakistan, were taking every opportunity to create dissensions among the Muslims and to undermine confidence in the stability of Pakistan. The agitation, the communique stated, was clearly designed to disrupt Muslim solidarity and to do the utmost damage to the vital interests of the country by fomenting internecine dissensions under the cloak of religious movement. It was, accordingly, decided that this threat to the security of Pakistan must be fully met and law and order maintained with all the resources at Government's command. At the same time, an appeal was made to all sections of the people not to counterance any unlawful activity and to do nothing to prejudice the safety of Pakistan.

It is matter of gratification that Government's appeal received widespread response throughout the country. In Karachi, thanks to the co-operation of all right-thinking sections of the public, the agitation received no support and quickly fizzled out without any untoward incident. Similarly, no untoward incident took place elsewhere in the country, except in Lahore, and a few other towns of the Punjab. In particular, press throughout the country has



wholeheartedly supported Government's stand and extended its fullest co-operation in countering this threat to national security. In doing so, the press had deserved well of the country, and has rightly earned the gratitude of the people.

The course that this agitation has taken in Lahore during the last two days, has, however, shown that disruptive elements are sedulously at work to subvert authority, and the stand hitherto taken by Government, has been fully vindicated. The real aim of this agitation is purely subversive, namely to create dissensions among Muslims and promote disorder with a view to disrupting the stability of Pakistan. The situation in Lahore, and the methods now employed there, namely loot, arson, dislocation of essential services and other evidence in the possession of Government, make it clear that all disruptive groups inimical to Pakistan, have now come out openly to exploit the situation for their own particular ends.

Faced with this situation, Government's duty is perfectly clear. They must suppress this threat to the safety and integrity of the country by every means at their disposal. This duty Government are determined to perform. Accordingly, martial law has been declared in Lahore. The situation in other parts of the country is at the moment quite. Necessary arrangements have, however, been made to ensure that prompt and effective steps are taken to deal with any disruptive agitation should it start elsewhere.

Government have no doubt that people will by now have fully appreciated the danger to which the enemies of

Pakistan have exposed the country. They are confident that the people will continue actively to co-operate with Government in restoring law and order wherever it should be threatened and in ensuring that the enemies of Pakistan do not in any way jeopardise the safety or stability of the country.

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## Statement by the Hon'ble Minister of the Punjab.

On the 6th of this month I appealed on behalf of my Ministry and of myself to the people of this Province to help in the maintenance of law and order. I assured them that my Government would be prepared to open immediate negotiations with the leaders of the Tahaffuz-i-Khatmi-Nabuwat Movement, and that my Ministers would place their demands before the Central Government with a recommendation that they should be accepted.

This appeal was made at a time when in Lahore lawless elements were indulging in loot, arson and dislocation of essential services. The Tahaffuz-i-Khatmi-Nabuwat Movement was being exploited by disruptive groups inimical to Pakistan in order to subvert authority, to create dissensions among Muslims and promote disorder with a view to injure the safety and stability of Pakistan. The object of my appeal was to ensure that the people of this Province exert themselves in the maintenance of law and order so that the enemies of Pakistan are no longer able under the cloak of a religious movement to foment internecine dissensions and create lawlessness in order to damage the security of Pakistan. In actual fact, unfortunately, lawlessness has continued in spite of my appeal, and in Lahore Martial Law had to be introduced in order to bring the situation under control.

Under the present circumstances, there can be no question of any negotiations with, or of consideration of the demands of, the leaders of the Tahaffuz-i-Khatmi-i-Nabuwat Movement. It is the foremost duty of any Government to ensure that law is obeyed and the lives and property of its citizens are fully protected. Both the Central and Provincial Governments are resolved to suppress lawlessness wherever it should occur and to maintain law and order in the Province. Government must suppress the present threat to the safety and integrity of the country by every means at their disposal.

I appeal to the people of this Province to co-operate



with Government to restoring law and order wherever it should be threatened and in ensuring that the enemies of Pakistan are not able to exploit the Khatm-i-Nabuwwat question in order to injure the integrity or safety of the country.

Sd/- Murtaz Ahmad Daultana,  
Chief Minister,  
Punjab.

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To

Foreign Karachi

Telegram No.45 of 3rd March

for INTERHOME and DIB. Top Secret.

Your telegram No.1158, 2nd March.

Sitrep upto 3rd March morning.

Situation deteriorated at Lahore. A large mob became unruly at Charing Cross 2nd evening. Broke Police cordon. Mild lathi charge resorted to. 120 arrests made. Section 144 promulgated. Troops standing by.

At Gujranwala mob attacked Police. Some police officers and a Magistrate injured. Police fired a few rounds without any casualty. Situation tense. Processions taken out in Lyallpur Multan Jhelum Qasur Montgomery Jhang Sargodha Gujrat Sheikhupura Rawalpindi districts. Others quiet. Many volunteers from Multan Lyallpur Jhang Sargodha heading for Karachi detained wayside stations and held. Agitation concentrating on Lahore. Homeseo

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Will USP kindly issue the following sitrep in cypher immediately to FOREIGN, KARACHI:-

Telegram No.46 of 4th March Top secret.

Following for INTERHOME stop sitrep on direct action stop Please read in continuation of this Government's communique issued last night which appeared in Today's papers stop Situation in Lahore improved stop Thirty persons defying section 144 order arrested today while moving about in prohibited area in small batches stop Troops are standing by stop A public meeting held last night in Wazir Khan mosque was addressed by Abdus Sattar Khan Niazi and others stop Niazi made highly objectional speech stop Preventive action is being taken against him stop Paragraph Situation deteriorated at Sialkot stop On third March unruly crowd stoned police and magistracy, burnt four vehicles, stabbed a police officer, injured many others. Police opened fire resulting in one dead and some other injured casualties stop On fourth morning again mob attacked police stop Police and military opened fire stop Four persons reported killed stop Curfew imposed stop Army patrolling town Paragraph Section 144 promulgated in parts of districts Campbellpur, Muzaffargarh and Lyallpur stop The latest reports from Lyallpur show acute tension Paragraph Volunteers arrested at Gujranwala, Muzaffargarh, Lyallpur, Gujrat, Sheikhupura, Jhang, Jhelum, Montgomery and Multan Paragraph Many volunteers leaving for Karachi and Lahore from different places in the province intercepted and detained .... HomeSec".

Sd/- S. Ghias Uddin Ahmad

4-3-1953.



CYPHER TELEGRAMIMMEDIATE

Top Secret Telegram No. 48 of 9th March

Following SITREP UP TO 7th MARCH ON DIRECT  
ACTION AGITATION

For INTERHOME

Begins on 2nd March the agitators took out processions which converged on the Charing Cross. The main procession was led by Maulana Akhtar Ali of the 'Zamindar' against whom a detention order under Public Safety Act had been issued earlier, but who could not be apprehended as he was most of the time in the Wazir Khan mosque. The demonstrators were very rowdy and in a threatening mood. They broke the Police cordons many times and mild lathi-charge was made to repel them. A large number of people offered themselves for arrests. There was no firing or tear-gassing. When eventually the mobs withdrew it was reported that some of them threw small stones at the Shezan Restaurant owned by an Ahmadi. No damage was, however, done. It was decided at this to promulgate an Order under Section 144 banning public processions in the affected parts of the city. The G.O.C. 10 Div was contacted to order the troops to stand-by. He was also asked to send out mobile patrols, but the troops were not to go into action until requested to do so by Civil authority. There were no further incidents on this date. On 3rd March there was heavy patrolling by the Police and the Army except in the congested parts of the walled city. Two processions were taken out on 3rd March and were tackled by the Police with lathis - one near the Tollinton Market and the other in front of the General Post Office. There was no casualties and there was no tear-gassing or firing on this date. On 4th March a riotous mob was intercepted and dispersed by the

Police with tear-gas and lathis in Chowk Balgaran. People who were already incited by Abdus Sattar Niazi's inflammatory speech: of the previous evening collected in Wazir Khan mosque at 2 P.m. where further inciting speeches were made and later the same were repeated in another meeting at 4 p.m. outside Delhi Gate. Exaggerated accounts of Police use of tear-gas were given and rumours were set afloat that Police had opened fire killing a young boy and infuring, among others, a Women. It was also said that a copy of the Holy Quran was kicked and trampled upon by policeman. Pages alleged to be burnt were exhibited in the meeting. Order under section 144 had been promulgated in the area outside the wall city from the previous night. Late in the afternoon D.S.P. City was murdered on the stairs of the Wazir Khan Mosque where he had gone to rescue two A.S.s alleged to have been forcibly taken away by the mob returning to the Mosque from the meeting. One Sub-Inspector, one Head Constable and two Constables also received injuries. The revolver of the D.S.P. and two muskets of Constables were snatched away. All injuries found on the D.S.P.'s body were of stabbing. Curfew was clamped on the troubled area and properly publicised by means of loud-speaker vans and on the Radio. Curfew order was defied the same night at many places where riotous mobs carrying swords and other arms started attacking Police parties and Police Posts. Police had to open fire at three places to disperse the uncontrollable crowds resulting in two dead and three wounded. 5th March was a tumultuous day. Order under Section 144 was openly defied all over the town and defiant crowds moved about everywhere threatening and abusing persons moving about in vehicles. Army



patrols produced little effect. Five Omnibuses belonging to Government were completely burnt. Policemen were attacked and two Constables received injuries while in the hospital where they had gone with wounded persons for medical examination. Two Post Offices were looted and burnt. A third was saved by the timely arrival of the Police. An Ahmadi was murdered and some private concerns were also looted. At two places Police parties were fired upon as well as and brickbatted at many places. Six police vehicles had their front glasses and window panes smashed; and one was set fire to. Police opened fire in all at nine places during the day resulting in ten persons killed whose bodies were picked up by the Police and 57 injured admitted to the hospital. Some other dead bodies and injured persons were taken away by the mobs. One Military patrol was also brickbatted outside Lehcré Gate and fired couple of shots resulting in injury to one. On the 6th shops and factories were closed forcibly and Railway employees prevented movements of engines from the Loco Shed to the Station. All-vehicular traffic was forcibly stopped and Railway offices closed. Students attacked Talimul Islam College (an Ahmadi institution) and brickbattering started from both sides. The timely arrival of Police prevented casualties. Ravi Road Post Office was looted and burnt and road blocks were put up on the Mall near the Tollinton Market. Clerks of the General Post Office, Irrigation Secretariat and employees of Telephone and Employment Exchanges struck work. Public Traffic was interfered with and faces of persons travelling in cars were blackened. At places car riders were brickbatted. A number of shops were looted and houses set on fire. The arrival of the Police saved the looting of an arms shop on the Bramdreth Road. Approaches to the Lehari Gate



Police Station were blocked and hostile slogans were raised. Automatic traffic signal box on the Mall, the only one in Lahore, was burnt and an attempt, which was averted by the arrival of the Police, was made to loot shops in the Commercial Building. It was announced by the rioters that the dead bodies of those killed by Police by firing would be taken out in procession for public funeral. Two Ahmadis were murdered, one of them being burnt alive. An appeal was made by the H.C.M. as a last resort but as it did not evoke a favourable response Martial Law was declared in the entire city of Lahore including the Cantonment.

districts. The agitation continues in the other districts. Increased tension has been reported from Lyallpur, Sargodha, Sheikhupura and Montgomery. An additional company of troops as requisitioned by D.M. Montgomery has been sent to him. In Lyallpur, the riotous mob came into the District Courts and broke the window panes. The D.M. Sheikhupura has asked for additional Police or Army to stand-by. Commissioner Pindi has been asked to alert the Div Commander concerned, Sargodha. The rioters in many cases called upon public servants to join them. Many officials of the Punjab Secretariat attended office but there was not work.

Attempts have been made to damage railway carriages, including an air-conditioned carriage, at Lahore and other places. Trains are being held up at a number of places. Quite a number of train services have been suspended owing to paucity of operating staff. One case of stabbing and two cases of arsoning, both of Ahmadis, were reported from Pindi on the 6th March.

HOMESEC

TOP SECRET.  
MOST IMMEDIATE.

Transcription of top secret most immediate OTP cypher telegram No. 1238, dated the 5th March, 1953, from FOREIGN KARACHI to PUNJAB LAHORE.

Top Secret. Telegram No. 1238 dated 5th March.

Addressed to Chiefsec Lahore Chiefsec Peshawar Chiefsec Sind ( by safe hand) Baluchistan Quetta and Chief Commissioner Karachi (by safe hand).

From Secretary Interhome. Anti Ahmadi agitation.

2. Central Government consider that in dealing with breach of peace the military authorities may be asked where necessary to provide close military support to police. Civil administration must however continue to function throughout the agitation. Any ill advised or hasty request by local authorities for declaration of martial law must be resisted by Provincial Government.

3. Important ringleaders of the agitation who are repeat not arrested must not be released by any Province unilaterally and without consultation with the Central Government.

4. Heavier police patrols should be provided on all railways to prevent sabotage or dislocation of traffic.

Sd/- A.K.M. Ihsan.  
 6-3-1953.

CS

U.O. No. 102-CA-USP-53, dt. 6-3-1953.



1. The Ahrar-Ahmadi controversy is more than a quarter of a century old, and started more than 15 years before partition. On a number of occasions the Ahrars have used it as a means of gaining political ascendancy.

2. The Ahrars have opposed to the creation of Pakistan, and once it had <sup>come</sup> into existence, they felt that their prestige had been lost. They attempted to revive it and employed the anti-Ahmadi platform as means for achieving this objective. They organized widespread propaganda, including speeches, conferences, issuing of pamphlets, booklets and appeals. A number of them might have been influenced by purely religious considerations: but the majority had political objectives in view.

3. Some of the main arguments advanced by them against the Qadianis were as follows:

- (a) The Qadianis were the creation of the British, who were afraid of the Muslims rising as a power on some future date and desired to create a section among the Muslims themselves which would tend to disrupt them.
- (b) The British realized that the spirit of Jihad among the Muslims was a potential danger to their empire, and, therefore, tried to create a section which would denounce Jihad by sword. This, according to the Ahrars, was exactly what the Qadianis were doing.
- (c) It was also felt that the sacrifice on the occasion of Id-i-Asha kept alive the martial spirit of the common Muslim. According to the Ahrars,



The British, through the Qadianis, attempted to do away with this institution altogether.

(d) The Qadianis regarded the non-Qadianis in the same manner as the original Muslims treated the non-Muslims. According to the Ahrars, this was the main reason why---

- (1) no Qadianis would offer prayers behind a non-Qadiani Imam;
- (2) no Qadiani would join the Namaz-i-Janaza of a non-Qadiani; or
- (3) no Qadiani would give in marriage a Qadiani girl to a non-Qadiani.

(e) The Ahrars also gave out that the Qadiani officers were indulging in nepotism, and Qadiani subordinates got promotion over the heads of other non-Qadianis whenever the officer competent to promote happened to be a Qadiani. This propaganda tended to create a situation similar to the Hindu-Muslim feeling prevailing during the few years preceding partition.

(f) They had created a city of their own at Rabwah and while other cities in Pakistan were open to all, non-Qadiani could hope to settle in Rabwah.

(g) It was also alleged that the Qadianis intended to create a Government within a Government, and in this connection references were made to the utterances of the head of the Ahmediya community wherein he had said that they wanted a province of their own.

4. As some of these allegations were in fact found to be true, namely these regarding the offering of prayers, Namaz-i-Janaza and inter-marriages, the common people were led to

believe that the Ahrars were really justified in exposing the Qadianis.

5. The Qadianis found themselves in a very awkward position. If they kept quite, their interests would be irreparably harmed. They, therefore, attempted to hold conferences at Sialkot and Lyallpur, but these led to disturbances.

6. Up till June, 1952, the Government's policy dealing with the situation was the one contained in Punjab Government D.O. letter No. 10027-51/463-HG., dated the 24th December, 1951, (Appendix I), and D.O. letter No. 6469-84-HDSB., dated the 5th June, 1952 (Appendix II). On the 19th June, 1952, Government sent a wireless message (Appendix III), which was to the effect that the Ahrars intended to hold anti-Ahmadiya meetings in the mosques immediately after the Juma-tul-Wida prayers, and the District Magistrates should ban all such meetings under Section 144, Cr.F.C. This order of Government caused widespread resentment, because it was the first time in the history of the province that the holding of meetings inside mosques was banned. The position had, therefore, to be reviewed, and in a meeting held on the 5th July, 1952, the proceedings of which would be seen as Appendix IV, it was decided that no action should be taken to disperse meetings organized by the Ahrars or the Ahmadis even outside the mosques until it was necessary to do so for the maintenance of law and order.

7. The Ahrar continued to carry on their propaganda, but the District Magistrates took no action in view of the above decision of Government. The campaign went on increasing all the time, and the movement got further impetus because the Ahrars roped in all the other non-Ahmadi organizations and created a situation in which all non-Ahmadi bodies started



criticizing the Ahmedis.

8. Definite demands were placed before Government.

These included:-

- (a) the declaration of the Qadianis as a minority; and
- (b) the resignation of Ch. Muhammad Tufarullah Khan from the post of Foreign Minister.

9. By the beginning of 1953, the movement had gained considerable momentum and a Committee of Action was formed. Subsequently, this Committee decided to resort to direct action if their demands were not conceded. The actual date for starting the direct action was postponed a number of times. Things, however, came to ahead on the 28th Februrary, 1953, when the news about the arrest of the leaders of the movement at Karachi reached Lahore. A big meeting was held at Lahore, and it was decided to take out a procession.

10. A procession was actually taken out. It came up to the <sup>h</sup>Charing Cross, offered some persons for arrest and dispersed. It was about 4.30 p.m. that I.G., Police, informed me about the growing procession which was heading towards Charing Cross; and he and I both went to the stop. The procession was, however, peaceful, and it was felt that no action was called for.

11. A similar procession was taken out on the 1st March, 1953. The I.G. Police, and myself both went to the spot. Some persons were offered for arrest, and the procession dispersed. This time the procession was larger, but there were no indications of violence.

12. On the 2nd March, 1953, Maulana Akhtar Ali Khan,



Editor of the "Zamindar", headed a large procession. This time the procession was not only larger, but there were also signs of growing violence. It broke through the Police cordon, and surrounded the officers present, which included the I.G. and myself. The situation was brought under control with difficulty, but it was felt that it would be necessary to chalk out the future line of action.

13. A meeting was held immediately afterwards in the Police Kotwali, at which the H.S., the I.G.P., and myself were also present. The consensus of the meeting was that orders u/s 144 Cr.P.C., should be promulgated. I, however, pointed out that once such orders were issued, it was absolutely necessary that they should be firmly enforced. The authorities should be prepared for curfew, and even firing. It was also advisable to ensure that Military assistance was readily available. It was decided that troops should be called out and should stand by.

14. The tentative decisions arrived at in this meeting, were communicated to the H.C.M. at his residence in the presence of the C.S. H.C.M. approved of the decisions. Action was, therefore, taken accordingly.

15. In the forenoon of the 3rd March, 1953, the D.C., Sialkot, informed me over the telephone that firing had to be resorted to in Sialkot. I immediately informed the H.S., C.S. and H.C.M., and also discussed the situation with the D.I.G., Lahore Range. We both felt that as Lahore was more important, the Commissioner as well as the D.I.G. should remain at Lahore, but telephonic communications should be maintained with the D.C., Sialkot, and after every half of an hour the Commissioner should find out the exact position and continue to inform Government. The H.C.M. subsequently called the D.I.G. and myself for a discussion, and it was decided that both officials should remain at

Lahore, but action should be taken on the lines indicated above. About the hour afterwards, however, I was informed by the H.S. that Government desired that I should proceed to Sialkot immediately. Accordingly, I left for Sialkot. The Situation, as I found it, as well as the subsequent events and developments were reported to Government in my report which would be found as Appendix V.

16. It is not easy to say what would have prevented the occurrences which actually took place in the first week of March at Lahore; but the situation which had been created as a result of the anti-Ahmadiya controversy, could only be met either politically or by use of force. On the political level, it could perhaps be said that the Ahrars could put up their demands at the time of the next elections; or the Prime Minister of Pakistan could have thrown a challenge that he would not ask Ch. Muhammad Zafarullah Khan to resign; and if anybody wanted, they could bring a vote of no-confidence against him on that issue. No political solution was, however, offered, and the only method left for dealing with the situation was the use of such force as the law permitted. I was not in Lahore; but the H.C.M.'s announcement on the 5th March that he and his party had accepted the demands and had sent a Minister to Karachi, tended to worsen rather than save the situation. If I were here, I would have advised against the issue of such a statement, especially when Government had previously decided to take a firm stand.

17. Other suggestions that would have been made by me would have included:-



- (a) the continuance of firm action by Government until the situation was brought under control.
- (b) Effectively dealing with the processions early in the morning when their numbers would be small. This is what was exactly done at Sialkot and proved successful.
- (c) Clear indication of the various stages at which the Police and the Military would be called in for action. These stages were defined in a meeting held at Government House on the 5th March, 1953, but I have no personal knowledge as to what extent these decisions were implemented.
- (d) summoning all senior officer to a conference, seeking their advice and deputing them for the maintenance of law and order if the situation so demanded.

Sd/- (I.U.Khan).  
Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab.

Dated Lahore:  
The 21st July, 1953.



APPENDIX 'I'.

Copy of D.O.No.10027-51/463-HG, dated the 24th December, 1951, from the Home Secretary to Government, Punjab, Lahore to all Deputy Commissioners in the Punjab.

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Subject:- Ahrar-Ahmadiya Controversy.

Dear Sir,

As you are aware, the Ahrar Ahmadiya controversy has been brewing for sometime past in the Province and certain incidents of personal violence which occurred recently have caused grave concern to the administration. It has been Government's firm policy that the legitimate rights of any community or sect to practise its religious beliefs should not be unduly restricted and that no discrimination in this respect should be made between different parties. It is, nevertheless, important that religious controversies should be discouraged or at any rate they should not be allowed to the extent of endangering the public peace and tranquillity. This letter is particularly designed to invite the attention of district officers to meetings held by the Ahrars or by the Ahmadiis.

2. Government feel that wherever the District authorities are vigilant and are able to enforce timely preventive measures, there is little or no likelihood of the Ahrars or the Ahmadiys disturbing each other's meetings. Clashes have occurred only where the local authorities have failed to adopt a firm attitude or have otherwise failed to assess dispassionately the rights or wrongs of the parties concerned. If both parties are dealt with firmly and justly without any discrimination whatever, there is no reason why this increasing menace of vilification by one Muslim sect of another should not be brought under proper control.

Copy of D.O. letter (Confidential) No. 6469-84-BDSB, dated the 5th June, 1952, from the Chief Secretary to Govt. Punjab, to all Deputy Commissioners in the Punjab (by name).

Subject:- Ahrar-Ahmadiya Controversy.

Dear Sir,

I am directed to address you in continuation of the Home Secretary's demi-official letter No. 10027-51/463-HG, dated December, 24, 1951, addressed to all the Deputy Commissioners on the subject cited above.

Government have noticed with concern that the Ahrar-Ahmadiya controversy instead of abating has now increased to an extent which if not checked immediately and firmly will constitute a real threat to the public peace. The trend of speeches delivered at the Ahrar conferences is generally marked by a deplorable lack of self restraint and healthy tone. The speeches made recently by some of their leaders were particularly inflammatory. On the other hand the Ahmadiya community, inspite of the undisguised hostility of a section of the public or probably because of it, insist on holding their tableeghi conferences frequently and in public. This attitude only succeeds in provoking fresh outbursts against themselves. After careful consideration Government have decided that in the general interest of the public peace and tranquility, neither the Ahrar nor the Ahmadis should be permitted to hold <sup>public</sup> meetings under any name or garb. You should, therefore, take preventive action under Section 144 Cr. P. C. whenever either party intends to hold a public meeting. This directive supersedes the one offered to above which left the discretion for taking preventive action with the Deputy Commissioners. Now preventive action will be taken regarding Ahrar/Ahmadi meetings invariably and without any exception until these orders are modified or withdrawn. The action taken by you and the reactions thereto should in all cases be reported to Government as early as possible for their information.



Copy of Wireless Message from Chief Secretary Punjab, Lahore to all Deputy Commissioners and Commissioners of Division No. 168-ST- (H-5) 52, dated the 19th June, 1952.

It has been reported to Government that Ahrar want to hold Anti-Ahmadiya meetings in mosque immediately proceeding or after the Juma-tul-Wida prayers because they think that such meetings are not liable to be banned by District Magistrates(.) If the Ahrar contemplate doing so within your District(.) You should immediately pass in appropriate order under section 144 Cr.F.C(.) Banning public meetings on the day without making any mention of the venue or the meeting(.) You should then send for them and the person connected with the management of the mosque and impress upon them that they should not become a party to this violation of your order and the desecration of a place of worship in the furtherance of the activities of a political party(.) It should be made clear to them that in the event of infringement(.) Your order you will not hesitate from prosecuting the persons connected with the management of the mosque for their abetment of the offence as well as the actual person and other moving spirits of the meeting including the speakers(.) Government are aware that the Public meeting may be done tail into a prayer congregating or that the complexion of assemblage gathered for prayers may change into that of a public meeting by tone and trend of speeches just before or after the prayers or the Khutba(.) But Government are advised that such facts will not afford any legal protecting to these responsible for the meeting from the consequences of a violation of your order a gazette extra-ordinary is under issue today notifying the violating of orders under section 144 Cr.F.C(.) Banning public meetings as a non-bailable and cognizable offences(.) You will receive copies thereof in due course meanwhile you should proceed this basis(.) Government will also send you short a model order under section 144 Cr.F.C. for issue by you on occasions(.) Lastly it should be noted carefully that Government not desire any public meetings which are being held in mosque or other places(.) Of sanctity or worship to be dispersed by force or they be interfered within any way while they are in progress(.) Nor do they desire that any arrests should be made while people are collecting for or dispersing from such meetings(.) The proper course to follow would be that a case should

be registered and the culprit should be arrested after the excitement of the meeting is over at an appropriate time and place(.) The cases registered should be prosecuted rigorously(.) You and your Superintendent of Police should remain present at Headquarters on Friday and also at the time selected for effecting arrests if any(.) Chief Secretary(.)

\*\*\*\*\*



CONFIDENTIAL

Decisions taken at a Conference of Officers held under the Chairmanship of the Chief Secretary in his office on Saturday July 5, 1952.

Present.

1. Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab (in the Chair)
2. Inspector General of Police, Punjab.
3. Deputy Inspector General of Police, C.I.D. Punjab.
4. Home Secretary to Government, Punjab.
5. Additional Deputy Commissioner, Sialkot.
6. District Magistrate, Gujrat.
7. District Magistrate, Lahore.
8. District Magistrate, Rawalpindi.
9. District Magistrate, Sheikhpur and Sargodha.
10. District Magistrate, Gujranwala.
11. District Magistrate, Lyallpur.
12. District Magistrate, Montgomery.
13. Additional District Magistrate, Jhelum.
14. Director Public Relations, Punjab.

Decisions.

- 1) The orders under Section 144 Cr.P.C should be amended wherever necessary so as to make them applicable specifically to the public meetings organized by the Ahrar or the Ahmadiys only without making any mention of the venue of the meeting. The model order promised by Government would be sent to the Dist. Magistrate as early as possible but District Magistrates concerned need not defer the issue of revised orders to await the receipt of the Government draft.
- 2) If any member of the Ahrars party or the Ahmadiys community deliver violent or inflammatory speeches at any public meeting not organized by their respective organization a reference should be made to Government for action under Section 153 FFC or the Public Safety Act. Pending the receipt of Government orders the culprits should not be arrested unless it is considered to be absolutely necessary.
- 3) No action should be taken to disperse meetings organized by the Ahrar or the Ahmadiys even outside mosques unless it becomes an imperative necessity to do so for the maintenance of law and order. Meetings held in mosques are in no case to be interfered with in any way and action should be taken regarding all meetings whether held inside a place of worship or in other public places by the registration of regular cases against the prominent leaders of the two groups only.
- 4) The Government propaganda machinery should be accelerated so that the interested parties cannot dupe the public and the true

significance and nature of the action taken by Government 121  
explained to the common man. Pamphlets, leaflets and posters  
should be prepared and distributed to the District Magistrates  
for dissemination throughout their districts. Propaganda through  
newspapers should also be intensified and the papers which are  
generally pro-Government should be asked to cooperate in this  
matter also because their attitude is anything but favourable  
towards Government in this matter.

5) Maulvis and Khatibs of the various mosques should be contacted  
by the District Magistrates and the true picture of the whole  
situation should be laid before them so that the interested  
parties cannot play upon their religious sentiments and mislead  
them into inveighing against Government.

6) The Government called for 13th July, 1952, in Lahore should  
not be interfered with in any way. The speeches delivered  
and the decisions taken there should be examined later to see  
what action, if any, is called for. This Convention may actually  
prove to be useful from the point of view of Government if the  
intending participants are contacted by the District Magistrates  
or the Director, Public Relations and prevailed upon to denounce  
breaching of violence and defiance of law. The Deputy Inspector  
General of Police, C.I.D., will make an effort to intimate the  
names of the intending participants to the District Magistrates  
concerned.

7) In all action taken in this connection by officers on their  
own initiative or in accordance with the Government instructions  
issued from time to time it should be borne in mind that the  
ultimate object is to kill the threat to law and order created  
by the Ahrar-Ahmadi controversy by isolating these two organizations  
from the rest of the public. This will destroy the unfounded  
notion of interference with the religious and political rights  
of the public by Government which the Ahrar have created in their  
desperate effort to regain their lost power.



The Deputy Commissioner has already sent a detailed report out the incident of the 3rd of March.

The latest position was reported by means of wireless and a copy of the situation Report is attached herewith. (Flag 'A').

The news appeared in the Press that Sialkot was handed over to the Military. This news has been indirectly contradicted by issuing a Press Communique, which was read over to Radio Pakistan by the Information Officer of the D.F.R.'s office, who was directed to get it approved by the DIG, IG & HS. A copy thereof is enclosed as 'B').

When arrived here on the 3rd evening, I found that there was a great concern among our officers at the inadequacy of the Military and the Police Force. Requests were made to the IG and the Milly. Authorities for augmenting the Police and Military personnel. HCM, who had rung up to find out the exact position, was apprised of the situation and he kindly agreed to issue the necessary instructions.

After a discussion with Col. Khushi Muhammad, it was decided

- a) The administration should remain with the Civil authorities.
- b) Police should take the necessary action in the first instance.
- c) If they found that they could not cope with the situation, the assistance of the Military authorities should be sought for.

There were rumours that there might be a widespread looting and arson in the city during the night between the 3rd and the 4th instant. With a view to finding out the exact position, I went out through the City with the Military officers and found that everything was absolutely quiet. Not a soul was stirring out. It was, therefore, felt that there was no need for any curfew order.

I made a second round of the City with the Deputy Commissioner and the Superintendent of Police without any Military escort. Everything was found to be peaceful again. It was, therefore, ultimately decided not to have any curfew at all.

The night remained peaceful, but information was received early in the morning that people had decided to disobey the District Magistrate's order promulgated under Section 144 Cr.P.C. The District Magistrate, Superintendent of Police and myself along with

1. Mr. Khushi Muhammad went to Thana Sadar and found that a procession was coming towards the Police station. At a distance of about 200 yards they were asked to disperse. Persuasion failed and they not only refused but became threatening. In the meantime, brickbats started from the roofs of the houses on either side of the lane. A lathi charge was ordered, but the crowd did not disperse and became all the more threatening. The Additional Superintendent of Police received an injury on the head and the situation became such that fire had to be opened. At first the police fired and then the situation was handed over to the police fired and then the situation was handed over to the Military as the police could not cope with it. After the Military fired, the situation was brought under control and the crowd dispersed. Reports were received that one person was injured.

2. After sometime, the crowd again collected and this time they came armed with swords, knives and sticks. They also brought some women who were put before the men and marched towards the barrier which the military had put up in the meantime. As the crowd had again become threatening, the Military had to open fire. Casualties were not known, but several persons appeared to have been injured. Subsequently the crowd again dispersed and there was no more incident afterwards.

3. In the afternoon, one Maulvi Muhammad Hassan brought some Maulvis who were in charge of direct action. Maulvi Muhammad Iqbal also came along with them. They gave their version of the incident of the 3rd alleging that mob got angry because the ASP entered the mosque with shoes on and arrested Maulvi Muhammad Iqbal who would have himself offered for arrest. As regards the vehicles which had been burnt, it was alleged that a Police Constable had himself set fire to them. They also demanded that Superintendent of Police, the Deputy Commissioner and the Additional Superintendent of Police should be transferred. They were flatly told that such a request could never be considered. If they wanted to offer arrests peacefully, their demand could be considered.

4. The meeting broke, because news were received that arson and looting had started in the locality where Ahmadis were residing. Magistrate with a Police and Military escort was sent to verify



after on they returned and said that the information was incorrect <sup>194</sup>  
but there had been two stabbing cases. The injured had been removed to the Civil Hospital.

12. Two constable and an A.S.I. had come from outside and when they came out of the train at the Railway Station, they were surrounded by a mob who took away the revolver of the A.S.I and the rifles of the constables. These three persons were subsequently shut up in a house. An attempt was made to set fire to it. A rescue party was sent, but before it arrived these three persons had been released.

13. A Battalion arrived in the day and there were news that another was arriving. This restored confidence and no further incident happened.

14. The DIG also arrived before the evening and the situation was reviewed. It was decided to have a curfew in the night from 10 p.m. to 5 a.m. This was done and the night remained absolutely peaceful. Report had been received that there were intentions to set fire to buildings and start looting. Subsequently they were found to be incorrect.

15. GOC arrived last night and the situation was again discussed in a meeting. Copy of the proceedings is attached herewith. (Flag 'C')

16. Nothing happened in the day. There were some rumours that people intended to take out a procession, but when I went out for a patrol along with the Station Commander, it was discovered that the information was incorrect.

17. Twenty-five persons, in batches of five, offered themselves for arrest in a peaceful manner and were taken in custody.

18. As the Military and the Police are patrolling the City, situation is improving, but nothing can be said definitely for a day or so. The position is being constantly watched. Curfew has been imposed from 10 p.m to 5 a.m. again. The modified orders under the Cr.P.C under which only processions and meetings have been banned, will continue in force for a week.

S/- I.U.Khan  
Commissioner, Lahore Division  
Camp Sialkot 5-3-1953

H.S.

Copy to:-

1. The Hon'ble Chief Minister, Punjab, Lahore.
2. The Inspector General of Police, P.B., Lahore.
3. DIG, Lahore Range, Lahore.  
for information.

S/- I.U.Khan  
Commissioner Lahore Division  
5-3-53

COPY

From

I.U.Khan, Esquire, C.S.F.,  
Commissioner, Lahore Division,  
Camp Sialkot.

To

1. The Hon'ble Chief Minister, Punjab, Lahore.
2. The Home Secretary, Punjab, Lahore.
3. The Deputy Inspector General of Police,  
Lahore Range, Lahore.

Dated the 5th March, 1953.

Continuation this morning wireless message.

There was no defiance of orders under sec. 144,

Cr.P.C. There were rumours that a procession was being organized. The Commissioner, the Station Commander, the Deputy Commissioner and the Superintendent of Police proceeded to the spot, but found nothing of the kind. All these officers then had a round of the City and found that the situation was quite.

2. The Military had a flag march, which had a further salutary effect.

3. In the afternoon, 25 persons, in batches of 5, offered for arrest and were taken in custody. Maulvi Muhammad Yaqub was one of them.

Sd/- I.U.Khan,  
Commissioner, Lahore Division.  
5-3-1953 Camp Sialkot.

Copy to:-

1. G.O.C. 15 Div., Sialkot.
2. Station Commander, Sialkot.
3. D.C.Sialkot.
4. S.P.Sialkot.

Sd/- I.U.Khan,  
Commissioner, Lahore Division.  
5-3-1953.



Information given to the Information Officer of the Office of the Director of Public Relations, Punjab, Lahore, and Radio Pakistan, Lahore, for being published in the Press and for being broadcast at the Radio this evening and tonight.

Fire had to be opened at Sialkot on the 3rd and 4th when an unruly mob attacked the Police and Civil Officers, several of whom received injuries - including the Deputy Commissioner and the Superintendent of Police. Four vehicles belonging to the Police, Municipal Committee and Civil Defence were burnt. One person was killed on the 3rd and four were killed on the 4th of March. Administration remained with the Civil authorities throughout.

2. No incident after yesterday's firing. Curfew was imposed last night from 10 P.M. to 5 A.M., but there were no breaches at all.

3. Military and the Police are patrolling the City. Conditions are steadily improving. Orders under Section 144, Cr.P.C., have been partly relaxed. There is a ban on processions and meetings only.

4. Twenty five persons, in batches of five, offered arrest peacefully and were taken in custody.

5. Curfew is being imposed tonight from 10 P.M. to 5 A.M. again.

Sd/- I.U.Khan,  
Commissioner, Lahore Division.  
Camp Sialkot. 5-3-1953

Copy to:-

1. GOC. 15 Div. Sialkot.
2. Station Commander, Sialkot.
3. Deputy Commissioner, Sialkot.
4. Superintendent of Police, Sialkot.

Sd/- I.U.Khan,  
Commissioner, Lahore Division.  
Camp Sialkot. 5.3.1953.

Proceedings of a meeting held at the Fort, Sialkot, on the 5th March, 1953, at 8 a.m.

Present.

1. GOC. 15 Div., Sialkot.
2. Commissioner, Lahore Dvn.
3. Station Commander, Sialkot.
4. Deputy Commissioner, Sialkot.
5. Superintendent of Police, Sialkot.
6. Addl. Superintendent of Police, Sialkot.

The following decisions were arrived at:-

1. There should be a flag march on the circular road by two sections. Behind the troops, there should be a loud-speaker announcing that Section 144 Cr.F.C. was in force and taking out of processions or holding of meetings in public places were banned for a period of one week from the 5th March to the 12th March.
2. Main road leading to Sialkot should be sealed off. No persons from outside intending to take out a procession in the City should be allowed to enter the City. If any person comes from outside and offers arrest, he should be taken into custody at the barriers set up for the purpose.
3. At such places there should be Army and Police pickets along with a Magistrate.
4. The order under section 144, Cr.F.C. should be slightly relaxed. Only meetings and processions should be banned.
5. An appeal should be made through loudspeakers to the parents not to allow their children to defy sec. 144, Cr.F.C. orders.
6. These Magistrates, who are not on duty with Army and Police pickets, should remain in reserve in the Fort.
7. The ammunition shops should either be guarded or ammunition therefrom should be transported to safe place.
8. The City should be divided in four Divisions comprising of the existing Police stations.
9. Military and police should patrol the City and the S.I.



in charge of the Police station should be their guide.

10. Fickets should be placed at important or strategic points.

11. The vehicles damaged should be removed to a safer place with the assistance of the Military authorities.

12. The following articles should be kept at a convenient place, so that they might be handy in time of need:-

- (a) Tear Gas equipment.
- (b) First Aid equipment.
- (c) Loudspeakers.
- (d) Steel helmets.

Sd. I.U.Khan,  
Commissioner, Lahore Division.  
5-3-1953

Copies to all who were present in the meeting  
for favour of necessary action.

Sd/- I.U.Khan,  
Commissioner, Lahore Division.  
5-3-1953.

TOP SECRET.

From

M. Anwar Ali, Esquire,  
Inspector-General of Police, Punjab  
(on leave)  
care of the Hon'ble the Agent to the  
Governor-General in Baluchistan,  
( Q U E T T A )

To

The Hon'ble President of the Court of  
Inquiry appointed for the purpose of  
reporting on certain aspects of the  
disturbances which took place in the  
Punjab in March 1953.

Through:- The Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab,  
L A H O R E .

Sir,

The Punjab Government served upon me your order dated  
the 1st July 1953 which requires that I should submit my statement  
on the three terms of references namely:-

- (1) The responsibility for the disturbances.
- (2) The circumstances leading to the declaration of  
Martial Law on the 6th of March 1953, and
- (3) The adequacy or otherwise of the measures taken by the  
Provincial Civil Authorities to prevent and subsequently  
to deal with the disturbances.

2. I made over charge of the post of Inspector-General of  
Police in the Punjab on the 1st June 1953 and proceeded on four  
months leave. Your order was served upon me at Quetta where I  
have no access to Punjab C.I.D. and other official records. For  
the proper preparation of a case, correct in all details, it is  
necessary that the relevant official documents should be examined.  
Owing to reasons of health it was not possible for me to go to  
Lahore much as I wished. I have, therefore, been constrained to  
prepare the case from memory and the few documents which I sent for  
from the I.G. of Police, Punjab. I trust that the Hon'ble Court  
will forgive me if some of the details stated in my note are not  
correct. My statement is more in the nature of a report than a  
factual discussion of events. I have attempted to describe in  
brief the tragic events which took place and which ultimately led  
to the declaration of Martial Law as best I could. I maintain that  
an understanding of the events which took place and the manner in  
which the Ahrars built up their strength is necessary for the



proper understanding of the problem and for the investigation of difficulties which faced the executive administration.

3. My statement consists of five parts. The first gives a history of the Ahrar movement since the partition. I wrote this note before handing over charge; it is based on C.I.D. reports. It shows how the Majlis-i-Ahrar exposed and suspect, as it was, by clever manoeuvres rehabilitated itself and ultimately became so aggressive that by rallying religious opinion in favour of demands which were essentially its own delivered a direct-action challenge to the Prime Minister himself. Part II consists of some reports made by me as D.I.G., C.I.D. and as I.G. Police to Government pointing the danger of the allowing the Ahrar movement to continue unfettered. The proposal that the Majlis-i-Ahrar should be declared as an unlawful association was made as early as May 1950. In our report dated 20.12.1952, the growing discontent against Government was reported. Part III is a brief narrative of the February and March events which ultimately led to the declaration of Martial Law. Part IV relates to specific questions on which I have been directed by you to furnish a statement. Part V consists of a copy of a report which I made to Government after the Martial Law had been declared about the prevailing situation and a letter which I wrote to Secretary Interior immediately after the declaration of the Martial Law in which I suggested that a high level enquiry at the Central-Government-Secretary level should be held to find out why the movement gathered so much support. My object/<sup>was</sup> that the enquiry should be held as the terms of the well known Hunter Committee said "not to apportion blame or to visit penalties" but to help the administration in dealing with such situations more effectively in future. The problem is essentially an administrative one but efforts will be made by some of the organisations which have been declared a party and others to make political capital out of it.

4. Before handing over I held a meeting of Police Officers concerned and left instructions for the collection of information relating to the Police strength available, the action taken

readily. The Punjab Government may, if it  
 5. In preparing this statement I have not been able to take  
 any legal or other advice. The Punjab Government may, if it  
 considers necessary, have this done at Lahore for the purpose of  
 deciding whether any part of it should be deleted or withheld or  
 for including any material which may have been omitted.  
 6. My statement may kindly be treated as secret as it  
 contains information which in the interests of the State should  
 not be made public.

I have the honour to be

Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

Sd/- M. Anwar Ali



Index of Enclosures.

- Part I. - The Majlis-e-Ahrar a printed booklet 79 pages.
- Part II. Copies of some reports made to Govt. about the dangerous potentialities of the movement 23 pages.
- Part III. Report on the course of disturbances pages 56.
- Part IV. Report on the questions put by the court of inquiry 5 pages.
- Part V. (1) Note on the situation as it developed from 5th March 21 pages.
- (2) Copy of a letter to Secy. Interior 4 pages.

Copies of some reports made by Mr. Anwar Ali to Government pointing out the dangers of the Ahrar movement-

1. Report dated 28-5-1950 by Mr. Anwar Ali in which among other things it was proposed that the Majlis-i-Ahrar should be declared as an unlawful association. pages 1-5
2. Report dated 20-5-1952 by Mr. Anwar Ali with a forwarding note by Khan Qurban Ali Khan in which it was proposed among other things that Majlis-i-Ahrar should be declared as an unlawful association and its leaders arrested or subjected to other restraints. The note gave an account of the various unlawful activities committed or instigated by the Ahrars. Pages 6-13
3. Report dated 5-7-1952 in which it was urged that counter propaganda should be organised to counter the agitation of the Ahrars. Page 14
4. Report in which the existence of private volunteer armies was deprecated. Page 15
5. A note dated 22-10-52 put up by Mr. Anwar Ali which was put up by Khan Qurban Ali Khan to H. E. the Governor in which it was apprised that the Ahrar agitation was destructive and had dangerous possibilities. Pages 16-17
6. A note dated 17-12-52 by Mr. Anwar Ali in which it was pointed out that discontent was widespread and that it was necessary to apply desperate remedies. Pages 18-21
7. A report dated 22-2-52 by Mr. Anwar Ali in which the need for taking a firm line was emphasised.

Pages 22-23



Lately the Majlis-e-Ahrar has apart from making obscene and indecent references to the founder of the Ahmadya faith and the present Khalifa began to advocate violence advertently as well as inadvertently. It will be recalled that last year a young Ahmadi officer of the rank of a Captain was brutally attacked and killed at Quetta because he took exception to the conduct of certain anti-Ahmadia demonstrators. The Majlis-e-Ahrar was opposed to the partition of the Indian sub-continent. Ahrar leaders enjoyed the confidence of the Congress and used to hobnob with Congress workers. After the partition they went low. For a time they were afraid of public fury and used to give occasional statements to establish that they were loyal to Pakistan. They were purely on their defensive and did relief work in refugee camps and elsewhere. The members were scattered and for while the party broke up. Sayyed Ataullah Shah Bokhari shifted from Lahore and took refuge in a village in the Muzaffargarh district. Shaikh Hissam-ud-Din announced that his political career had come to an end and opened a Joint-Stock Company for the purposes of doing inter-dominion trade. For a while Shaikh Hissam-ud-Din was kept under detention u/s 3 of the P.P.S.A because his loyalty to Pakistan was questioned. One of his colleagues, Makhdum Shah Banauri, was also interned for some time.

2. When the Muslim League in this province became torn with dissensions and its influence suffered a severe set-back the Ahrars thought that it was high time for them to enter the political field. Accordingly, they started a series of Tablighi Conference-s. The burden of Ahrar speakers used to be that they were loyal to Pakistan, that they acknowledged the Muslim League/ as the only political party in the country, that the Kashmir Jehad was fully justified and that public effort should be mobilised for improving the defence of the country. Later

They also began to speak against the Ahmadis. The Majlis has some very effective speakers and soon S. Ataullah Shah Bokhari emerged from his retirement and with his eloquent tongue aroused public interest once again in his party. As time went on, the tone of the speeches continued to deteriorate. Other items on the programme were forgotten and the Ahrars began to concentrate on the Ahmadis vilifying them in a most shameful manner. As confidence was gained, Sir Zafarullah Khan began to be attacked and described as a traitor. The Ahrars are no longer on the defensive but have positively become aggressive. Conditions have now gone too far and bounds of decency and political morality have been surpassed. The following things which are significant have taken place:-

- (1) The writings of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad are quoted and neuseam or twisted and obscene and indecent inferences drawn.
- (2) Mirza Ghulam Ahmad and the present Khalifa are described as adulterers and given to unnatural indulgences.
- (3) The Ahmadis are described as traitors who have no loyalty towards Pakistan.
- (4) Sir Zafarullah is vilified and abused. He is often described as an "ass" and as a "Knave" and it is imputed to him that he will barter Kashmir to safeguard Ahmadi interests at Qadian.
- (5) Alarm is created in the public mind by giving out that Pakistan is governed by Ahmadis who are traitors. In pursuance of this plan lists of Army and Civil Officers who are Ahmadis are often published.
- (6) S. Ataullah Shah Bokhari has often said that if Mirza Ghulam Ahmad had claimed prophethood in his life time he would have killed him with his own hands.



(7) At a recent Ahrar meeting passions

were raised so much that a man in the audience got up and volunteered to kill Mirza Bashir-ud-Din.

(8) At a meeting at Multan which was addressed by

S. Ataullah Shah Bokhari, a man got up and asked if should go and kill Sir Zafarullah Khan.

(9) A booklet entitled " Al-Shahab" written by

Maulana Shabbir Ahmad Usmani in which it is made out that the Ahmadis are "murtads" and, therefore, deserved to be killed by every Muslim has been re-printed and is being circulated.

(This book was written by the late Maulana when a controversy had arisen about lynching of two Ahmadis in Afghanistan).

3. Against this the Ahrars have not made any constructive contribution for the manifold problems, economic, social political, etc. which confront Pakistan. They have practically no political programme except perhaps the desire to win supporters for the forthcoming elections.

4. Public memories are tragically short. Inspite of the fact that about two years ago the Ahrar leaders were looked upon with distrust and suspicion, they are able to attract large audiences whenever they address public meetings. There are few who question their bonafides or even care to ask why all this fuss is made about the Ahmadis. The Ahrars have partially achieved their objective: they have rehabilitated themselves and will before long emerge as political party not necessarily on the side of the Muslim League. They have their counter-part in India as well. If they are sincere they should have dissolved their organisation and should have become Muslim Leaguers.

5. The Ahrar leaders probably do not realise that they are playing with fire. A certain amount of buffoonery can be overlooked, but where feelings are inflamed to such an extent that murders, riots, the heaping of insults, etc. are threatened, a halt must be called. It may not be

advisable to proceed against the Ahrar leaders under the penal code ( in order to avoid raising further controversy) but their activities being prejudicial to the maintenance of public safety and public order, the following suggestions might be considered:-

- (a) Action should be taken where active violence is preached either u/s 3 of the P.P.S.A or for the abetment of the offence concerned.
- (b) Abuse and oblique insinuations against Sir Zafarullah Khan emanating from Ahrar leaders should on no account be tolerated. Any one who defames a Cabinet Minister in public, should be proceeded against u/s 21 of the PP.SA.
- (c) Indecent and obscene speeches which corrupt public morals and outrage public decency, should not be tolerated. Often Ahrar speakers have said that Mahatma Gandhi and their Khalifa slept together. Such abominable and nauseating humour should not be tolerated particularly in an Islamic State.
- (d) Lastly the question of declaring the Majlis-i-Ahrar as an unlawful association u/s 16 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1908, should be seriously considered.

6. H.A.L will recall that the Hon'ble Minister for the Interior expressed it as his opinion that the book entitled "Al-Shahab" which advocates violence against the Ahmadis should be immediately proscribed. It will also be recalled that he maintained quite rightly that unless action is taken at this stage against the Ahrar party and its workers, its popularity may have increased manifold and later action might give them the role of martyrs apart from creating practical difficulties. I might also mention that intelligent and sane people do not want depraved utterances on the part of Ahrar leaders to be countenanced.

7. I will be failing in my duty if I do not point out to Government that the atmosphere aroused by Ahrar



leaders is pregnant with dangerous possibilities and may lead to individual cases of violence against Ahmadis.

32/- M. Anwar Ali.  
D.I.G/C.I.D.  
Camp Murree.  
28.5.1950.

C.S.

Government has been apprised from time to time about the serious threat to public peace which must

inevitably result from Ahmadi baiting advocated by the Majlis-i-Ahrar. For facility of reference the particulars of these notes are given below:-

- (1) Note dated 17-1-1950 in which a suggestion was made that a warning should be administered to the Ahrar leaders. No action was taken on the note.
- (2) Note dated 3.2.1950, in which the objectionable propaganda carried out in the course of a conference at Multan was brought to the notice of the Government. The late Governor spoke to Qazi Ehsan Ahmad Shujaabadi and Maulvi Ghulam Ghaus Sarhadi.
- (3) Note dated 23-5-50, in which a suggestion was made that Master Taj Din and other Ahrar leaders should be sent for ~~and~~ warned. Government asked C.S. to administer a warning.
- (4) Note dated 28.5.50 in which it was stated that the atmosphere created by the Ahrars would inevitably lead to outbreak of violence against the Ahmadis and was also otherwise dangerous. Certain concrete suggestions for dealing with the menace were also made. Government, however, decided only to warn the leaders.
- (5) Note dated 4.4.1952, in which the dangers of the Ahrar movement were pointed out vis-a-vis the activities of the Ahrars at Sargodha. Government wanted more definite proposals to be made.

2. For a proper understanding of the case it is necessary to recapitulate the objectionable incidents which have resulted from the reckless and exciting speeches made by Ahrar workers. These incidents are briefly as follows:-

- (1) Osara-October-1950. Ahmadi preachers were



waylaid and their faces blackened. An Ahmadi Schoolmaster was killed as a result of the tense atmosphere created by Ahrar speakers.

- (2) Rawalpindi-October-1950. An Ahmadi was killed as a result of hatred spread against the community although the immediate cause was different.
- (3) Sialkot-January-1951. An effort was made by the Ahrars to break up an Ahmadi meeting. The arrival of the Police saved casualties.
- (4) Chak Jhumra-February, 1951. At the railway station as a result of Ahrar violence, a man( son of Maulvi Ismat Ullah, who is an Ahmadi) was stabbed by Ahrar workers.
- (5) Gujranwala-March, 1951. An Ahmadi shopkeeper was attacked when he objected to the raising of slogans against Mirza Ghulam Ahmad. The Police saved him from violence.
- (6) Iwallour- April, 1951. Following a threat held out by Ghulam Nabi Janbaz an Ahmadi shopkeeper was attacked.
- (7) Samundri-May, 1951. An Ahmadi mosque was burnt by a mob led by Ahrar workers.
- (8) Iwallour-November, 1951. An Ahmadi meeting disturbed by Ahrar workers resulting in casualties on both sides. Police intervention checked further trouble.
- (9) Multan-November, 1951. 50 Ahrars attempted to break up an Ahmadi meeting. The arrival of the Police prevented further trouble.
- (10) Sargodha-March, 1952. Following an Ahrar Conference a procession was taken out in defiance of Police order. The processionists were beating their breasts and shouting "Zafarullah Hai Hai".
- (11) Rawalpindi-April, 1952. After hearing the provocative and exciting speeches at an Ahrar meeting a youth got up and shouted "Zafarullah

Mirza ko hataya jawe- Wazir Zafarullah ko 8

qatal kia jawe, mar dia jawe". Ata Ullah Shah Bukhari, who was addressing the meeting, after the shouting of the slogans by the youth, exhorted the audience to take out a procession and to press for the dissolution of the "Zafri Wazarat".

- (12) Gujranwala-April, 1952. Ahrar workers organized a procession in which two mock funerals of Sir Zafarullah Khan were taken out and slogans, such as "Zafarullah puttar chor da, naara maro zor da" were shouted.
- (13) Lyalpur-May, 1952. Ata Ullah Shah Bukhari addressing a meeting said that anti Ahmadi demonstrations would be staged on a large scale and would not be confined to places such as Lyallpur but also in Lahore and Karachi. A procession was also taken out. (His voice was almost prophetic because on the 18th May, i.e. a week after his claim violent demonstrations resulting in riots took place at Karachi.)
- (14) According to a letter which has come to my notice paradise has been promised to the persons who will cut the throat of Sir Zafarullah Khan.

I have mentioned above only important incidents resulting in attacks and breach of peace arising from Ahrar truculence. Innumerable meetings have been held in which hatred against the Ahmadis has been openly advocated. Public mind has been poisoned. Ahrar leaders who were afraid of facing crowds after the partition, have since become heroes. Syed Ata Ullah Shah Bukhari lived in seclusion at a remote village of Muzaffargarh district for nearly two years and declined to accept invitations for addressing public meetings. He now commonly addresses meetings all over the province and is no longer on the defensive. His eloquence and loquaciousness have once again built



around him a halo of importance. Muhammad Ali

Jullundri, Ehsan Ahmad Shujaahabadi and Sahibzada Faiz-ul-Hassan are prominent among these who have been consistently making a poisonous speeches against the Ahmadis.

4. Warnings to Ahrar leaders have been administered in turn by His Excellency the Governor, the Chief Secretary and the Inspector-General of Police. These warnings have had no effect in fact it is obvious that the speakers are becoming more aggressive.

5. At one time Ahrar leaders were giving out that they had made up with the high-ups of the Muslim League and that they had nothing to fear even in spite of the fact that their speeches fell under the provisions of the ordinary law.

6. The Majlis-i-Ahrar has its headquarters at Lahore. It is without substantial finances and special levies are made for conferences. The last appeal for funds only brought Rs 500/-. The following four persons regularly contribute to the funds:-

1. Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan of Muzaffargarh.
2. Haji Din Muhammad, Mill Owner of Badami Bagh.
3. Mian Qamar Din, Rais of Ichhra.
4. Rana Ghulam Sabir, M.L.A. of Okara.

7. The Ahrars have a volunteer organisation which has a membership of 1064 persons throughout the province. At the time of partition the membership of shrunk as several volunteers resigned from the organisation. The membership was larger at one time. The party is at the moment only concerned in doing venomous propaganda against the Ahmadis. Lately demands have been made, in rather an objectionable way, for the removal of Sir Zafarullah Khan. The chief demand is that the Ahmadis be declared a minority community.

8. The Ahrars have a party paper- "Azad" which is published thrice a week. It has a small circulation. Its editor is Dr. Sabir Multani.

9. The elections of the All Pakistan Majlis-e-Ahrar have not been held since 1947. The Punjab elections

were held in November 1951 at Okara with the following results:-

President	....	Qazi Ihsan Ahmad Shujaatadi.
Vice President	....	Maulvi Abdur Rehman Mianvi.
General Secretary	...	Maulana Muhammad Ali Jullundri.
Secretary	....	Mehr Abdur Rahim Jhelmi.
Treasurer	....	Muhammad Shafi.
Salar-e-Suba	....	Chaudhri Meraj Din.

10. It will be recalled that immediately after the partition the Ahrar leaders were flirting with (General) Shah Nawaz of the I.N.A., who later shifted to India.

A prominent member of the Majlis-e-Ahrar of the united Punjab namely Habib-ur-Rehman, shifted to India.

One Farbodh Chandar who later became an M.L.A. and was a prominent Congress worker, handed over his hotel on the Meleed Road (Vira Hotel) to Agha Shorish Kashmiri and Nawazada Nasrullah Khan. Shorish resigned from the Majlis-e-Ahrar in 1948. He was previously a member of the Working Committee.

11. There is already a group amongst the Ahrar which favours collaboration with the opposition parties.

This group is led by Sheikh Hissam-ud-Din. Sheikh Taj Din Ansari, however, has been counselling moderation, and is opposed to an open breach with the Muslim League at this stage. So far Sheikh Taj Din's party is stronger. There is no doubt that when the Ahrars find that they have sufficiently rehabilitated themselves with the public they may openly break with the Muslim League and set up an independent party.

12. As pointed out above the mischievous speeches made by Ahrar workers have already resulted in a large number of incidents of breach of peace and physical violence. The latest incident at Karachi is a pointer to what can happen if the activities of the Ahrars are allowed to go uncurbed. Moreover it must be appreciated that if the Ahrars are allowed to gather strength and popular favour it will become more difficult to take action against them. They are no longer suspect as they were at the time of partition.



13. The above situation was discussed with I.G. Police and Home Secretary yesterday and the following recommendations are made for the consideration of Government:-

(a) The Majlis-e-Ahrar should be declared an unlawful association under section 16 of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act. (This suggestion was made by me as early as May, 1950).

(b) The following prominent workers should be arrested and detained under the Public Safety Act:-

- (1) Syed Ata Ullah Shah Bokhari.
2. Qazi Ehsan Ahmad Shujaabadi.
3. Muhammad Ali Jullundri.

Against Ata Ullah Shah Bokhari the material is very strong because his declaration at Lyallpur seems to indicate that the happenings at Karachi were within his knowledge.

(c) In case detention is not considered advisable the above three leaders should be restricted to their home villages.

all  
After/Ata Ullah Sha Bokhari lived of his own choice for two years in a village of the Muzaffargarh district. Muhammad Ali Jullundri( who is a refugee and has since settled in the Multan district) and Qazi Ahsan Ahmad Shujaabadi will have to be restricted in that case in the Multan district.

(d) In case it is not considered advisable to declare the Majlis-e-Ahrar as an unlawful association, its meetings at any rate for the next year or two, should be banned by orders under section 144, Cr.P.C.

14. At the meeting it was decided that it would be necessary to apprise that Central Government of what we propose to do in order to ensure uniformity of action. The Central Govt. should cooperate and ensure that similar action is taken in other provinces of Pakistan. It will be meaningless if certain bans are imposed on the activities of Ahrars in one province

only. We were also of the opinion that in case the Central Government does not propose to take action on the above lines, it would not perhaps be advisable for the Punjab Government to do so unilaterally.

15. In case Government agree with the above views a suitable draft for C.S.'s approval will be put up.

Sd/-M. Anwar Ali.  
20.5.52

I.G.

U.O.No. 305-BDSE dated 21.5.52.

I do not know how long will we remain at the stage of writing notes informing Govt. What the Ahrars are doing and what should be expected of them if they are not checked in time. The Ahrars have already done enough to show without any doubt, which way the wind is blowing in their camp. I am for one convinced in my mind that if Govt. continues with its present policy of leaving the Ahrars along the Ahrars will sooner or later perpetrate some such horrible crime that Government would find itself in a difficult position to explain their failure to take action upon what the C.I.D. has been repeatedly and vehemently reporting to them.

It is a difficult decision to take, I know, but some one has to take it. The Central Government is not likely to share the responsibility of getting involved in a matter which has the remotest chance of raising another opposition especially on an issue which may be exploited as a religious one-Muslim versus Ahmadis. There is a possibility of that. In fact the moment Ahrars are touched they will make that an issue. But some Govt. somewhere cannot give the masses a correct lead. If every party is afraid that the Ahrars will join hands with the opposition no one will even be able to maintain the law and order. And in fact the Ahrars are today no power. Tomorrow they



may become one. No sensible person can support their policy of violence. If Govt. is convinced that the conduct of the Ahrars calls for action, today is I submit, the most opportune time to take it. Before H.C.M. leaves for Murree it may be worthwhile to call a meeting of the Hon'ble Minister, C.S., H.S., D.I.G C.I.D. and the I.G.

S/- Qurban Ali  
20-5-52.

H.S.

U.O.No. 5/1788/52, dated 22.5.52.

C.S. may kindly see and obtain H.C.M's orders regarding the meeting proposed by I.G.P. which on account of the urgency of the situation must be held before H.C.M. moves for Murree.

SC/- S.Ghias-ud-Din  
22.5.52

C.S. (by hand)

SI/- H.A. Majid  
22.5.52

H.C.M.

Extract from a note of D.I.G., C.I.D.  
dated 5-7-1952.

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No.16(2)  
Vol.II  
Notes).  
"2. Reports are coming to the effect that much misunderstanding and mischievous propaganda is being spread in the rural areas. Innocent and simple masses are being made to believe that section 144 was clamped on mosques and the assembly of more than five persons both inside and outside mosques forbidden. Among the rumours which are spread are that under the influence of Sir Zafarullah Khan and his community the Government has made a law making it an offence for any Muslim to say that Ahmadis are Kafirs. This particular feature of the agitation is most unfortunate and vigorous steps are needed to counter it. Publicity on a big scale must be organised without delay and pamphlets or leaflets issued in large numbers. The aid of Khatibs and other religious divines should be enlisted for the purpose of explaining the Govt's policy. In almost all districts of the province the tempo of the agitation has increased."

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SECRET.

Copy of D.I.G./C.I.D's note dated 22-7-52.

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H.S. may kindly see the report in reference to his note dated 16-7-1952.

2. It will be seen that according to past records a large number of volunteers exist in different districts. So far there is nothing to show that the Majlis-e-Ahrar proposes to adopt aggressive tactics through its volunteers organisation. It will therefore be premature to take action against their volunteer organisation.
3. I have separately suggested that all private volunteer organisations, including those of the Muslim League, should be discouraged. Independence has now been acquired and there is no reason why private <sup>should</sup> armies/be maintained. Those who wish to serve their country can join one of the Government-sponsored organisations.
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No. 16(2)  
Vol. II.  
Notes:)

The main features of the agitation are as follows:-

- (1) M. Akhtar Ali Khan is materially supporting the agitation. At his instance it has been decided to print "notes" worth a crore which will be sold to the public and a fund built up for anti-Ahmadi agitation.
- (2) The tone of the speeches generally is marked by obscene, abusive and indecent references against the Ahmadis.
- (3) Social boycott and victimisation by other means have also been advocated. At Kabirwala the servants of the local Naib Tehsildar were prevented from making their day to day purchases. At Wazirabad the Municipality at the instigation of the Ahrars, dismissed two female school teachers who were Ahmadis. The D.C. is taking steps to get the resolution cancelled.
- (4) A number of Ahmadis as a result of the edium aroused against their community have been forced to send their families to Rabwah and quite a number have abandoned the Ahmadi faith. It is not known to what extent the decisions were voluntary and to what extent dictated by expediency.
- (5) Ignorant and illiterate Mullahs in the districts have taken the cue and have begun to attack the Ahmadis even in remote places of the Province. The movement is not constitutional and objectionable methods are being used for its advancement.
- (6) A number of Ahmadis women and children have secured permanent settlement permits from the Indian Deputy High Commissioner and will leave Pakistan for good. These women and children want to join the Ahmads who stayed behind at Qadian in spite of the post-partition riots. The Indian Government readily issued permanent settlement permits.
- (7) Anti-Government elements such as the Jama'at-e-Islami (the Jama'at has increased its eight demands to nine, the ninth being the declaration of the Ahmadis as a minority), the Islam League (it is particularly active at Rawalpindi), and individual opponents of the Government such as M. Abdus Sattar Niazi, have thrown their weight on the side of



the agitators.

(8) The significant feature is that after attacking the Ahmadis, most of the speakers fun down the Government and accuse it of inefficiency, corruption, food situation etc., This inclines one to the view that the anti-Ahmadi agitation is used as a device for mobilizing public opinion with a view to ultimately arousing contempt and hatred against Government

(9) At Rawalpindi much mischief was done because a secret letter in which a particular commanding officer had criticised the Ahmadis was filched from the office and published openly. One of the clerks (incidentally he belongs to the office of the D.D.M.I) in the course of his statement made wild allegations against Ahmadis officers.

(10) Although according to the latest information the Ahrar leaders feel<sup>a</sup> bit tired of their agitation, there has been<sup>no</sup> reduction in the number of meetings addressed in the mofussil.

My opinion is that the Ahrar agitation has dangerous potentialities. It has diverted the attention of the simple and ignorant masses from the essential issues which Pakistan. It is essentially destructive and has emphasized sectarian differences at a time when all ranks should have drawn closer to each other.

Sd: M. Anwar Ali  
22.10.52

H.E. would be interested to see this note. There can be no doubt whatever that if this Ahrar agitation is allowed to go on in this fashion, we will one day be faced with serious trouble. It may be easy to control it today, but it may become a difficult problem later.

Sd: Qurban Ali Khan,  
23.10.52

Sd: I. I. Chindrigar,  
24.10.52

U.O. 8/3215/52, dated 23.10.52.  
I.G. Police.  
D.I.G./C.I.D.

Sd: Qurban Ali Khan.

The Lahore Diary dated 15.12.1952 has probably been seen by Government already. It is typical of what is going on all over the country. Anti-Government propaganda has been intensified of late and the food situation is being vigorously exploited. Government is being ruthlessly abused, maligned and defamed. The confidence of the public is being sedulously destroyed and confusion and panic are spreading. In all circles, business, service etc, fierce criticism is being levelled against Government. In railway trains, private gatherings and at social functions there is one topic which arouses the deepest interest and that is anti-Government talk. Members of the League and Government servants are no exception and indulge liberally in such talks. People who return from Karachi, bring a grim picture, and say that Secretariat officers and other high-ups seem to have lost faith in the future and talk as if a collapse is imminent. The position is desperate and if the nation is to be saved from chaos and anarchy, effective measures should be taken without delay. It is true that some of the problems which <sup>face</sup> the country are stupendous but nevertheless an effort must be made. The situation is not as hopeless as some people are apt to believe.

2. The following matters deserve consideration:-

1) Publicity. Government publicity is extremely poor, particularly in this province. The Awad Pakistan Party, the Jamaat-e-Islami, the Ahrars, the Jinnah Awami League, the Islam League and the 'Ulema' have launched a concerted attack. They consider that the situation is favourable and such vigour and determination on their part is in evidence. M. Abdul Ala Maudoodi has suddenly become active and in the recent issue of the 'Tarjuman-ul-Quran' launched a very mean attack against the Government. He sees nothing good and is preparing public opinion for the purpose of bringing the downfall of the Government. A poster, recently



issued depicts that there is nothing good in the country and the Government should therefore be quickly and effectively destroyed. I am sure that Maudoodi's position could easily be assailed if his past attitude to Pakistan, to Kashmir and to service in the armed forces, (for which there is documentary evidence), was publicised. The same is the position of the Ahrars, the followers of Allama Mashriqi and other mushroom organisations who have suddenly leapt to the fore. Vitality in publicity work is needed.

(2) Morale of the services:- The worst criminals in spreading dismay are probably Govt. servants themselves. That their morale is low, cannot be denied. The increase in the cost of living, the failure of Govt. to honour service guarantees, the freedom given to irresponsible elements in the press to attack Govt. servants with impunity, the failure to recognise good service by the grant of medals, etc have combined to sap the morale of Govt. servants. Even those in higher income levels live on the margin and are not able to provide for their families in the event of premature death. For the efficient administration of the country a good contented public service must be built up. If Govt. servants lose confidence in themselves it will not be easy to check the rot. Perhaps a commission of a high level to enquire into the present state of affairs is the answer.

(3) Taking the public into confidence. Up till now the tendency has been to paint a complacent and bright picture and to gloss over national weaknesses. Almost all politicians in the course of their speeches, used to maintain that with the formation of Pakistan, poverty, injustice and lack of individual liberty would come to an end. The British and the non-Muslims were blamed for the ills which existed at that time. Confidence was boosted and the public were not trained to make a true appraisal of the situation and to face their weaknesses. Until lately, public leaders and Cabinet Ministers have been making statements that there is no shortage of food and



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that it will be possible to tide over the crisis without importing foodgrains from abroad. Similar propaganda is now being carried out about the next year and it is stated that the next year's crop would be a bumper crop and that the rice production will in any case be enough to offset wheat shortage. It has been said in official quarters that fertilizers are being issued which will enable the production to increase manifold. The fact on the other hand is that wheat sowing has been much below normal and the fertilizers have been issued in restricted areas only. Time has come when the public should be taken into confidence and should be made to face the situation with fortitude and courage. The habit of finding scapegoats is now reflected by the bitter propaganda against national leaders.

(3) Faith in the future. If a patient knows that his disease is curable and that everything is being done to rid him of his disease effectively and quickly, he acquires courage and puts up a better resistance. If on the other hand the patient knows that his disease is not curable and that steps are not being taken for his proper treatment, he dies an earlier death. The anti-Government propaganda carried out by the opponents of the Govt. and other destructive elements, has destroyed faith in the future. Quite a large proportion of the people are becoming pessimistic and feel that the situation is too far gone and cannot be successfully retrieved. Publicity could easily be organised and faith in the future built up.

(5) League on trial. There is no doubt that the prestige of the Muslim League has suffered and the public is becoming skeptical of this body. Members of the Muslim League are, there, on trial and must set an example of fair play. They must not interfere with the working of the services and should not claim advantages to which they are not justly entitled. They must support Govt. servants when they do justice and not expect them to accept 'safarish'. The members of the District League must make a contribution in combating the lack of morale



and should built up public confidence. At present their contribution in this behalf is precious little. The 'Mufad-e-Ama' committee which were set up with a certain amount of gusto, have done nothing to boast of.

(6) Mullahism. There is no doubt that most of the Mullahs rise from a class which is without education and has an extremely narrow outlook. The Mullahs have been built up by politicians themselves and instead of behaving as their supporters have turned on the very forces which created them. They are not to seek power for themselves and are the enemies of progress. An intelligent and educated class of Mullahs should be created and in the meantime the leaders should, when making speeches, not make promises in the religious fields which they know they cannot honour.

(7) Public feasting. In view of the acute food shortage public feasting and entertainment on a big scale should be stopped. Hon'ble Ministers and other high officers should, when on tour, discourage expenditure on entertainment, preparation of gates, etc. Some high officials of Government do not realise that even if they pay for their own expenses members of their establishment who accompany them, are not so considerate and make themselves a burden to the local officials.

Sd/- M. Anwar Ali  
17.12.1952.

Government may like to see the record of the speech made by Maulvi Muhammad Ali Jullundi at a meeting held at Lahore on 15.2.53. One thing is very significant and that is that in a loquacious moment he admitted that he and his party were opposed to the partition. He said further that the reasons why they held that view should become apparent to the people and that, in any case, if that awaking had not taken place it would do so within a year or two. He also condemned the Government vigorously, his main target being the H.P.M. The speakers also maligned not at this meeting the Chief Ministers of the Punjab and N.W.F.P. The H.P.M. is being branded as a Mirzal. In another meeting Ataullah Shah Bukhari described him a 'Budhalazina Ahmakoon' (dunce and fool). Contempt is a characteristic of the speeches.

2. At a time when food is short, unemployment rampant, business depressed and Kashmir popularly held to be lost, any one who attempts to spread confusion is no friend of Pakistan. It is my view that the Ahrars and the other Ulemas who are backing them have been singularly successful in diverting the public attention from the serious problems which confront the country. This confusion will weaken the determination of the people to fight the problems and to remedy them. We have evidence to show that the Ahrars took money from the Bahawalpur branch of the Azad Pakistan Party. They are sabotaging Pakistan. Govt. should gird its loins and face the menace. Sympathy of the intelligent public is being lost and the foreigners have begun to question the ability of the Govt. to face the crisis created by the Ulemas. The representative of the 'London Times' gave the impression to an officer of the Punjab Government that the Central Govt. was too weak to deal effectively with the existing problems. The British Deputy High Commissioner



in Lahore told me last night that he had been receiving reports that the situation in the country was very threatening and that a general flare-up was imminent. H.S. Suhrawardy, Malik Khizr Hayat Khan and the Nawab of Mamdot have met the British D.H.C. We have apprised the Central Government of the seriousness of the situation and let us hope that a firm line will be taken.

3. Maulvi Muhammad Ali Jullundri has been delivering objectionable speeches before also and others were issued that he should be prosecuted under section 124-A for a speech which he made at Montgomery. I am trying to find out what progress has been made in that case.

Sd/- M. Anwar Ali  
22.2.1953.

C.S.

PROVINCIAL CONNEXION.

I was D.I.G. C.I.D in the Punjab from the 15th August 1947 to 11th February 1953. from the date of partition until some date in October, 1948, I held in addition the charge of Provincial Transport Controller. For two and a half month from the beginning of August 1952, I officiated as Inspector General of Police also retaining charge of D.I.G. C.I.D. During the absence of Khan Qurban Ali Khan on leave. From April 1952 to the end of March 1953, I was also in charge of the special staff created by the Government of Pakistan for the investigation and prosecution of the Rawalpindi Conspiracy Case. This staff functioned first in the Punjab and later at Hyderabad (Sind). On the 11th February 1953, Khan Qurban Ali Khan retired from service and I took over as the permanent Inspector-General of Police.

ROLE OF  
PROVINCIAL  
GOVERNMENT  
IN SENIOR  
AND POLICE  
OFFICERS.

According to the Rules of Business of the Punjab Government the Inspector-General of Police is Joint Secretary in the Home (Police) Department. As such he is in charge among other things, at the Secretariat level, of internal defence. The Chief Secretary is in charge of "Public Tranquility" and for other Police matters including the administration of the Public Safety Act, the Secretariat work is dealt with by the Home Secretary. All important cases relating to law and order pass through the Chief Secretary. He is also in a way the head of the political branch of the C.I.D. In actual practice there is hardly any matter concerning law and order which the I.G. deals with entirely on his own initiative.

The D.I.G.C.I.D. is responsible for the provincial intelligence organisation and



in this capacity assists both the Government and the district officers. In his dealings with Government he marks papers about political matters direct to the Home Secretary or the Chief Secretary as the case might be. Reports relating to crime are, however, submitted to Government through the I.G. of Police by D.I.G. C.I.D. and not direct as in the case of political reports. The collection of intelligence is the responsibility of the C.I.D. as well as the District Security Staffs, the latter staffs are under the District Superintendents of Police and the C.I.D. staffs which have been <sup>into</sup> formed/groups are under the D.I.G. C.I.D. Both the C.I.D. group staffs and the District Security Staffs are, however, expected to work in close collaboration. For Lahore town, the responsibility for collecting intelligence is mainly that of the provincial C.I.D. Nevertheless there is a City Intelligence Staff formed out of the Lahore district strength in the charge of a Sub-Inspector which is under the disciplinary and operational control of the Senior Superintendent of Police, Lahore. The City Intelligence Staff liaises closely with the C.I.D. During my service as D.I.G. C.I.D. and also as I.G. Police the Sub-Inspector incharge of the City Intelligence Staff was required to appear before me every day the first thing in the morning on the opening of the office. I thus kept myself closely in touch with all that went on. Similarly, Inspectors in the C.I.D.

incharge of section were required to appear before me once a week and to tell all that went on their respective spheres of working.

The Range D.I.G is the adviser of the Commissioner and the District Magistrates within his field. His knowledge should be available at all times for promoting Police efficiency and for concerning measures for the better control of crime.

The Commissioner exercises general control over the administration of his division in criminal and other matters. The District Magistrate is the head of the criminal administration of the district and is responsible for the maintenance of law and order. The Police force in a district is under the general control and direction of the District Magistrate and it is he who is responsible for taking effective measures for effectively dealing with lawlessness and disorder.

The I.G. is the adviser to Government in all matters relating to the Police.

In the C.I.D the Majlis-i-Ahrar and the Jamaat-i-Islami were subjects for which Ch.Nazir Ahmed, (S.P.'B') was responsible. Separate staffs were in existence to deal with the working of these two bodies. The officer incharge of the Majlis-i-Ahrar was Sub-Inspector Muhammad Azeal. His immediate supervising officer in March 1963 was Inspector Abdul Rashid Khan. There are separate Ahrar and Jamaat-i-Islami Sections in the office and complete and upto date records are maintained about their workers and their activities.

Malik Habibullah was the Senior most S.P. in the C.I.D. He was designated as



A.D.I.G and in routine matters acted as

D.I.G. C.I.D. where as I.G I was holding charge of the C.I.D. in addition.

OFFICERS WHO WERE  
INFORMED WITH THE  
ADMINISTRATION OF  
AND ORDER AT  
THE TIME OF OPERATION.

When I took over as I.G. of Police on the 11th February 1953 I also retained the charge of D.I.G C.I.D. Mr. S.N.Alam was D.I.G. Lahore Range. A little earlier at the request of the late H.F.M. and H.M. Interior the Punjab Government agreed to release him so that he could take over in Karachi as I.G. Special Police Establishment. The Central Government had undertaken to give an officer of sufficient seniority in exchange. The plan<sup>was</sup> that the officer from Karachi would become one of the D.I.Gs in the Punjab and I would then hand over charge of D.I.G. C.I.D. Mr.S.N.Alam was also holding charge of Director Civil Defence in addition to his own duties. He obtained permission from the Hon'ble Chief Minister to visit Civil Defence Establishments in East Bengal and left 2 or 3 days after I took over as I.G. of Police. He returned to Lahore on the 1st March after the agitation had actually started. The current charge of D.I.G Lahore during the absence of Mr.Alam was held by Mirza Naim-ud-Din S.S.F. Lahore.

The District Magistrate in Lahore was Syed Ijaz Hussain Shah and the Commissioner Secretary in the Food and Civil Supplies Department.

PROVINCIAL AND  
CENTRAL GOVERNMENTS  
WERE FULLY INFORMED.

The Punjab C.I.D. submits regularly for the information of Government and other agencies the following reports besides special reports in which the political situation is reported:-

- (1) The Lahore Daily Diary.

- (2) The Provincial Situation Report. It is not issued daily except during an emergency but whenever there are matters which are considered important enough the report is prepared and submitted. During the agitation the Provincial Situation Report used to be issued twice daily/morning and after noon.
- (3) The Secret Abstract of Intelligence. This is issued weekly and the draft is prepared by the Assistant to the D.I.G. C.I.D. The document is printed but advance copies are submitted among others to the Intelligence Bureau and His Excellency the Governor through I.G./H.S./G.S. and the H.C.M.

Besides the above periodical reports other special reports and reviews containing important information and trends are submitted to Government by D.I.G. C.I.D. direct through H.S. Most of the important conferences held by the Ahrars were covered by C.I.D, Urdu Stenographers and whenever objectionable speeches came to notice they were promptly brought to the notice of Government for information and orders. Government is kept fully in the picture and it is one of the duties of D.I.G. C.I.D. to keep H.E. the Governor informed about political and other developments which have a bearing on the law and order in the course of his weekly interviews. In the Punjab the Chief Ministers do not hold such interviews but they keep themselves informed by going through the reports and otherwise keeping in touch.

Periodical reviews are prepared on political movements and copies sent to the Intelligence Bureau for the information of the Pakistan Government. The Intelligence Bureau is the medium for the dispersal of information received from Provincial C.I.Ds in the Ministries of the Central Government. Copies of all such reports are put up to the Provincial Government through the H.S.

As D.I.G C.I.D. I wrote comprehensive



notice which were in some cases printed in book form. A note on the activities of the Majlis-i-Ahrar was also written which has since been printed (Part I). Apart from this I have been suggesting according to as the situation demanded specific action with a view to dealing with threatening tendencies manifested by different political organisations. The Punjab C.I.D. was fully aware of the dangerous potentialities of the Ahrar movement and this point of view was stressed on several occasions with sufficient force. As early as 1950 (when Section 92-A was in force) a positive suggestion was made in the state that the Majlis-i-Ahrar should be declared as an unlawful association and its leaders arrested. It was visualised even at that time that unless action was taken the activities of the Majlis-i-Ahrar would lead to disturbance of peace and tranquillity. Other notes advocating similar action were submitted to Government from time to time. Copies of some of the notes which I was able to trace are appended to this report. Not only I as D.I.G. C.I.D. but Khan Qurban Ali Khan as I.G. of Police emphasised that the movement was dangerous and that a halt must be called to the activities of the Ahrars.

On the 22nd October 1952 the then I.G. of Police forwarded a note which I had written to H.E. the Governor in which the dangerous trends of the movement against the Ahmadis were emphasised.

The Central Government was also kept fully acquainted with the progress of the movement in the Punjab. Copies of the Lahore Daily Diary, the Provincial Situation Report, the Secret Abstract and other provincial reports were sent to the Director, Intelligence Bureau who is responsible for passing on information to the ministries concerned. In the conference of Chief Secretaries and I.G. Police held at Dacca in September 1952 I ( at that time I was

officiating as I.G. Police) pointed out that the Ahrars were engaged in disruptionist activities where were against the interests of Pakistan. The printed record of the proceedings of this conference is available. The Central Intelligence Officer (who an officer of the Central Govt.) is expected to maintain close liaison with the Provincial C.I.D. and for this purpose he is required to visit the Provincial C.I.D. Office regularly. The relations between the C.I.D. and the S.P.s of the C.I.D. were cordial and whatever information the former asked for was readily supplied. Copies of the Lahore Daily Diary, the Provincial Situation Report and the Secret Abstract are also applied to the Central Intelligence Officer.

The notice that direct action would be started if the three demands [namely (i) that Ahmadis should be declared a non-Muslim minority; (ii) that Sir Zafarullah Khan should be removed from the office as Minister of Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth Relations and (iii) that all Ahmadi Officers holding key posts should be relieved of such posts] were not met within one month was given in person by a deputation headed by Master Taj Din, President All-Pakistan Majlis-i-Ahrar to Khawaja Nazim-ud-Din, late Prime Minister of Pakistan on the 21st January 1953 at Karachi. Official information of the notice was sent to the Punjab C.I.D. by the Karachi C.I.D. in a letter which was despatched on 9.3.53 (three days after declaration of Martial Law in Lahore). No instructions as to the action to be taken or the policy to be followed were received from the Central Government. Master Taj Din was accompanied by



three other persons. As soon as I came to know about the notice through our own sources discussed the matter with the I.G. of Police who fully appreciated the gravity of the situation and the need for formulating a policy early. Both of us went to Mian Muntaz Muhammad Daultana and apprised him about the situation. I think the Home Secretary also went with us. The Hon'ble Chief Minister felt that as the notice had been given to the H.P.M. himself and as an answer to the three demands which had been made could be given by the Central and not the Provincial Government it was necessary before formulating a policy to make an official reference to the Ministry of the Interior. The Ahrars had been spreading rumours that the Central Government was sympathetic and the demands were likely to be conceded at any rate partially. It was decided that the C.I.D. should prepare a draft letter for the approval of the H.C.M. Mian Muntaz Daultana also directed me to inform Master Taj Muhammad Ansari to appear before him. It was his intention to warn him of the serious consequences of the action on which the Ahrars had embarked. As I was busy in taking over I was not able to prepare the draft personally and directed the C.I.D. Office to submit one to the Home Secretary for approval. I told Khan Zul Qurnain Khan, S.P./"A" C.I.D. to contact Master Taj Din and to tell him to see the H.C.M. On the 12th February I left for a tour of Multan and D.G. Khan Districts and on returning to Lahore on the 17th or 18th February I found that the draft had not been put up to Government. The office draft was not very lucid and was otherwise objectionable. I, therefore, prepared a fresh draft and took it to Syed Ghias-ul-Din Ahmad, M.S. who fully appreciated the

gravity of the situation. Both of us sought an interview with the H.C.M. and took the draft personally to him. He approved it but suggested slight alterations in the concluding paragraph. These alteration were made by the H.S. and the draft issued under his signatures in the form of a D.O. letter to Mr.G.Ahmad. Thus the Punjab Government letter was the first attempt at Governmental level so far as we know to force a decision.

In the meantime I also sent for Master Taj Din Ansari and had a talk with him. He agreed that public passion had been excited to a high pitch but nevertheless he assured me that he and other Ahrar leaders were confident that they would be able to control the situation satisfactorily. He said that he know of solution which he did not tell me but which he <sup>by</sup> thought would prove effective. He told me that he had seen the H.C.M. and that he had assured him that law and order would not be disturbed. Taj Din was very critical of the Central Government and said that he and his party men had many interviews with the H.P.M. and other Central Government Ministers. I warned him that if peace was broken the Punjab Government would be constrained to take firm action. The one month's notice given on the 22nd was extended later <sup>by</sup> five days by the Council of Action.

On the 25th February in the afternoon I received a message from the H.C.M. that I and the H.S. were required to go to Karachi immediately by air and that we should hold ourselves in readiness for the purpose. He informed me that arrangements to Commandeer aircraft were being made. On the following <sup>morning</sup> (the 26th) the H.S. and I were sent for to the house of Mian

CALL FROM  
KARACHI.



Mumtaz Muhammad Daultana at about 10 a.m. Ch. Muhammad Hussain Chatha was already there. The H.C.M. said that we were to leave for Karachi at about 12 in the Governor-General's Viking and that the representatives of the N.W.F.P. Government would also accompany us in the same aircraft from Lahore. He then discussed the direct action threat. Ch. Muhammad Hussain Chatha was to go as the representative of the Punjab Government and the H.S. and I were to act as his advisers. The Central Government had asked for Mr. I. I. Chundrigar and the H.C.M. to come. Both had however urgent engagements and could not therefore go. Ch. Muhammad Hussain Chatha would represent the H.C.M. Mian Mumtaz Muhammad Daultana briefed us suitably. We were to say that the demand of the Majlis-i-Ahrar and their supporters was highly retrograde and must therefore be resisted with firmness. He told us that it would be wrong to minimise the strength of the agitation but nevertheless it was necessary to take a firm stand. He, however, told us to point out that to suppress the agitation not only determination but show of strength was necessary. With these instructions we went to the airfield. H.E. Mr. Ghulam Muhammad had reached Lahore in the morning to attend the Horse Show. We found that H.E. Kh. Shahab-ud-Din and Hon'ble Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan had already arrived. All five of us left at about 12 noon and reached Karachi at about 4-30 p.m. At the Lahore airfield I received a telephone message from Mian Mumtaz Muhammad Daultana that we were to say that the attitude which he had taken had the full support of his Cabinet colleagues. At the Karachi Airport we were received at about 4.30 p.m. by certain officials and taken direct to the house of the

Hon'ble Prime Minister of Pakistan in Government transport. A cabinet meeting was in progress. Chief Secretary Sind, I.G. Sind, Chief Commissioner Karachi, I.G. Karachi, Mr. Sikandar Mirza, Defence Secretary and Director Intelligence Bureau (Mr. Kazim Raza) arrived after some time. The first session of the Cabinet which Ch. Muhammad Hussain Chatha attended concluded at about 9 p.m. Mr. Ghias-ud-Din and I were called in for about ten minutes and asked certain questions about the Majlis-i-Ahrar. After the meeting we dispersed but at about 2 a.m. I was awakened (I was staying as guest of the Governor of Sind) and informed that I was required immediately in the Prime Minister's house. Ch. Muhammad Hussain Chatha had already arrived at the H.P.M.'s house when a Cabinet meeting was in progress. The H.S. Punjab had apparently not been found and was, therefore, not present. The Cabinet was in session and there were besides H.P.M. Secretary of the Interior, Chief Commissioner Karachi, I.G. Karachi, the Deputy Chief of Staff (General Musa) the Governor and the Governor of Sind and Chief Minister of the Frontier Province. We were informed at the meeting that the Khatm-i-Nabuat agitators had held a meeting in the evening in Karachi and decided to picket the house of H.P.M. with effect from 6 a.m. on the 27th February. Between 3 and 4 a.m. (about 2½ hours before the pickets were to be posted) the decision to deal with the agitators was taken. The representatives of the Punjab were advised to take the following actions:-

- (1) Arrest all the prominent leaders of the agitation (I informed the meeting that a list had already been prepared).
- (ii) Arrest Maulana Akhtar Ali Khan of the Zamindar.
- (iii) Ban The Aaad (Ahrar paper), the Al-Fazal



( the Qadiani paper) and the Zamindar.

- (iv) Mirza Dahir-ud-Din Mehmud was to be warned not to move out of Rahwah or to do anything which would cause further excitement.
- (v) Stop movement of volunteers to Karachi by taking action to the station of embarkation.

We learnt later that the Cabinet meeting had been called on receipt of the Punjab Government letter. The notice of one month which was later extended by five days had actually expired when the Cabinet concluded its meeting.

At 8 a.m. in the morning we were flown back to Lahore via Peshawar where the Governor and the C.M. of the Frontier Province disembarked. We reached Lahore at about 4 p.m. From the Peshawar Government House (where H.B. the Governor kindly took us for lunch) I alerted Malik Habibullah A.D.I.G. on the telephone and told him to come to my bungalow alongwith Khan Zul Qurnain Khan, Stenographers and all relevent papers. The list of persons who were to be round up had already been prepared. From the airfield all three of us went to the house of Mian Murtaz Muhammad Daultana and told him the decisions which the Central Cabinet had taken. He approved of the proposals and also said that the H.S. and I should send for Khawaja Nazir Ahmad, Managing Proprietor of C & M Gazette and warn him to see that nothing inflammatory was published in his newspaper (The C & M.G has a pro-Qadiani bias). From the C.M's house we went to my house on the Gulberg Road where the two S.Ps of the C.I.D. were already waiting for us. Orders for the arrest of about twenty persons who were leaders of the agitation were issued; some of them were outside Lahore and messages by wireless and telephone were drafted and despatched to S.Ps concerned, there and then.

ACTION TAKEN  
LAHORE  
C.I.D.  
C.I.D.

At that time, the policy was to keep the Ahrars isolated and not to go for unwary persons who had been dragged into the movement by misrepresentation and fraud. The Director of Public Relations was apprised of the action which was contemplated against newspapers. The orders, were, however, prepared by C.I.D officers and issued under signatures of the Home Secretary. The H.S. also drafted a letter to all Commissioners, D.I.Gs, District Magistrates and S.Ps in the province, apprising them of the action which had been taken. This draft issued on the 1st March after it had been seen and approved by the Chief Secretary. I think the Home Secretary issued wireless instructions to D.Ms about it. Kh: Fazir Ahmad was sent for and suitably spoken to in accordance with the instructions of the H.C.M.

Most of the persons concerned were rounded up during the following night. Some of the prominent leaders including Master Taj Din Ansari, Sahebzada Faiz-ul-Hassan, Muzaffar Ali Shamsi and Abu Hasnat Muhammad Ahmad Qadri were in Karachi and were arrested in the course of the raids which were carried out in the early hours of the night between the 26th and 27th February.

STICK TO THE  
ED OF  
CERE.

The arrest of agitation leaders throughout the Punjab and in Karachi and the issue of a Central Government communique caused considerable surprise in the Ahrar and Jamaat-i-Islami circles. This was the first time that a general round up of Ahrars who had been engaged in preaching sectional hatred had been made. Maulana Abul Ala Maududi promptly issued a statement in which he condemned the Government tartly. He immediately called a meeting of the Majlis-i-Shura (the meeting was actually held on the 4th & 5th



March). Maudoodi also met some of the Khatm-i-Nabuwat leaders namely Abdul Sattar Niazi, Maulana Dawd Ghaznavi, Khalil Ahmad at his house on the 26th February. He undertook to produce literature for the education of the intelligentsia which he thought did not understand the issue and was apathetic. The "Qadiani Maala" was the outcome. The Punjab/did not publish the statement of Maudoodi. It was published by the Jamaat at Karachi in the form of a poster which<sup>was</sup>/later broadcast throughout the Punjab. Among other things while commenting on the arrests the Maulana asserted that the intelligence of Ministers of the Government of Pakistan had descended to the level of an ordinary thaneedar. He asserted that there was no justification for arresting persons who only emphasised a demand which was popular as well as based on reasons.

THE FORM OF  
DIRECT ACTION.

The leaders of the agitation did not themselves know the form which the threatened direct action was to take. Certain facts were, however, clear, the most prominent being that the agitation would be carried out at Karachi <sup>at</sup> and not/any other place. It seems that the Ahrar plan was to make a show of force and to brow-beat the authorities in Karachi. They had carried the agitation too far and they knew that unless the demands were met even if partially they were faced with political annihilation. The bluff had been carried too far and there was no going back. They did not wish to force a head on collision with Government and their hope was that some such thing as resignation by Sir Zafarullah Khan or his dismissal would come

about and their face saved. ~~Sahibzada~~ Faiz-ul-Hassan had been appointed the first dictator and in this capacity he toured the Province and enrolled a large number of volunteers enthusing them with a spirit of sacrifice. The volunteers were willing to proceed to Karachi and to obey completely the order of the Council of Action or the Majlis-i-Amal as it was called. A volunteers camp was set up in the Municipal Gardens outside Delhi Gate in the vicinity of Majlis-i-Ahrar Office. The intention was to have a number of volunteers at hand and to despatch them to Karachi as the need arose. Sufficient funds had been collected for financing their travel to Karachi. The leaders of the agitation knew that Section 144 Cr.P.C. would be clamped in Karachi and meetings and processions banned. For this they were prepared and their plan was to defy the orders and to Court arrests if necessary. The large number of volunteers who had been enlisted were to carry on the agitation until some saving formula was found. Later we discovered that one other item on the programme was to picket the house of Hon'ble Prime Minister at Karachi. In early 1960, Allama Mashriqi had made a similar plan to collect a large number of Khaksars at Karachi. His entry in Karachi was banned and the Punjab Government later arrested Mashriqi and his lieutenants.

The leaders did not clarify their attitude towards the Punjab Government. It was said at one occasion that if the Punjab Government would stop the movement of volunteers from the Punjab to Karachi the orders could be defied, and simultaneously the direct action



would be started in the Punjab. We have also a C.I.D report according to which Maulana Akhtar Ali Khan told the agitation leaders that so far as the Punjab was concerned he would see that the Government did not create any difficulties.

The town of Lahore was divided into a number of areas to each of which workers were allotted. Propaganda was carried out incessantly by word of mouth and through congregational addresses in mosques and public opinion aroused against the Qadianis. The Ahrar leaders met almost daily in their office and took stock of the situation and issued instructions when necessary. A high tempo of activity was maintained. Behind all this activity, however, there was a feeling that the situation would so develop that it would ultimately not be necessary to resort to direct action or to defiance of the law. They were confident that they had aroused so much public opinion in support of their demands that the Government would ultimately give in and their efforts crowned success. The Zamindar and the Azad maintained the propaganda at the same high pitch. Strangely enough the Muslim League papers such as the Afaq, the Thean and the Maghribi Pakistan did not condemn the demands. The only papers which were opposed were the Pakistan Times, the Imrooz (which are Communist papers) and the Nawa-i-Waqt whose editor Hamid Nizami is an Ahmadi but even they did not take a strong line. The atmosphere had become so much charged that people were afraid of condemning the demands whatever their private convictions. The Zamindar had increased its sale by writing vigorously in favour of the demands. The C & M

PROPAGANDA  
REVENUE AND  
TAXES

Gazette is looked upon as a Qadiani paper and in any case has a limited circulation.

One factor which greatly helped the Ahrars to advance their cause was that many Mullas in the province had a pro-Ahrar bias. While delivering congregational addresses they made pro-Ahrar propaganda. One item on the Ahrar plan was to capture mosques or at any rate to bring their Imams under their influence. The prominent centres of Ahrar activity were Sargodha, Rawalpindi, Sialkot, Lyallpur, Gujranwala and Multan. At each of these places there were not only ardent field workers but mullas incharge of mosques with sympathies for the Ahrars.

THE AGITATION  
BEGINS IN LAHORE.

In Lahore, meetings used to be held in the garden outside Delhi Gate and later in the Wazir Khan Mosque. The reason why the Wazir Khan mosque was selected as a venue of meetings was that its Imam Abu Har<sup>at</sup> Muhammad Ahmad Qadri was an active member of the Council of Action. His son Khalil Ahmad though not a member took charge of the movement when his father went to Karachi.

On the 28th February a meeting was held in the afternoon and after its conclusion a number of volunteers mainly those who had come from outside presented themselves for arrest. The important leaders had gone to Karachi <sup>in</sup> and their absence the movement became disorganised and violent in later stages and riff raffs took command. The volunteers who had offered for arrest were taken in a procession which finally ended up near the Charing Cross at about 5 p.m. As soon as I received information (I was at that time in the Horse Show grounds) I went there. The District Magistrate and the Senior Superintendent of Police alongwith



Police Reserves some of whom were armed and the Gas Squad were present. The procession was stopped near the Taxi Stand on the Mall. The crowd was, however, not unfriendly and was on the whole peaceful. It consisted largely of street urchins shabbily clad and bare-footed who were shouting merrily abusing Sir Zafarullah Khan, the Ahmadiya Khalifa, members of the Provincial and Central Governments and the Governor-General. They had little sticks which were used for producing a kind of music to the accompaniment of the slogans which were being raised. They obeyed the orders which were given to them. The organisers and those who had come to court arrest were at the back. They sat down, made a demonstration and finally some persons with garlands came out and said that they wanted to be arrested. Section 144 Cr.P.C. had not been promulgated and it was explained to them that they had committed no contravention of the law and could not, therefore, be committed to custody. Nevertheless in order to clear the road and to facilitate the movement of traffic the persons who came forward were put in lorries and driven away to the outskirts of the town where they were released. The procession had in the meantime dispersed. The boys in threes and fours continued to shout anti-Ahmadiya slogans on their way home. The demonstration was more in the nature of a burlesque rather than a religious demonstration. The expressions which were used were vile and even obscene. The urchins who were in it seemed to enjoy thoroughly. I am not definite but I think a hartal was observed on the 28th February; otherwise the city was normal, offices were open and people moved about the streets as usual.

Abdus Sattar Niazi who was not a member of the Council of Action and in whom the Ahrars and

other leaders of Khatm-i-Nabuwat agitation had no faith suddenly. leapt into the field. His entry was made easy because the prominent leaders of the agitation had been arrested and there was a vacuum. On the 2nd/<sup>or</sup> the 3rd March he shifted to the Wazir Khan mosque with bag and baggage. Abdus Sattar Niazi had come to notice for making anti-Ahmedia speeches and had pungently attacked and abused Mian Muntaz Muhammad Daultana as well as members of the Central Government. He is a rabid zealot. He is a good speaker but has no control over his tongue. He is a misanthrope and his genius is destructive. Whenever an opportunity has offered for defaming Government he has not allowed it a slip. He made speeches in Lyallpur, Sargodha and other districts and had also addressed Friday congregations in the Nila Gumbaz mosque. His speeches were violent and defamatory of the Government and the leaders of the Muslim League. On a number of occasions his speeches, many of which were recorded by C.I.D. Stenographers, were examined for the purpose of deciding whether a prosecution should be instituted or not. Almost always it was thought best to leave <sup>him</sup> alone and not to give him prominence by putting him in court. He was treated as a mad cap.

On the 1st March in the afternoon another procession was taken out which was stopped near the Charing Cross as before. Again the crowd was non violence, mirthful and willing to obey orders. The majority of the processionists as before consisted of little boys who looked upon the whole affairs as a fascinating sport. The procession was bigger and stayed longer before. Those who had come to arrest were taken in custody. The number of spectators was large. More obscene



language was used. On the following day ( I think) Maulana Maudoodi issued a statement condemning the way in which a demonstration which was claimed to be religious was made. Maudoodi's statement appeared in the press. There was no Hartal in the city and everything was normal, there being no rancour or bitterness.

When the warrant for the arrest of Maulana Akhtar Ali Khan was taken to him by a Police Officer on the 27th February he asked if he would be let off if he give written undertaking to show that he had severed his connection with the agitation. He was taken to the Civil Lines Police Station where he wrote out a draft in which he said that he would disassociate himself absolutely from the agitators. He affirmed that he was a well-wisher of Pakistan and did not want to disturb the peace. At the same time he represented that the order banning his paper should not be served as he was prepared to give an undertaking that he would not permit it to be used a medium of Ahrar propaganda. Khan Zul Qurnain Khan through whom both the orders had to be served came to me in the Government House (where a dinner party had been given to H.E. the Governor-General) and asked for instructions. The H.C.M. was not there and I told Khan Zul Qurnain Khan to take his orders. When the facts were put before him, the H.C.M. agreed to both the orders being held in abeyance. I think I told about the development to both the G.G. and the Governor. On the following morning (1.3.53) H.E. the G.G. was to return to Karachi and the apology written by Akhtar Ali Khan was shown to him at the airfield.

M. Akhtar Ali Khan is a weak minded man;

He is unreliable and is a swinger. He did not wish to go to Jail at any rate in the beginning. In fact he was under the impression like all Ahrar Leaders that the need to court arrest would not arise. In any case, Taj Din Ansari wrote to him from Karachi (the C.I.D. have a copy of the letter) that the party did not want him to be arrested and that he should stay at Lahore and organise the agitation without in any way incurring the risk of arrest. This arrangement suited Akhtar Ali Khan. In fact - he was <sup>to patch</sup> even prepared/up with the authorities by giving a written undertaking. His intention was to keep the fact of his having offered an apology secret, but as always happens, the news got out and spread like wild fire. The Ahrars and their friends were angry. A crowd collected and went to the Zamindar office. They raised slogans and called upon Akhtar Ali Khan to come out and to explain why he had abandoned the cause of the movement. When he did not come out brick batting was carried out as a result of which window panes were broken and damage done to property. Akhtar Ali Khan's son came out and said his father had gone to his village in Gujranwala District and would return in a few days and appear before them. Akhtar Ali Khan was at Karam Abad, District Gujranwala. Some local workers called on him. When he faced the crowd he lost his nerve and denied that he had given an undertaking. On the contrary he said that he was ready to court arrest. He came to Lahore on the 2nd and addressed a public meeting in the Wazir Khan Mosque. He spoke like a demagogue, had himself garlanded and led a procession. Some of the agitators who knew the real story wanted to make it impossible for Akhtar Ali Khan to back out. They took him through the streets longer than usual and on the way collected



a large number of people. The procession thus swelled as it went along. It was first expected to come out of the city walls from Bhati Gate but it went back towards the Zamindar office on the McLeod Road. Police detachments had been collected at the Charing Cross. The processionists in fact themselves did not know what route to take and they were in the hands of unthinking and excited riff raff. At one time it was feared that the procession would make it's way to Governor's House via the Empress Road near Simla Bihari. Some Police platoons were sent off from the Charing Cross to reinforce that sector. Ultimately the procession <sup>came</sup> ~~mean~~dering its way to the Assembly Chamber. It was bigger and rowdier than that of the preceding two days. The so called leaders had no control and boys and scally wags who were again in large numbers were running helter skelter. Obscene and abusive shouts were being raised. Some were doing "Siapa" (mock mourning). The number of persons who had come <sup>to court</sup> to arrest was larger. The processionists were excited having worked themselves up by raising slogans. They did not obey their leaders and resembled more a rabble than a religious procession. They made attempts to push through the Police barricades. At one time they were abusive and aggressive and unlike the day before it looked as if force would have to be used. They were at least ten thousand persons most of them entirely unruly. Many persons who did not set out with the intention of courting arrest got into a state of frenzy and began to push the Police saying that they should be arrested. While the arrests were being made, a large number of processionists about a thousand in number suddenly rushed at the place where the arrested persons had been seated prior.....

to their removed in lorries. Brick bats, empty tins, bottles, and other missiles were thrown at the Police. Several Police Officers including Mr. Taylor, S.P. Technical received injuries. We had to put on tin hats to protect ourselves. A mild lathi charge was made which had the desired effect. There was more hooliganism. The arrested persons with the exception of Maulana Akhtar Ali Khan were taken away this time to a more distant place to be released as before. Maulana Akhtar Ali Khan, was, however, arrested under the warrant( under the Public Safety Act) previously issued and sent to Jail. Akhtar Ali Khan, normally a timid and nervous person had become infected with excitement and was in a fighting mood. He continued to excite his followers and made no effort to pacify or control them.

On the 28th evening, the day on which the first procession was dealt with the Home Secretary also came on the scene. The Commissioner was, however, not present. When the news of the approach of the procession reached my house on the 1st March I went to Commissioner's house and asked him to come along to the scene. I apprehended that the situation might deteriorate and in that went the presence of the Commissioner would be necessary. I also brought him in my car on the 2nd March. The Home Secretary came on all three days. Mr. Alam, D.I.G. Lahore returned from Dacca on the 1st March and was present at the site when the processions were dispersed and arrest made on the 1st and 2nd March.

i . . . . . Daily after the dispersal of the processions we used to go to the house of the Chief Minister where a meeting used to be held. In the



later stages the other members of the Cabinet also used to be present. The situation used to be reviewed and a plan for the following day made. As the D.P.R. was ill, the Home Secretary was entrusted with the task of publicity. After the 2nd March the Commissioner went away probably to Sialkot and Gujranwala under Government orders. Mr. Alam was also sent out.

After the procession had been dispersed we went to Civil Lines Police Station and discussed the situation. We were all of the opinion that the situation had deteriorated and even threatened to get out of control. The procession was unruly and on the following day a much more rowdier demonstration would be made. The Ahrar leaders had been exciting the feelings and passions of the common man for a long time. Any one can raise passions but few can control or keep a crowd peaceful when such passions have been raised. The Ahrars did not understand that their agitation <sup>would</sup> one day cause the mobs to get completely out of their control. Mahatma Gandhi realised this feature and advocated the cult of non violence. The Chara Chauri incident was the result of ignoring the cardinal fact that Indian and Pakistani masses when once excited will not even listen to their own leaders. An orgy of murder, violence and arson must inevitably follow. We felt the need for calling an immediate halt. So far no Ahmedi had been molested but if no action was taken, violence was almost certain to break out. A sign of general deterioration was that daily thousand of spectators began to collect to see the Police clash with the agitators. Even women used to come and wait and watch the fun. The traffic

remained held up while the demonstration continued. On the 2nd March we realised that unless the processions were broken up from the start, law and order was certain to be disrupted. Accordingly the H.S., the Commissioner, myself, the D.C., the range P.I.G., S.S.F. and other officers in our meeting in the Civil Lines Police Station decided that it was necessary to enforce 144 Cr.P.C. outside the Circular Road. We were of the opinion that if processions and meetings were banned throughout the city greater passions might be raised and that the area inside Circular Road should be open for meetings and processions. This would also prove safety valve. From the Civil Lines Police Station we went to the house of the C.M. and put up our proposals to him. We also suggested that as there was a likelihood of orders under section 144 Cr.P.C. being defied it was necessary to call troops in the town and to make a show of force. I also decided to send for the Border Police and to place pickets at various strategic points. The G.O.C. was called by the Chief Minister to his house. These arrangements were approved and we returned to Police Station Civil Lines to work out the details. The Military officers who came under the directions of the G.O.C. to the Police Station were apparently not aware of the legal position and demanded a requisition in writing at the governmental level. The correct position is that the P.M. can requisition troops orally when there is no time to put in a written requisition and a reference from Government is not necessary. To cut short the arguments I advised the H.S. to put in the



requisition in the form in which it was demanded.

It was decided that the Military would patrol on the following day in the city in bren carriers and tanks and their main concentration located in the Jinnah Garden from where detachments rushed when necessary. Static Police Pickets and mobile patrols would also be turned out. The D.M. promulgated orders under Section 144 Cr.P.C. and other operational orders were issued. The enforcement of Section 144 was also broadcast on the radio.

On the 3rd the City was patrolled by the Military from morning till evening and Border Police pickets took up positions at strategic places. The strength of Police Stations was reinforced and sufficient constabulary platoons were given "stand to" orders. The Border Police Commandant was able to spare only 200 men. Most of his force was spread along the border and more men could be found from this force only by reducing the strength of posts on the border. One of my main tasks was to conserve the Police strength. The demands were increasing, from some district frantic calls for more Police were being received. They were met according to their relative urgency. Platoons were despatched to Lyallpur, Sialkot, Montgomery, Sargodha, Gujranwala and some other districts. Normally districts reserves are moved from one district to another. On this occasion, no district for good reasons of course was prepared to let its reserves go. Demands for gas squads were also received and in the case of at least two districts they were met. We were lucky as attempts to reduce the strength of the Constabulary were made at the time when the budget was prepared. The then Chief

Secretary was in favour of arbitrarily reducing one thousand men. What might have happened if the strength had been reduced is too horrible to imagine.

Conferences were held every morning and evening in P.S. Civil Lines and late in the evening the situation used to be reported to the Chief Minister in the presence of his Cabinet and guidance obtained. When the decision to call troops was made the C.S. was also present in the Chief Minister's house.

On the 3rd there was calm in the city and the presence of Border Police and patrolling troops had an excellent effect and no procession came out in the prohibited area to defy the ban. Small collections were, however, broken up by the Police at a few places. It was policy to break up processions at the source instead of allowing them to come right into the Civil Lines. Near the point of formation the size was smaller and comparatively less resistance was offered. A meeting was held outside the banned area in the evening and in spite of much excitement the wise decision of not defying the ban was taken. Magistrates accompanied troops in the patrolling vehicles. Business was normal, there was greater confidence generally. The presence of troops and the Police made every one feel that hooliganism and rowdiness would not be tolerated. It looked that the corner had been turned and the situation would improve.

#### THE 4TH OF MARCH.

On the 4th without consulting us the Military patrolling in the city was stopped. The H.S. and I spoke to the Liaison Officer when we came to know about it on return from the office in Police Station Civil Lines. He agreed to start it again and I think that some patrolling was actually carried out in the Civil Lines area after our talk. I am not sure but I also think that the strength



of troops in the Jinnah Garden was also reduced by one or two companies. Small processions were formed and volunteers came out. They were dispersed by our mobile striking force. The Civil Lines area was kept completely free from trouble. Near the Dalga-ran Mosque on the Circular Road a procession was broken up by a Constabulary party which was in the charge of Malik Khan Bahadur. While I was in the Police Station I came to know that processions were being formed near the Tollinton Market and were proposing to come on the Mall. I immediately went there with a Police party. Two processions were dispersed by mild lathi charges, one near the Tollinton Market and the other near the General Post Office on the Mall. Arrests were also made at both places.

I had felt for some time that our publicity organisation was very weak. Much malicious and false propaganda was being done against the Government. This was accepted as true by the simple masses and the credit of Government was suffering. The H.S. and I pointed this out to the H.C.M. Mir Nur Ahmad, the Director of Public Relations had fallen ill and his assistants did not display the necessary zeal and energy. Routine activity was not going to save us. Imagination and hard work was necessary. The public mind had become poisoned and it had to be cleaned. The process was not any easy one but it was worth making.

On the 4th evening I sent for the Director of Lahore Radio Station to the Civil Lines Police Station and asked him to arrange some talks on the need for maintaining peace and eschewing sectional strife. We also sent for some respectable persons including representatives of the Chamber of Commerce and asked them to use their influence in restoring

law & order. They offered to co-operate. I also rang up Mian Amir-ud-Din who is a personal friend of mine and asked him if he would agree to issue a statement on behalf of the Jinnah League inviting the public to keep the peace. He was suffering from fever but nevertheless he contacted the leader of his party the Khan of Mandot and put up my suggestion to him. The, Khan, however, declined to issue any statement and Mian Amir-ud-Din conveyed this reply to me. I was very disappointed at this attitude. I also had some posters printed containing slogans to divert the public attention. The posters were sent to Police Station Kotwali for distribution on the 4th evening. They were printed at the C & M. G Press through Abdul Wahid, the representative of Dawn in Lahore.

Abdul Sattar Niazi, Ghulam Ghaus Sarhaddi, Muhammad Hussain Salar, Maulvi Mohd Yusuf of Sialkot, M. Khalil Ahmad and other second and third line workers decided to make their movement a success even at the risk of destroying the country. The tactics which they adopted explain the above point of view. They were not interested in the good name of the country, the safety of Ahmadi lives and property or in the maintenance of the peace. They did not consider any method too bad provided it would bring humiliation and bad name to Government, weaken the Police and earn them cheap appreciation from the public. With this objective in mind they resorted to the following tactics:-

- (1) Spreading of false rumours to inflame the public mind. Among the many rumours which were spread the most mischievous was the one about the desecration of the Holy Quran by the Police. It was said that on the 4th March the Police while breaking up a



procession deliberately trampled upon and kicked a copy of the Holy Quran which an elderly volunteer who had come to court arrest was carrying. The kicking was said to be so violent that the pages flew apart. A boy was produced at the public meeting held on either the 3rd or 4th afternoon outside Delhi Gate (outside the banned area) with a few torn leaves which were alleged to have been picked up from the scene. He affirmed that he had witnessed the incident himself. One of the speakers (I think it was Maulvi Mohd Yusuf) immediately took hold of the leaves and made a fiery speech. It was made out that the insult was deliberate and studied. This at once infuriated the crowd who began to shout vengeance and defiance. The rumour was spread also by word of mouth and within a few hours every body was talking about it. Until then the crowds had on the whole behaved well and had shown no bitterness or anger against the Police. The rumour changed the position. The Police was now universally hated and there was talk of wreaking vengeance. This signal incident did more than anything else to cause a rapid deterioration of the situation.

(2) Leaflets were issued in which exaggerate and totally false information about shooting by the Police was given. It was alleged that shooting had taken place in Jhang, Sargodha and many other towns where not a single bullet had been fired. Casualties were reported to be in four figures. Unfortunately the public, credulous as it is, accepted this information and turned against the Government and its forces of law and order. The object was obviously to paint the Police as and butchers/to work up public indignation.

(3) A leaflets was circulated according to which Ahmedis were going round in cars shooting

down non-Ahmedis mercilessly. This rumour later led to attacks against Ahmedis. Until the 4th March no act of violence against an Ahmedi had been reported.

(4) It was announced from the Wazir Khan mosque that many Government servants representing different offices had offered to join the movement and to strike work. This news had a bad effect on the weak minded Government servants and they thought that the time had come to go over to the camp of the agitators. The impression that the Government had been vanquished did great harm. This was used as a lever for suborning loyalty of Government servants.

(5) Damaging of trains and property was encouraged. An air conditioned coach ( one of the few that Pakistan had) was damaged.

(6) An attempt was made to create a rift between different branches of the Police force. Shouts of 'Shahi Police Zindabad' , 'Border Police and Constabulary Police Mordabad' were raised and an impression was spread that the District Police was supporting the agitation. The Border Police and the Constabulary were abused because they made the lathi charges and did most of the firing. The work of the Constabulary was more creditable. The public did not know the difference and the Constabulary was at many places taken for the Border Police. This propaganda did not do much good to the Police. The same technique was continued when the Army came in. The Police was abused and defamed but shouts of 'Pakistani Fauj Zindabad' were raised. This attitude was partly due to the coincidence that until the declaration of Martial Law the Army did not open fire, whereas the Police was lathi charging and



shooting since the 2nd March.

In this country, the mischief which rumours can do must not be undirected. They can poison the mass mind, fill them with ideas and even let loose an orgy of violence and lawlessness. During all major disturbances rumours have played an important part. Even the great Indian mutiny was excited mainly by the rumour that the fat of cows and swine was used in the manufacture of the cartridge cap which a sepoy had to moisten with his tongue before loading his musket.

On the 4th March, a meeting was held as usual outside the Delhi gate and fiery speeches were made. On this day some firebrands in the audience demanded that a procession should be formed and led into the area in which Section 144 Cr.P.C. had been promulgated. Saner opinion was opposed to it. While the meeting was in progress the Home Secretary and I sat anxiously in P.S. Civil Lines, which we had made as our operational headquarters listening to the wireless news about the progress of the meeting. With great relief we heard that saner opinion had prevailed and the proposal of taking out a procession into the Civil Lines finally dropped. A procession was formed but it was taken into the city through the Delhi Gate towards the Wazir Khan mosque. At about 5-30 p.m. the H.S. and I left for our respective houses glad at the thought that another day had passed in which no major procession had been formed.

At about 6-30 p.m. in my house I received a message that Syed Firdaus Shah, D.S.F. City had been attacked in the city and killed. I immediately rushed to the Civil Lines Police Station and from there to the City Kotwali where

the dead body of D.S.P. had been brought. The Home Secretary who had also been informed had joined me in my house. The S.S.P. and the D.M. also went with me. The D.M. told us that as soon as he heard the news of the killing of D.S.P. he decided to hand over control to the Military. Information to this effect had been conveyed by him to the Military officer concerned. The H.S. and I neither understood this remark nor appreciated the wisdom of it. Shortly afterwards Col. Alim, G.C. 1st Baluch Regiment arrived along with a number of officers. He was at time commanding a brigade. The G.C.C. also joined us in the Kotwali later. We told the D.M. that his orders were not correct and that there was no need at that stage of surrendering control to the Army. The control of the city was not thus handed over to the Army on the 4th.

About the death of S. Firdaus Shah, D.S.P. we learnt that the procession which was formed after the meeting outside the Delhi Gate turned inside Delhi Gate and proceeded towards the Wazir Khan mosque. Shouts were being raised and there was much ill feeling against the Police, mainly owing to the alleged incident of the desecration of the Quran. Near the Wazir Khan mosque two Assistant Sub-Inspectors were on duty. Aggressive elements in the processions wanted to attack the Police Officers. In the mean time the news reached the Kotwali that the A.S.Is had been attacked and probably done to death. S. Firdaus Shah, D.S.P. on hearing this news set out with a Police party. Until then there had been no case of violence against the Police and on the whole orders were being obeyed. The crowds were not friendly after the 2nd but active defiance was not visible. The D.S.P. had no apprehension about his safety and



and thought that his presence would have a salutary effect and the Police Officers saved. After all he was the D.S.P. in charge of the city. When he reached the gate of the mosque some of the mischief mongers resented his presence and wanted him to be stopped. This was a signal for the crowd to fall upon him and he was done to death most brutally. His revolver was snatched and he was given many knief and lathi blows. The Police Officers who were accompanying him ran away discreetly. The crowd was large and the vicinity congested. If they had fired, they would have been pelted to death with stones from house tops and their way would have been barred from all sides. There was no question of their getting any help. The dead body of S. Firdaus Shah was brought to the Kotwali by a well wisher of the Police. The assailants after killing him left his dead body and dispersed. We sent for the Civil Surgeon and asked him to make a post mortem examination. Arrangements for the holding over of the body to the relations of the deceased and for its transport to the Attock district to which he belonged were made. The officers who were present, held meeting and decided to enforce curfew with effect from that night. Representatives of the D.P.R. and Pakistan Radio were sent for and orders promulgated.

The situation changed completely with effect from the time the D.S.P. was killed, n  
Instead of feeling remorse and shame the public become almost insane. Until then the situation had been practically under control. Our reporters used to attend the Wazir Khan mosque and prepare a record of speeches openly. Beat Constables

used to go out in the city in uniform in ones and twos. Normal activities went on in the city. Shops were open and offices were functioning. When the D.S.P. was killed Abdus Sattar Niazi was nearby and instead of coming to his rescue he excited it further. Niazi and his friends thought only by maintaining an aggressive and defiant attitude would victory come to them. The killing of the D.S.P. was to them a sign of their success.

We sat in Kotwali late that night and attended to various arrangements. A message came from the Government House that the guard should be doubled. All that night the people in accordance with a plan which had been prepared in the Wazir Khan mosque recited the Kalma and raised anti-Qadiani slogans. This technique was learnt during the partition riots when rival communities used to shout defiance at each other. Weird sounds were made which struck terror at night. As the wind wafted the sound, an impression was created that mobs were on the march. Much of the panic was created by this tactic. The records recovered from the Wazir Khan mosque showed that the technique of shouting at night had been imparted by Ghulam Ghaus Sarhaddi.

When we were in the Kotwali a message came from Tibbi Police Station that a mob was advancing towards it apparently for the purpose of attacking it. A Military patrol was sent out. Later a Police patrol under Agha Muhammad Ali Khan was also sent. I found nothing near the Tibbi Police Station but on going further contacted a mob near Bhati Gate. It was ordered to disperse as curfew had been enforced but as it did not do so and was bent upon mischief a few rounds were fired. From the Kotwali we noticed that a crowd was



being formed in defiance of the curfew in the Naulakha Bazar and shouts were being raised. I went down with a Police party and after giving suitable warning fire was opened. The night was pitch dark and a lathi charge was not advisable. There was no casualty and patrolling in the area was increased. In the mean time information came from the Lahore Hotel on the Malloed Road (it's proprietor Khawaja Bashir Pakhsh is related to Khawaja Naim-ud-Din and is known to be an Ahmedi although he is not one) that it was being attacked. A Police party under Ch. Mohd Hussain S.P. was sent to deal with it. In the meantime Ahrar volunteers who had a camp nearby collected on the Circular Road near the Ahrar Office/ <sup>they became excited when they</sup> heard shouts all over the town and also possibly by reports of rifle fire they began to advance towards the <sup>down</sup> Kotwali. I immediately went <sup>down</sup> to meet them and after giving warning opened fire. One dead body was picked up and one man who had been wounded was brought and sent to the hospital. Later a lathi charge was made as a mob apparently of Ahrar volunteers again began to raise slogans had to be dispersed. The wounded man who was picked up said that he was a volunteer probably from Kasur. Crowds were reformed in some cases even after firing. They were angry and excited. At about mid night when we were still in the Kotwali information came that a mob was advancing towards the H.C.M.'s house. The H.S. and I went there with a Police party but found that the roads leading to his house were all clear. The sounds which were heard were apparently carried by the wind. The guard of the H.C.M. had been doubled earlier. I gave the guard commander instruction to remain vigilant and we then went to the Government House.

The Governor was awake. The H.S. and I reported the situation to him and he approved of all that we had done. In the mean time Ch: Mohd Hussain returned from his visit to the McLeod Road and said that he had met a mob <sup>which</sup> was carrying lathis and swords which had refused to disperse and that he had been compelled to disperse it with rifle fire. Some casualties were inflicted. After that no incident took place that night.

4TH OF MARCH.

The whole city had suddenly gone ablaze. On the following day shops were shut and no business transacted. Angry and sullen crowds were everywhere. A cabinet meeting was held in the Government House which the G.O.C. and some military officers were also present. I had felt that the time had come for the Army to be used for the dispersal of crowds. The Police was getting tired and was under strength. Arrangements to provide rest were made and relief provided not only for officers but also for the lower subordinates. Their rations were supplemented and men of the Constabulary were given an extra ration of tea and buns. The Cabinet decided that the Police should continue to deal with the situation and call in the Army only if it found itself unable to deal with a particular situation. It was further decided to take more effective action and Police patrols for dispersing unlawful assemblies which were all over the city were sent out under Gazetted Officers. I was particularly anxious that firing should not be carried out except under the orders of an officer below the rank of S.P. because of the rumours that some subordinate Police Officers had been effected. Except where shooting was carried out in self defence



the dispersal of unlawful assembly by firing was carried out under my personal supervision, that of D.I.G. Lahore, Agha Muhammad Ali Khan, A.I.G., Ch. Muhammad Hussain, S.P. C.I.D. Malik Habibullah Khan S.P./C.I.D, and Malik Khan Bahadur, S.P/P.C.

On the 5th in the city there was complete Hartal and all shops were shut. Offices were open but in many cases, the low grade employees staged a walkout. The streets all over the city were full of sullen angry and defiant groups. They had a feeling that they were in the right and the Government was in the wrong. At many places cars and other vehicles were stopped and the inmates made to get down. Some rudeness was shown to car drivers also.

A Police party which went with some wounded persons to the Mayo Hospital was surrounded by a crowd and attacked. I am not sure but I think the Police officers were compelled to fire in self defence. Another mob in the vicinity stopped a Government bus and sent fire to it. By mid-day two post offices in the city had been looted; one was also burnt. An Ahmedi School master in the Suburb of Baghbanpura was stabbed. Isolated attacks against Ahmedis started all over the city. At the Railway station there was much lawlessness. The hooligans who had been so far only raising slogans and forming processions now began to loot and kill. Persons with the Ahmedi style of beard were stopped and attacked. The hooligans had found a moral sanction for looting Ahmedi shops. On the Nicholson Road the Bata Shoe Agency held by an Ahmedi was looted. The Police arrived on the scene and arrested some persons and stopped further mischief. At about

11.30 a.m. Zulqarnain Khan rang me up and said that the clerks of the Secretariat had walked out and were raising threatening slogans. I said to myself that if we did not face the demonstrators we would stand condemned for ever. I asked the Chief Secretary to come with me and together we went to the Secretariat. The Mall was practically deserted. A few persons were standing near the Zamzama. They were probably the remnants of a procession which the Police had broken up a little earlier. When <sup>we passed</sup> the gate of the Secretariat we found that the Police guard had turned out. They were standing with rifles at the port position. I immediately told them to come to the stand-at-ease position as I thought that this would excite the clerks who were at a little distance making a demonstration. They were standing on the open space between the main block and the block in which the Health Directorate is housed. On getting out of the car the Chief Secretary <sup>and</sup> I went towards the Khan Zulqarnain Khan, Ch: Nazir Ahmad, Malik Ghulam Farid Dy.S.P. and some other officers followed up. When they saw us coming they began to shout louder than before. The slogan which was raised again and again was "FIRING BEND KARO". I tried to speak to them but they were in no mood to listen and were defiant. Some of them had made their throats <sup>hoarse</sup> by incessant shouting. They interrupted me and while a few sane ones asked them to give me a chance to speak, the majority were yelling and saying that they were not prepared to listen. I told them that we were trying to avoid the enforcement of Martial Law and that they should co-operate in restoring normal conditions. While I was talking to him, reports of firing were heard. They became more excited. The Chief



Secretary did not say anything. When we found that they were in no mood to listen, we went back to my office room. Before leaving we had said that we were prepared to listen if an orderly deputation came to us and told us what the grievance was. A significant thing was that one of the clerks contradicted me when I was giving the facts about murder of the Dy: S.P. He had the audacity to say that he was present in the mosque when the Dy: S.P. was killed ( we have not been able to trace this man). We waited in the I.G.'s office for nearly half an hour but no one came to meet us. We learnt there that the C.I.D. and the Central Police Office Staff had refused to join the demonstrators. I thanked them heartily for their high sense of duty. An Ahmedi assistant of the Home Branch was nervous moving about and had taken shelter in the Central Police Office.

Curfew was to be clamped at 3 p.m. (later it was made 4 or 4.30 p.m. as one of the Matric papers was to finish at 3 or 3.30 p.m.). The Chief Secretary closed the Secretariat and we returned to the Government House where we told H.E. and the H.C.M. what we had seen.

Earlier in the morning the college students behaved in a most irresponsible manner. The students of the Islamia College walked out, formed a procession and proceeded towards the Dayal Singh College. They were moving in a procession in which an assembly of more than five persons had been banned. We were however anxious to avoid a clash with them. Outside the Dayal Singh College they made a demonstration and when the students showed some reluctance in coming out they threw brickbats and broke window and door panes. They also

slightly damaged the car of the Principal. From there they went to the University Hall and on to the Government College. We were anxious to avoid a clash with the students and orders were issued to avoid Lathi charging or firing at them except when grave provocation was caused.

A wireless car had been brought to the Government House in order to keep in touch with the Police reporting stations in the Kotwali and the Civil Lines Police Stations. The telephone lines particularly of Police Stations were loaded and wireless communication was to be preferred. Information about incidents was coming fast and was promptly conveyed to H.E. the Governor, the Chief Minister and members of the Cabinet who were all present.

At the Government House after returning from the Secretariat we found that the Governor had called a meeting of respectable citizens for the purpose of persuading them to issue an appeal for maintaining the peace. A draft of the appeal had apparently been prepared. The meeting started after lunch. The Chief Secretary, the H.S. and I were called in the Durbar Hall where the invitees had been assembled. I was directed by H.E. the Governor to explain the situation which I did. Most of the persons appeared to be sceptical of what I said. After I had finished Maulana Abul Ala Maududi made a speech in which he severely criticised the Government. He held the Government to blame for all that had happened and said that the acceptance of the demands alone would ease the situation. He was followed by Ahmed Saeed Kirmani who said that the movement was led largely by hooligans, unemployed and other irresponsible persons and that the intelligentsia was not convinced about



the correctness of the demands. He said that he knew something about the Police firing carried out the night before under the orders of Ch. Muhammad Hussain near the Fleming Road. He asserted that the mob was defiant and abusive whereas the Police was patient and courteous. In spite of provocation the Police officers remained calm and good humoured. After his speech the officials namely the C.D., the H.S. and myself were sent out. The meeting continued for some time and more speeches were made. We learnt later that the meeting proved abortive and the leaders declined to issue a joint appeal. Curfew passes were issued to the invitees in order to enable them to get home. Maududi stayed back and worked on a draft for some time. I am not aware of the contents of the draft or its purpose. In the afternoon another Cabinet meeting was held presided over by the Governor at which the situation was reviewed. According to the report which was made, the last incident of lawlessness had taken place at 2-30 p.m. This concerned an attack on a Police party and the setting of fire of a Police vehicle. The Cabinet decided that as no incident had taken place and the city had become calm firing should be avoided as much as possible. The instructions given in the morning were that unlawful assemblies were to be dispersed if necessary by firing. It was in accordance with the decision that Police patrols under the command of Mr. S. N. Alam and Malik Habibullah were sent out. They covered many streets and wherever they saw an unlawful assembly they dispersed it when necessary by force.

Earlier during the day the house of an Ahmedi A.S.I. of Police Station Gawalmandi was set on fire. His family was rescued by a Police Patrol.

The following day was a Friday and more

serious trouble was apprehended. Late in the night the Chief Minister held a meeting at his house to which the G.O.C. was invited. His attention was drawn to the need for greater vigilance as large crowds were expected to gather after the Friday prayers. We dispersed an hour or two before day break. We were all tired and exhausted. Although relief had been provided for all ranks, the senior officers got no rest as the situation was serious and demanded personal attention.

In the course of the day many unlawful assemblies were dispersed and much shooting done. The Police action tried their best to suborn loyalty there was not a signal case in which Policemen to whom given orders failed. The strain on loyalty was very great, as many Government servants had behaved shamefully and had shown open disloyalty. The only trouble was that the available Police was not enough to cope with the incidents that took place. Not only were lawful assemblies on the streets dispersed, but aid was sent to places from where cases of looting and arson were reported. Calls from Ahmedis for help were met and Police parties sent. The military were in the town but as far as I know did not disperse any unlawful assemblies.

7 MARCH.

At 7 a.m., I got ready and left for the Kotwali where I wanted to study the situation. The S.S.P. and some other officers were already there. On my way I was stopped by a mob near the Railway Station. They were apparently stopping all persons travelling in cars, tongas and bicycles. They stopped me but as I was in uniform, they said that they were not using violence and were only stopping people from going to their places of work including Government offices. I asked them to disperse but



When I had gone I found that they reformed themselves Near Police Station Naulakha, I saw a tank with some troops. The people were walking all round it and a cordon had not been made. Near the under bridge on the Circular Road I was again stopped by another mob which was more aggressive. A bearded man was at the head of the mob which consisted of a large number of boys. My car was stopped and some ruffians despite my uniform tried to pull me out. I, however, remonstrated with them and after an argument managed to go on. They said that they were looking for Ahmedis who were moving about with arms. Their real object was to make people get out of cars. Before I got to the Kotwali, I saw another mob with Lathis chasing a horse cart. They ultimately made him stop and the horse was unyoked.

Outside the Kotwali a large number of people had collected and they were shouting as follows:-

"Shahi Police Zindabad"

"Pakistan Army Zindabad"

"Police Constabulary & Border Police Mirdabad"

The Police officers were looking tired and anxious. I had a loud speaker fixed on the top of the Kotwali with the object of exhorting the mob to disperse. I was told that since the morning the mobs had been collecting and shouting slogans. The S.S.P. Mirza Naim-ud-Din took me aside and <sup>the situation</sup> said that in the city was not at all good. Crowds were collecting all over the city and, according to Naim-ud-Din, They were more aggressive and determined than before. He said that the people were somehow under the impression that Government was in the wrong and that it only ansympathetic but actively hostile. In this context the use of force was enasperating feelings further increasing the chargin. He said that so far the Government had not defined it's attitude on the demands and nor was there any indication that the Government had any intention of deliberating over them. This according to Naim-ud-Din was making the situation

more difficult. He wanted to be put up before the Chief Minister and to suggest that mere repression was not likely to bring the situation under control. He wanted the Punjab Government to assure the public that it was not as unsympathetic and callous as was being made out and to add that it was doing all it <sup>could</sup> to expedite a decision on the demands. He felt that such appeal would mitigate the bitterness and hostility against the Government which was distinctly mounting. Mirza Naim-ud-Din looked tired and over wrought. There is no doubt that much of the ill feeling was aroused because while the demands were being made feverishly and with vehemence no official pronouncement on their merit had been made. Government's silence was taken for apathy and indifference and much ill feeling was caused on that account. Accordingly the S.S.P. and I went to the C.M.'s House. Again we had to pass through excited and angry crowds who were stopping traffic. Persons on bicycles were asked to get down and no one was allowed to go his place of work. Shops were shut and the city had a very grim look. The people had collected in small batches every where and were looking for mischief. At the C.M.'s house we learnt that he had already gone to the Government House. We then went to the Government House and found that the Ministers and the C.M. had already come. The Civil Lines area was comparatively free from crowds. I put the S.S.P. before the C.M. and he repeated what he had told me. I also noticed that members of the Lahore Corporation including women members namely Begum Tasadduq Hussain, Begum G.A.Khan, the Mayor and Nawab Muzaffar Ali Qazalbash had arrived. Attaullah Jehanian was also present and he had brought with him some student workers. There was considerable commotion in the Government House and the peons and clerks looked nervous and



anxious. A crowd consisting of the Government House Staff had collected around the wireless car which was receiving reports of incidents.

At least 10 a.m. the C.S. and the H.S. arrived and said that the Secretariat clerks had again walked out and had made an even uglier demonstration. The gates of the Secretariat were locked from inside and at one time the car in which these two officers had gone was not allowed to be moved. The C.S. and the H.S. had gone to attend their office but could not work as the clerks were not doing any work. They said that a new feature was that the clerks also wanted Government to accept the demands unconditionally. We learnt later that the clerks of the Accountant General, the Food and Civil Supplies Office and some other offices also staged a walk out. The clerks of Accountant General tried to bring out the staff of the High Court. The telephone clerks also struck work and went on what they described a sit-down strike. The news from the Railway offices was also bad. The Railway workers had gone to the Engine Shed and had taken possession of it. No engines were allowed to be moved. The Railway track between Lahore and Moghalpura was out and a train which was coming from Shahdra side stopped on the way. The Pakistan Mail was the last train to go in the direction of Multan. Then came news that shops in Anarkali were being looted burnt. The automatic traffic signal near the Y.M.C.A. building was burnt by a mob. It was planning to loot the Commercial Buildings but the Police arrived and the mob dispersed. Crowds were collecting in great strength around the Kotwali. Police patrols were on streets but the crowds were playing the game of hide and seek. The houses of Ahmedis were attacked at a number of places and the Nisbat Road. At one place Ahmadi property was brought out, put on the road

and a bonfire made. The body of the owner was put on the top. More Government buses were burnt. A message arrived from the Chief Engineer, Electricity Branch while the Cabinet was in session that the workers of the Power House had given a notice that they would black out the city unless the Government House, the Ministers and the Officers residing in the G.C.R. Estate voluntarily cut off electricity. The man who sent the message had the audacity to say that an answer should be given. The Chief Secretary on hearing this remark said that no answer could be given to such an impudent question.

In the mean time the electricity in the Government House had already been cut off. The Governor and the C.M. wanted to put a call to Karachi and found that the secretephone was not working. Even the normal telephone line was dead and ultimately the H.S. secured a connection over the military exchange. We learnt later that while the subordinate staff had struck work trunk connection were given by Gazetted Officers of the Telephone Department. The Governor and the C.M. conversed with the Hon'ble Prime Minister in Karachi behind closed doors. In the meantime hurried conversations were held and the Chief Minister directed the Home Secretary to prepare a statement. I came to know about it when the Chief Minister asked the Home Secretary if he had prepared the draft. The H.S. said that he had given the points to Khan Zulqarnain Khan who was a good draftsman in Urdu. Later the statement was cyclostyled.

When the cyclostyled copies were ready I was to arrange asked/for their distribution in the city.

We did not consider it advisable to send a Police Officer for this purpose because the public was hostile and we feared that the reception of the



statement would not be good, there being so much bitterness and ill feeling against the Police. Accordingly we decided to send announcers who were students selected by Ataulah Jahanian in military vehicles. Unfortunately military vehicle fitted with loud speakers could not be procured and ultimately Mirza Naim-ud-Din volunteered to go alone even at the risk of his life reading out the statment. He did so ultimately. The statement was read on the telephone by Malik Habibullah to the Officer who was acting as S.S.P. in the Kotwali and he was directed to broadcast it from the loud speaker which had been installed there. The Governor directed the H.S. to read out the statment on the telephone to Khalifa Shuja-ud-Din who had been making efforts to persuade the agitators in the mosque to call off the agitation probably on the 5th a printed portion which had been broadcast by Abdul Hammed whose pen name is Dai-ul-Haq was brought to the Government House. The poster gave a list of dictators of the agitation. The names of dictators were Abdus Sattar Niazi, Mian Muhammad Shafi, M.L.A. and Qazi Murid Ahmed of Sargodha. The position continued to deteriorate and although the Police went out and dealt with several situations no improvement took place. More and more incidents continued to occur. At this stage I apprehended that if the mobs took into their head to attack officers many lives would be lost and the situation would become impossible to control. The whole city was infested with mobs and they were looking for mischief. So far they had not thought of attacking officers but such a possibility could not be ruled out. The Ministers wanted to know the reaction to the statement and wanted the Police to proceed cautiously. In certain quarters it is possible that the statement was taken by Police

officers to ~~state~~ that no action was to be taken by them. Moreover it was Friday and the Government was quite rightly anxious not to take a strong line before the prayers. The reactions according to reports were diverse; at some places the crowd jeered and said that they had half won the battle. They, however, said that the struggle should be continued and the demands would then be accepted. At other places the crowd took no notice and merely abused. From some places appeasement was reported but on the whole the statement was not well received.

Ch. Abdul Karim, Mayor who was in the Govt. House came to me and said that the C.M. should make another effort to bring round the people by <sup>a speech on</sup> the radio. I told him that this was not advisable as the situation was rapidly deteriorating and might soon get completely out of control. At this stage I took General Azam and Brigadier Kallu aside and told them that if attacks against Government started the Police would not be able to do much. Senior Government servants lived in all localities in the Civil Lines and the Police Force was not adequate to protect all of them. I, therefore, told him that whatever the reactions of the Governor and the Ministers the military should take over the area on the side of McLeod Road away from the City. There were talks about enforcing Martial Law but two factors deterred the authorities from enforcing it, one was a code telegram from the Central Government saying that Martial Law should be avoided as far as possible, the second was that the Ministers wanted to hear more reports about the reactions before handing over the city to the military. The G.O.C. saw my point and went away apparently to make the necessary arrangements.



He came back about half an hour later and it appeared that he had a talk with the Commander-in-Chief and the Defence Secretary in the meantime. In the meantime more telephonic talks had taken place between the Governor and the H.C.M. on the one hand and the Central Government Ministers on the other. At about 12.30 the decision to declare Martial Law was taken and the centre of activity then shifted from the Government House to the headquarters of the 10 Div.

FEATURES  
CITATION

The above is brief narrative of the tragic events which took place in Lahore prior to the declaration of Martial Law. The narrative is by no means comprehensive; I am writing it from Quetta. I have no access to papers and documents and I have put down briefly what I have been able to recall. My memory may have failed me in the chronological order of events or other details. However, I feel that before any conclusion can be drawn it is necessary that the situation as it developed should be understood.

The significant features of the problem were:-

(1) The Ahrar agitation was permitted to be carried on for nearly five years. Hundreds of meetings and conferences were held; articles and sermons delivered and the public mind otherwise poisoned against the Ahmedis. Religious passions were aroused and the common man who is credulous was convinced:-

(i) That the Ahmedis offered deliberate and studied insult to the Holy Prophet, and

(ii) That they were disloyal to Pakistan.

The Muslim League while condemning other political organisations continued to treat the Ahrars with sympathy and favour. The Government on the other hand in spite of reports from the C.I.D. did not realise the consequences of a movement which was arousing religious passions against a community. The manner in which Ahrar leaders worked leaves no doubt in ones

mind that their technique was carefully studied. They were afraid and cautious in the beginning. They raised the tempo of their activity in slow stages. Later they began to blow hot and cold while denouncing the Ahmedis praised and blessed the Muslim League. In due course they began to abuse Muslim League leaders. They said that they had finished their political role and were functioning as a religious body. By clever tactics and the good will of the Muslim League they rehabilitated themselves completely and built up their credit which was non-existent at partition time. The first indication of the successful wooing of the Muslim League came when other political organizations, some of which have since become extinct and had no political importance, were made taboo to Muslim League workers but the Majlis-i-Ahrar was excluded from the list and given a position of privilege. Interviews by high personages including the Prime Minister of Pakistan continued to be granted to Ahrar leaders in spite of their black and anti-Pakistan record. This not only created confidence in the minds of Ahrar workers but also gave an impression to the general public that the Ahrars had the blessing of the Muslim League and its leaders. During the Punjab elections in 1950-51 the Ahrars were allowed to come forward as a body and to do electioneering propaganda on behalf of Muslim League candidates. Thus the Ahrars developed confidence and with the passage of time began not only to denounce the Muslim League but also its leaders. Ultimately they developed sufficient confidence and gave a direct-action threat to the Prime Minister himself; The Government's silence was misunderstood and provided the Ahrars an opportunity to say that their activities had the approval of the League and the Government. They went further and spread



rumours to the effect that there was a rift in the Central Cabinet and that their propaganda was liked by some high personages. The Ahrars had worked with the All-India National Congress, and, therefore, understood the technique of political agitation better than many parties.

(2) Official machinery for dealing with the agitation was not set into motion until it became very late. The decision to meet the direct-action challenge was taken after the one month's notice and the five days by which it was extended had expired. Under the British regime whenever the Congress or any other political party made a similar threat it used to be promptly declared as an unlawful association under the Criminal Law Amendment Act, its funds confiscated and leaders interned. No such action was taken in this case; the agitators continued to address meetings and to enlist support otherwise.

(3) One important point which the Government did not appreciate was that a religious agitation of this kind if continued unhampered was likely to place severe strain on the loyalty of the armed forces. If Government had struck in the beginning sympathy would have been expressed for the Ahrars or their cause. As time went on the people were gradually converted and many people began to believe in the righteousness of the demands. Action in the beginning would have ruled out the possibility of Policemen developing a sympathy. The common Policeman is religious and is susceptible to a religious approach. He is particularly sensitive to matters which concern the honour and prestige of the Holy Prophet. As I have said before, I did get reports that some Policemen were saying that Government was not acting correctly in suppressing an agitation which had for its object the preservation of the honour of Prophet. Khan

Zulqarnain Khan brought me reports to this effect.

(4) The agitation was very wide-spread. I don't think that all these persons had sympathy with the objects of the agitation. What was apparent was they had no sympathy with the Government and were not willing to appreciate or understand its point of view and were insanely trying to weaken its hands. Government servants, particularly of the lower levels, had become affected. Never in the history of the Secretariat did the clerks demonstrate in front of their own senior officers so defiantly. There was particularly no sympathy for the Government's stand until the agitation remained peaceful. When, however, looting started many people suddenly realised that their honour, property and lives were in peril. Previously they had thought that only Ahmedis and Policemen were in danger which did not very much matter to them. A rather disturbing feature was that the respectable persons of Lahore, some of whom are known for their sanity, declined to issue a statement when an appeal was made to them by the Governor and the Chief Minister. This shows how much public spirit they had; they were involved in their own private wrangles and thoroughly enjoying at the discomfiture of those who were in power.

(5) A peculiar feature of this agitation was that whereas before the partition the population used to be mixed and if action was taken against one community the other always came forward and welcomed it. With almost cent percent Muslim population of a fanatical disposition administrative difficulties are bound to arise. Before the partition whenever Muslims had to be dealt with, Sikhs, Dogra, Hindu Jats, Garhwali and British troops used to be called into action. During the Shahid Ganj agitation Muslim troops were not used and non-Muslim troops except the Sikhs were



placed on duty. The firing was, however, carried out only by British troops. The Government had at least this satisfaction that when it took action against one community the other liked it. This feature is absent now and if action is taken on a religious issue the entire population turns hostile.

(6) During the Shahid Ganj agitation in 1934 I was A.S.P. in Lahore. Although the agitation was confined to Lahore and to a lesser extent to Gujranwala and Rawalpindi the Government of India sent detachments of police from Behar and U.P. to assist the Punjab Police. The resources of the Government of India were much larger. The anti-Qadiani agitation was of a much bigger scale and it spread to every nook and corner of Lahore. A much larger Police Force was, therefore, required for combating the agitation. The Shahid Ganj agitation in Lahore town was confined mainly to the Naulakha and Delhi Gate area. I made an effort to get Police from the N.W.F.P. and Sind <sup>but</sup> was unsuccessful. The I.G. of Police, N.W.F.P. said that it might be possible to send Frontier Constabulary but he wanted a requisition to be made by the Governor of the Punjab to the Governor of the N.W.F.P. I conveyed this message to His Excellency the Governor but I was advised not to press my demand.

(7) The absence of instructions about the requisitioning of Military for aiding Civil power created some confusion and doubts. The pamphlet which had been issued by the late Government of India on this subject in 1943 was withdrawn by the British Officers before the partition and destroyed. Fresh instructions were not issued. Most District Officers were new and had no experience of the working of Military aid to Civil power. Similarly few Military officers had the necessary experience and knowledge and, therefore, the maximum co-operation and harmony would

not be secured.

Why the agitation met with so much success when the demands which it made were so pueril and senseless was due to the following reasons:-

(i) The price of wheat in the autumn of 1952 in the Punjab went up to Rs 40/- per maund in certain areas. Before the partition the price of wheat at any rate in the Punjab never went above Rs 15/- per maund. It is true that wheat was available at controlled prices in rationed areas. It is however a fact that criticism was levelled at the inadequacy of the scale and the quality of the flour issued.

(ii) The general price level has shown an upward tendency since the partition. The statistics issued by the Board of Economic Inquiry, Punjab will show that except for brief periods, the upward trend of prices has been maintained. The lower class, are, therefore, today worse off than they were at the time of partition. (To give an instance a Police Constable in 1939 received Rs.17/- per mesem and with this pay could buy more than 8 maunds of wheat. To-day with his pay of Rs.65/- per mesem even at the controlled price he can buy less than five maunds).

(iii) Opposition leaders and newspapers have been spreading panic and confusion. They see nothing good and even where Government has done wonders they see occasion to find fault. The common man is gullible and begins to feel frustrated, when he hears so much anti-Government talk. The Government of India printed a book which contained self condemnatory excerpts from Pakistan newspapers. The newspapers unfortunately do not realise how much damage they do to the country by careless writing. The support lent to orthodoxy has spread much dismay in the intelligent-sia.

(iv) The disappearance of the class of buffers



between the public and the Government. The British ruled this country not only with a Police force but also with the class of title holders, jagirdars, honorary magistrates and other persons who did not belong to these categories but hoped to step into them. All these classes have suddenly disappeared. There has been no change in public mentality and the burden of the forces of law and order has, therefore, enormously increased. ✓

(v) Lastly the Mullahs got a feeling that time was not far when an undiluted Islamic constitution would be enforced. They were looking forward to acquiring a place of importance in the theocratic -- State which was promised. They began to interfere in all matters. The demand that Ahmedis should be declared a minority was defended on grounds of religion. This time the cry of Islam in danger was used for bringing down the governmental structure.

Quetta.

Sd/- M. Anwar Ali  
18-7-53

Part IV.



1. RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE DISTURBANCES.

So far as the political side is concerned the responsibility is that of the Majlis-i-Ahrar which went on playing with the passions and emotions of the people for a long time. High passions were raised and class hatred bred. The Ahrars did not realise that they were playing with fire and that having raised mass passions they would let loose any orgy of violence and horror. They, however, paid no thought to this aspect and indeed with determination and vigour continued to bend their efforts for promoting sectional strife. Any one with common sense could have visualised the serious consequences of their activities. When ultimately the leaders of the Majlis-i-Ahrar were rounded up the Jamaat-i-Islami leapt into the field and took up the leadership of the agitation. The technique of this party was different from that of the Ahrars. It did not intimidate and coerce Government; it set out to convert the nation and to convince it that the Ahmedis were infidels and therefore deserved in an Islamic State a differential treatment. They condemned Government for not declaring the Ahmedis as a non-Muslim minority community and expressed profound sympathy with the alleged exasperation and despair of the people. The Jamaat wanted to bring about a "spiritual revolution" in favour of the demands when the Majlis-i-Ahrar had endeavoured to achieve its object by intimidation. Earlier when the Ahrars could not carry through their plan single handed, they made their movement more broad based and rallied the support of all religious elements who do not believe in compromise and tolerance called the All-Muslim Parties Convention and secured support for their demands. They then formed a Council of Action which claimed to represent all Muslim parties but was in reality controlled and dictated by themselves. The agitation which was really an Ahrar agitation was given the name of 'Khatm-i-Nabuwat'.

on. The  
league as a  
political

party was somewhat apathetic and failed to give a proper lead. Later a number of Muslim Leaguers including M.L.As on seeing the wind blow against the Ahmedis began not only to bless but to support the demands. The other political parties such as the Jamaat-i-Islami and the Azad Pakistan Party remained apathetic. Mr. H.S. Suhrawardy during the later stages of the agitation sent a telegram on behalf of his party urging upon the Hon'ble Prime Minister to accept the demands. On the whole the opposition parties were happy at the discomfiture of Government. According to a report which is the C.I.D. the Azad Pakistan Party Bahawalpur Branch gave money to the Ahrars. There are also reports which show that individual communists in Lahore helped to aggravate the situation. The saner people were too frightened to express their views; the reactionary elements had become so strong thanks to the support given to them since the formation of Pakistan. The M.L.As showed more interest in ministry making and unmaking than in quelling the agitation.

## 2. CIRCUMSTANCES LEADING TO THE DECLARATION OF MARTIAL LAW.

I will not say anything about this point as I have given a full narrative of the events until the 6th March 1953 in Part III. It was absolutely necessary to enforce the Martial Law and if this had not been done the tragedy would have been infinitely greater.

## 3. ADEQUACY OR OTHERWISE OF THE ARRANGEMENTS.

The problem is two fold; did the Intelligence authorities keep the Government suitably informed about the danger of the movement and suggest action for neutralising it and did the civil authorities act properly on the ground when the disturbances actually broke out. So far as the first part is concerned the copies of reports which have been furnished from time to time and which are contained in Part II of the



statement will show that the C.I.D. was fully aware of the destructive activities of the Majlis-i-Ahrar and left Government in no doubt about it. About the second question namely the action of the civil authorities on the ground I maintain that at any rate the Punjab Police on the whole did a very fine job of work. As soon as the Central Government decided to take action leading workers throughout the Province were rounded up and arrested.

In the beginning it was not considered necessary to impose Section 144 Cr.P.C. The agitators had no intention of starting the direct-action in Lahore. A combination of events, however, unexpectedly changed the situation. The entry of Abdus Sattar Niazi, the spreading of the malicious rumour that the Holy Quran had been desecrated by the Police and the decision to take action against volunteers who were on their way to Karachi at the point of starting shifted the centre of the agitation from Karachi to the Punjab. As soon as it was found that the situation was threatening to become serious, section 144 Cr.P.C. was promulgated and meetings and processions banned in the Civil Lines area in Lahore. The city was deliberately excluded because it was hoped that a safety valve would be left and the movement fizzle out gradually. When, however, the D.S.P. was killed curfew was imposed. The Police acted with firmness and vigour. In the beginning the authorities were anxious to avoid clashes but when we found that law and order was being defied and the safety of life and property imperilled firm action was taken. An important thing to remember is that the intention was fully in control until the afternoon of the 6th March. Within 24 hours it had become very serious.

As I.C.Police I kept personally in touch with all developments, supervised action on the field, held meetings, organized publicity (which was not our work)

and issued operational orders not only for Lahore but for outside for the guidance of subordinate officers. Everything possible within the resources of the Police Department was done and I am confident that but for the part which the senior officers of the Police played in dealing with the disturbances the position might have been different. The officers were in contact with the men all the time and this prevented them from falling under the influence of the agitators.

There was a lurking fear in the minds of all Police officers that ultimately an enquiry would be ordered and that they might have to face difficulties. This fear nowadays always haunts the Police.

Until the Martial Law was actually declared the Military did not disperse any lawful assemblies. This is due to various reasons. Both the Civil and Military officers were not clear about the powers and responsibilities of the Military in the maintenance of law and order. The Civil officers had a feeling that the Military were reluctant to act unless full powers were given to them and that they were not keen to work under civil command. The civil officers were on the other hand reluctant to employ the Army and wanted the Police to carry on alone. Before the partition in disturbances of much lesser magnitude the Military used to be called out and was made to act side by side with the Police under the orders of the civil authorities. On the 5th morning the situation was pretty grim and the question of employing the Army side by side with the Police was discussed by the Cabinet but a decision was taken that the Police should for some time more continue to act alone unless it found itself in any particular situation unequal to the task.

The Court of Inquiry have also asked why <sup>the</sup> Military authorities after the declaration of Martial Law became successful in suppressing disorder. The reasons are that the Chief Martial Law Administrator immediately very



wisely threw four brigades into action in Lahore. This meant that over 10,000 men with all their equipment of machine guns, mortars, tanks, etc., took charge of the situation where only a few hundred Police were acting as the striking force. At strategic places machine guns nests were built. The Police striking force was in comparison inadequate. The Martial Law authorities had infinite powers and could promulgate any law. In troubled areas curfew was imposed for 36 and 48 hours continuously. The offenders were arrested and given exemplary punishments and finally the action of the Military was covered by the Act of Indemnity. The civil authorities made a proposal before the Martial Law was lifted that in areas which became disturbed, the civil authorities should be invested with special powers. A bill was drafted but the Law Departments envisaged so many difficulties in its legislation that at any rate until I handed over charged there was no hope of getting it through. The powers of the Police in comparison are very much restricted and often after disturbances Police Officers are made to account for their actions. The action of the Military could not be questioned and political pressure could not be brought to counter, it. Administrative machine has become weak after the partition and some sections of the public no longer take it seriously. No Police force can be stronger than the Government which it represents or command respect when the Government does not. The Army was, when the Martial Law was enforced, an institution which was respected and glorified.

Part V

1. Copy of a note dated 29th April 1953 by Mr. Anwar Ali in which the situation obtaining in the province was reported. 21 pages
2. Copy of a letter dated 10-3-53 from Mr. Anwar Ali to Mr. G. Ahmed in which the need for a departmental enquiry for the purpose of straightening departmental difficulties was put to the executive administration. 4 pages



Note on the situation as it developed  
from the 5th March 1953.

Situation on the  
5th March.

On the 5th March, Lahore suddenly went into paroxysm of a violent rage. The people were certain of the righteousness of their cause and were convinced that Government was in the wrong. Angry and sullen crowds were visible everywhere casting defiant looks and shouting aggressive slogans. Business was brought to a standstill; almost all shops were shut and bands of urchins led by bearded <sup>leaders</sup> paraded the streets holding up vehicular traffic, pulling office hands out and intimating shopkeepers who were still doing their business. The students were also infected. The first to take the lead were the students of the Islamia College who walked out and went in a procession to the Dyal Sing College where the inmates showed their reluctance to come out. Abuse and brickbatting followed. The processionists then went to other colleges and finally ended up in the Government College. The first clash between the Police and the riotous crowds took place in the Mayo Hospital where a Police party, which had brought some wounded persons, was set upon and assaulted. Then an orgy of violence, loot and arson followed. Ahmedis were waylaid and attacked; buses and post offices burnt. Car drivers had their faces blackened at several places. One Police vehicle was burnt and brickbatting done at the Police at several places. Road blocks were erected and threatening crowds shouted defiance. The most shocking incident was the marching out of the Secretariat clerks who made a very ugly demonstration.

2. As the day progressed the crowds became more militant. A meeting of the leading citizens and political workers held in the Government House at the instance of H.E. the Governor and the late H.C.M. proved infructuous. These venerable gentlemen even declined

to issue an appeal for peace without touching on the merits of the controversy. Maudoodi, who realised how grave the situation was, viciously pressed for the acceptance of the demands and thoroughly enjoyed at the discomfiture of Government. His jubilation caused him to say with candour that a war had broken out between the people and the Government. He affirmed that the demands were correct reasonable and that therefore the blame for their nonacceptance lay with the Government. He was so sure of himself that he even set out to draft an article of agreement in which Government was to surrender. Muslim League leaders were dazed and frightened. They could present no practical solution and were loath to face the public. A member of the Lahore Bar Association offered to go to the mosque by giving an assurance that he could exploit his prepartition connection with the Jamaat-i-Ulema-i-Hind. His mission was blessed and he went to the Wasir Khan mosque but apparently he changed his mind later and was found in the mosque several days later when the military had it vacated. All through the night weird and frightening sounds were raised from the city casting panic and terror.

akening  
a public

3. In the tangled skein of confused thinking and madness the following threads of opinion were clearly discernible:-

- (a) That Government was utterly wrong;
- (b) that Ahmedis knowingly insulted the holy Prophet and therefore deserved to be destroyed ruthlessly;
- (c) that the use of force on the part of governmental authorities was altogether unjustified;
- (d) that the public meant no harm and was only acting to vindicate the honour of the Prophet;
- (e) that the Hon'ble Ministers, both of the Central and the Provincial Governments, were veritable devils;



- (f) that the public had no business even to deal with the persons who looted and burnt Government property or caused hurt. Admittedly the looters were in the wrong but who was the Police, any way, to use force;
- (g) that in the holy war it was correct to attack policemen and to loot their property (Two muskets seized from policemen, who were accompanying Syed Firdous Shah, were kept in the Wazir Khan mosque until their recovery on the 24th April 1952. The house of the City Inspector was looted in broad daylight by a mob and it's contents were distributed openly. The house of a brother of S.H.O. Gawalmandi was set on fire. A party went round to collect petrol for the purpose of burning Police property and houses of Policemen).

4. The feeling that this measure would not last for ever without ultimately resulting in anarchy, in which no distinction would be made between an Ahmedi and a non-Ahmedi, a man and a women, the weak and the strong was completely absent. That explains why action against hooligans was not only not approved but positively resented. The Jamaat-i-Islami, which has always advocated for producing a race of "pious and good men" instead of expressing horror at acts of arson, murder and loot opined that constitutional methods having failed the public has been forced to act as it had. The credit of Government had been low and fear of authority had gradually mitigated. There was also a feeling that before long revenge would be taken against the Police and others who had stood in the way of the successful achievement of the agitators.

5. Deeper and invisible reasons also worked on the public mind to create this awful situation. Food prices shot up very high and for several months wheat

was not only difficult to get but sold at prices ranging between Rs 24/- to Rs 30/- per maund. In rationed towns wheat was undoubtedly sold at a controlled price (Rs 13/12 per maund), but the amount of daily ration was only five chataks. For a people whose staple food is wheat that ration was wholly inadequate and it was necessary to supplement it from the black-market. The persons in lower income levels were **thoroughly** improverished and their savings dried up. Trade depression had hit the small wage earner and the demon of unemployment was gradually increasing in size. Frustration was widespread and had affected the rich and the poor alike. The rise in the cost of living shattered individual peace and domestic budgeting became an impossibility. When Pakistan came into being the common man was convinced (thanks to the utterances of the **demagogues**) the Pakistan's armed might was great (the fifth in the world), that whereas Pakistan would forge ahead India would disintegrate and be continuously a victim of hunger and poverty, that Kashmir would fall in the lap of Pakistan within a short time, that corruption, jobbery and nepotism would disappear, and finally that Delhi would be conquered within a few years. None of these hopes was achieved. Instead, food shortages became almost a yearly feature; canals began to dry up and it became patent that only a miracle would deliver Kashmir to Pakistan. Information from India accentuated the sense of bitterness. India's industry rapidly developed and prices of home made goods (and it was said that there was hardly anything that India could not manufacture) were within the means of the common man. Food was no longer scarce and the wheat which the Indians ate was cheaper, whiter and cleaner. What shocked many was that the price of many imported goods in India was cheaper than in Pakistan in spite of no devaluation. In the middle



of 1952, news began to spread that very acute financial crisis was impending and that in 1953 the food situation would be even more desperate. Many people began to wonder whether Pakistan would ultimately survive and the nation was becoming sceptical and defeatist. The partition had broken the middle class which was the bulwark of the Punjab. There was further fragmentation of holdings. People were left with few convictions and discontent was rampant. The fact that faith in the ability of Pakistan to steer through the difficulties was wearing away made the situation much more poignant. Government servants, except in the Police and the Army, were showing a lack of zeal. Enthusiasm for work was lacking. As the future appeared uncertain, everyone was trying to get rich in a short time. The leaders were found to be men with feet of clay. The Muslim League lost contact with the masses and its members were busy in securing <sup>in</sup> benefits and self aggrandizement. The B.P.C. report took over five years to come out and the draft shocked sober opinion. The central leadership smacked of staleness and inertia. The stage was thus set for a revolution: the Khatme Nabuwat issue lighted a powder magazine.

situation  
6th

6. The 6th of March was a Friday. For many days the loud-speakers from the Wazir Khan mosque, where day and night sessions were held, brayed and aroused emotion and hysteria. Friday was the day when Muslims would congregate in mosques. They would then act as one individual and bring the Government to its knees. On that day the suspension of business was complete. The railway workers cut the line to Karachi between the City and Cantonment stations. The loco shop was taken charge of by railway workers and engines immobilized. The electricity workers threw a challenge and threatened to cut off the electricity of the

Government House and the G.O.R. (Gazetted Officers residences) Estate. Telephone wires were cut and telephone and telegraph workers went on a sit down strike. The connection was kept going by the officers of the telephone department who remained loyal. The clerks of the Secretariat made an even uglier demonstration. They locked the gates of the Secretariat from inside and misbehaved with their officers. Widespread looting started and shops were set on fire. On Friday, non-Ahmedis also began to be molested. With the Police the crowds played a game of hide and seek. They dispersed on sight of a police patrol, took cover in side lines, and as soon as the patrol was out of sight came forth and assembled again. Goonda rule prevailed for some hours. This was the turning point and it was then that saner public opinion realised for the first time, and almost with a shock, what was coming. So far there was complacency and the impression excited that only Ahmedis and Government servants would be the target of attacks. On the 6th goondas, not needing any moral sanction for their acts, descended on anyone they could lay their hands on. Then it began to dawn ~~that~~ if lawlessness was not checked immediately no one's honour or property would be safe. The Martial Law was proclaimed at 1-30 and it took the troops some time to move into position. I will not recount in this note the bloody events which took place on that day. It will suffice to say that the people had a taste of what they had prepared for but which they were hoping would not befall them. The mobs retreated to their houses and all except the goondas locked themselves indoors and began to pray for their safety and deliverance.

7. Major-General Muhammad Azam Khan acted very wisely in throwing most of the troops in the garrison in the city immediately after the declaration of the



Martial Law. Thus by sunset the City was stiff with troops, vehicles, bren-guns, tanks and other equipment. This not only struck terror to the law-breakers but brought confidence to those who feared molestation and loot. They appreciated for the first time that but for Martial Law the consequences would have been too horrible. The population which was aggressive and defiant a day earlier now felt apprehension about it's own safety.

Plans for the  
8. It is human nature to minimise ones own faults and to emphasise those of others. It is this trait which makes one look for a scapegoat when something goes wrong. In this country the politicians have always looked for scapegoats. Before the partition, if malaria broke out or some other calamity befall the country the Congress at once held the British Government to blame. After the partition, the politicians continued to suffer from the same habit. For the ills of the country, the blame they lay either with the British or the wily Hindu. The politicians did not appreciate that India's hostility towards Pakistan was an accepted fact, and that it was no use decrying that country. They should have instead set upon the task of finding a solution. What if India closed the canals alto-gather. The public found the old argument to swallow and therefore lost patience with the politicians.

wakening  
9. When the fear of hurt and plunder became a stark reality, the public instead of searching it's own heart began to curse and dencounce the politicians. The very persons who had asserted a day earlier that the Police was tyrannical and brutal began to accuse it of leniency. It was said that Daultana had knowingly made the statement of the 6th to embarrass the Central Government. Even the Maulvis whose speeches were heard with rapt attention began to be looked upon

with suspicion, and in some cases with profound abhorrence. Government was blamed for encouraging the Mullahs and for permitting them to become so strong. The horrors of a society dominated by ignorant, intolerant and fanatical Mullahs were visualised for the first time.

causes  
movement.

10. The middle class felt more dismayed than ever, It viewed with horror the intolerance which was <sup>a</sup> feature of the disturbances. Would life be worth living if the Mullahs came into power? It were the Ahmedis to-day: the turn of the Shias, the Ahl-e-Hadis, the Chakralvis, the Deobandis and even Christians would come in due course. Then there would be fights between members of the same sect. Those who did not observe Purdah would be regarded as infidels. This realisation would not have come so realistically otherwise. The exponents of the Islamic constitution were disillusioned. Several middle class persons said that they would like to get out from Pakistan, Canada was mentioned as likely refuge by many. The methods of transferring money to other countries were discussed. Almost all expressed concern about the future of their children.

11. All the time the stock of the leaders continued to decline. They were denounced and blamed more than ever for the situation in the country. It became a general talk in Lahore that Daultana had organised the 'direct action' agitation and he was violently abused.

M.L.As all  
themselves.

12. Most M.L.As behaved most unrealistically. They did not have the courage to face the electorate and made little or no contribution for improving the situation. When the H.P.M. and the Hon'ble Minister of the Interior came to Lahore it became known that they had to come to change the Punjab Ministry. This was a signal to the M.L.As who became active and



lobbying started! Mamdot woke up from his perennial slumber. While still with fever he had visited Peshawar, according to popular rumour, for consulting H.E. the Governor and <sup>the</sup> H.C.M. He rallied his supporters in Lahore. Hamid Nizami of the "Nawa-e-Waqt", Sheikh Nasir of the Colony Textile Mills, Multan (who is financing the "Nawa-e-Waqt") and his brother Farooq were seen shepherding the M.L.As about. The conduct of the M.L.As presented a strange contrast to the situation: they were oblivious of the situation in the province. Arrests were being made, processions taken out and tension existed in almost every district of the province. The M.L.As were, however, collecting supporters for making a case for their inclusion in the ministry. Their behaviour shocked the soberminded. They did not realise that the country was passing through a very serious crisis, the worst since its formation. They looked upon the problem as one of individuals, some of them had already changed fronts. When they saw that the anti-Qadiani agitation was popular they jumped into it rather than risk unpopularity. The question whether these M.L.As could save the country from destruction and ruin baffled many. The erstwhile admirers and supporters of Daultana were now taking of his misdeeds and offered to produce material for PARODA against him.

13. When the H.P.M. came to Lahore, Daultana commanded a majority in the parliamentary party although there was a group of disaffected M.L.As. They spoke in the Assembly and openly attacked Daultana but the majority remained on the side of Daultana. It was intended to bring a vote of confidence but a formal resolution was not tabled because it was hoped to break the rebels and to bring some of them round.

14. Daultana had built a strong position for himself. His critics however accused him of being undependable. Attaullah Jahanian, who enjoyed his confidence, was disliked by many. His communist past, his activities against the landlords and the advantages which he secured for himself made him unpopular. The officials of the Muslim League were jealous of him. The stand which Daultana took on the parity issue in the B.F.C. report enhanced his prestige. There is little doubt that the debacle would not have taken place if an impression had not spread that he had lost the confidence of the Central Government. There was talk of his being prosecuted, and in fact a rumour had spread that he would be arrested by the Military and tried by court-martial.

15. There was no one anywhere near Daultana in the League Assembly Party to hold the reins of leadership. The opposition parties were too insignificant and had small followings only. The Khan of Mamdot took some interest in whipping up opinion against Daultana. He gave out that Khawaja Nazimuddin had invited him to cross over to the Muslim League and to form a ministry which offer, he said, he had declined to accept. Iftikharuddin and Shaukat Hayat were undoubtedly happy at the exit of Daultana but wisely kept away from the conflict. They, however, addressed a letter to Khawaja Nazimuddin in which they challenged his action in calling upon Daultana to submit his resignation and said that if Daultana was guilty of misconduct he should have been tried openly. Maudoodi had already been arrested; and Mashriqi did little else except to suggest casually to his visitors that the time had come for setting up a coalition government. Suharwardy came late on the scene. He called a meeting at Sheikhpura of



the Jinnah Awami League in the house of Malik Muhammad Anwar. He did not wish to be left out and therefore identified himself with the anti-Qadiani demands. He issued a statement at Karachi which was however suppressed. On coming to the Punjab he sent a telegram to Khawaja Nazimuddin urging him to accept the demands. He nominated the Working Committee of the All-Pakistan Jinnah Awami League for the purpose of taking further stock of the situation. Over the composition of the committee, Mamdot and Suharwardy quarrelled and parted company. Mamdot's parleys with Khawaja Nazimuddin were resented by Suharwardy. He did not want Mamdot to form a ministry. On the other hand, Mamdot could not resist the temptation of joining Khawaja Nazimuddin for breaking Daultana. The communists had undoubtedly emerged unscathed and, if any thing, with greater strength. Their <sup>party</sup> papers increased in circulation. Mullaism had been dealt a blow and the public was developing a predilection for the progressives.

16. The position as regards the press was that "Zamindar" and the "Maghribi Pakistan" (which was bought later by Mansoor Ali Khan) which were Daultana's supporters had been suppressed during the early stages of the Khatm-e-Nabuwat agitation. Later, the "Afaq" was suppressed by the Martial Law authorities. The "Nawa-e-Waqt" which increased its sales was aggressively anti-Daultana. Hamid Nizami was popularly held to have done his best in securing the overthrow of Daultana. The "C & M Gazette" is an Ahmedia paper and shared the distrust of his community for Daultana. The "Pakistan Times" and the "Imroz" (the sale of the latter paper increased manifold in view of the vacuum created by the suppression of other Urdu newspapers) are communist papers and welcomed any change which had the effect of lowering the credit and prestige of the Muslim League.

The "Pakistan Times" denounced Daultana when he resigned. A few days later, it attacked equally fiercely the composition of the new ministry.

selection  
Malik Feroz  
Noon as  
leader of  
assembly

17. The selection of Malik Feroz Khan Noon as the leader of the Assembly party was generally welcomed; the communists, the progressives and the right-wing Muslim Leaguers being the only dissidents. Malik Feroz Khan Noon had been away from the province for a considerable time and was, therefore, above party faction with which the local M.L.As were infected. All credited him with sincerity and said that his long administrative experience would stand him in good stead. Having been nourished in the pre-partition traditions, it was anticipated that he would improve the administration. Officials would be left free to act and interference in the day to day administration on the part of M.L.As, which was an irritating feature, would disappear. The officials were particularly happy and felt that they would now enjoy greater freedom. The prestige of the services would be enhanced under the new Chief Minister. The landlords hailed his appointment as they hoped agrarian policy of the former Government would be reversed.

springing by  
M.L.As

18. The M.L.As were happy at the exit of Daultana and remained loyal to the new leader until the Cabinet was announced. When some of them who were hoping to step into the ministry found that they had been left out, they became indignant and began to look for reasons to attack the new ministry. They started whispering at the inclusion of Nawab Qazilbash in the Cabinet. The Nawab was the one time lieutenant of Malik Khizr Hayat Khan and did not subscribe to the idea of a separate home-land for the Muslims. He did not enjoy the confidence of Nawabzada Liaqat Ali Khan as he was not given a League ticket by him during the 1951 elections. The right-wing Muslim Leaguers were



also suspicious of him and expressed the fear that by including him the way was being paved for the return of Malik Khizr Hayat Khan. In the early stages this criticism mainly emanated from Muslim League M.L.As, whose hopes for inclusion in the Cabinet were not realised, and their friends and supporters. It is however odd that the critics of Nawab Qazilbash in private conversation admitted that he was a man of unquestioned integrity. They conceded that he would make a better minister than all his colleagues except the Chief Minister. The Government officials welcomed his appointment as they considered that with his educational and family background he would make a very good minister. Nevertheless, the criticism gathered strength and gradually permeated to the ranks of the Muslim League (thanks to the whisperings of the League M.L.As themselves). The General public was, however, /

19. About this time one of the rumours which had gained currency and which persisted for a long time was that certain senior officers of the Provincial Government would be transferred; some of them out of the Province. Hamid Nizami and Mamdot were probably responsible. The rumour caused some consternation in the services. It always happens that when a ministry changes officials in key posts have to go through a period of suspense. It takes them time to establish their bona fides in order to gain the confidence of the new ministers. Their opponents exploit the situation and level all kinds of charges against them to prejudice the new ministers against them. The Punjab has been particularly unfortunate because it has had five changes since the partition. On each occasion Government servants had to live through a period of suspense and mental strain.

20. The disgruntled M.L.As who claimed to have ousted Daultana, decided to start a signature campaign; their

thetic.  
Muslims did  
interest them  
wanted good  
and not  
others.

or about  
transfer  
officials.

intention was to prepare a memorandum protesting against the appointment of Nawab Qazilbash for presentation to Khawaja Nazimuddin. The friends and supporters of Daultana were so far in the background and kept aloof from this move.

Dismissal  
Nawab  
uddin.

21. On the 17th April came the exciting news of the dismissal of the Nazimuddin Cabinet. There was universal joy and relief. A few Muslims here and there and their votaries felt sorry for Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar. Mr. Fazlur Rahman had come to be generally disliked. In the excitement no one thought of Mr. Khalilur Rahman who had only a few days earlier visited Lahore and had heard statements against Daultana. He was always a nonentity. The new H.P.M. is unknown in this Province, at any rate, and therefore serious criticism has not been made about him. About Sir Zafrullah Khan, opinion is divided. The common people are not pleased at his appointment and feel that he should have been got rid of. The saner people, however, hold that his removal at this stage would have amounted to a surrender to reactionary elements and might have become a dangerous and awkward precedent. They nevertheless hope that Sir Zafrullah would before long either quite himself or get some other job. The inclusion of Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan in the Cabinet had been specially welcomed. He is perhaps one of the very few politicians who is liked. His methods are criticised but his strength of character, single-mindedness and honesty are praised. For the other members of the Cabinet no interest was shown and it is a fact that even if all the old ministers had been changed no tears would have been shed. Through long frustration cynicism has developed and people are developing a distrust of politicians. They evince little interest in them and assert that changes reflect individual battles and by themselves will save the country. They want results; they maintain that all politicians on taking office make



pious resolves which are apt to be forgotten.

22. Since the dismissal of Khawaja Nazimuddin, the supporters of Daultana became heart<sup>er</sup>ed. They felt that the dismissal of Daultana had been amply avenged. They had not reconciled themselves to the dismissal of their leader, and had all along maintained that he was a victim of malice on the part of Khawaja Nazimuddin. Some of them went so far as to say that His Excellency Mr. Ghulam Muhammad liked Daultana and that in deciding to remove Khawaja Nazimuddin he had been influenced by the former. The feeling that the Centre would no longer be hostile to Daultana and might even support him created a new situation and caused some of the more enthusiastic supporters of Daultana to start work openly. A rumour had been current that the Punjab H.C.M. would go to Karachi as the successor of His Excellency Mr. Ghulam Muhammad. According to another rumour, the Punjab H.C.M. was to ~~take~~ the place of Sir Zafrullah Khan. These rumours created a feeling that the office of the Chief Minister would soon fall vacant. Already certain M.L.As who had initiated the attack against Daultana were talking against the appointment of Nawab Qazilbash. Prominent among those who were engaged in this propaganda were Sardar Zafrullah of Kahore, Mr. Nasir Malli of Sialkot, Mir Abdul Qayyum of Lyallpur and Ch. Salahuddin. Mr. Nasir Malli went to Karachi to see Khawaja Nazimuddin. They were about twenty five in all and represented mainly the districts of Gujranwala and Sheikhupura.

23. The supporters of Daultana, after the dismissal of Khawaja Nazimuddin, decided to take up cudgels against Nawab Qazilbash. They knew that this propaganda was likely to go down very well with the public. Even Hamid Nizami, who had pledged his support to the new ministry, was prepared to take up the issue. Whereas the intention of the so-called rebel group was simply to get one of their nominees

included into the Cabinet, the intention of the supporters of Daultana was to shake the credit of the H.C.M. by arousing public opinion against the selection of the ministers.

24. More prominent among the followers of Daultana who started whispering campaign were Sh. Fazal Elahi, Ch. Muhammad Hussain Chattha, Sardar Ahmed Ali and Malik Abdul Aziz. At the house of the last mentioned meetings were held for the celebration of the Iqbal Day at which some persons collected including Raja Hassan Akhtar and Khawaja Abdur Rahim and discussed the inclusion of Nawab Qazilbash in the Cabinet. Raja Hassan Akhtar is a close friend and a staunch supporter of Ch. Muhammad Hussain Chattha. They were not sure of their position in the parliamentary party and, therefore, favoured the raising of the issue at a meeting of the Muslim League Council. Some of the M.L.As did propaganda in the districts also. The Gujranwala City Muslim League has already passed a resolution condemning the appointment of Nawab Qazilbash. The indications are that the League Council would support the issue in case it goes before it. The position of the H.C.M. would then be embarrassed. It was also in the mind of the supporters of Daultana that at least one, if not two, members of their party should have been included in the Cabinet because it still enjoyed substantial support. It is also a fact that some of the supporters of Daultana had genuine apprehensions that with Malik Feroz Khan Noon as the Chief Minister of the Province a come-back for Malik Khizr Hayat and other diehard Unionists was assured. Ch. Muhammad Hussain Chattha had also a temperamental distrust of the big zamindar.

25. Daultana continued to be the president of the Provincial Muslim League. He had been told by Khawaja Nazimuddin to submit his resignation but he did not comply with his wish. In fact, powers to one of the vice presidents to transact the day to day business have



not so far been delegated. Difficulty is being experienced in operating the account. The supporters of Daultana did not want him to resign and hoped that as long as he continued to be the president his position in the provincial politics would remain strong. For obvious reasons, the ministry did <sup>not</sup> like this position. No Chief Minister can function unless he ~~was~~ the unstinted support of the Muslim League Council.

26. Daultana has now been in Karachi for nearly two weeks. He is probably there to ascertain the attitude of the new Government towards him. He may even have met some members of the Central Government. He has no immediate plans in the Punjab and he does not want to stage an immediate come-back. He has made arrangements for going to Europe and will probably keep away from active politics until his return next autumn. His followers, however, do not propose to leave him alone and would like <sup>him</sup> to return to the province. This view had gained force since the detention of Ch. Muhammad Hussain Chattha. Daultana is a close friend of Chattha and his followers would like him to make an issue of his detention. Daultana is expected to come to Lahore on the 4th May. The detention of Chattha has confused the group and future activity against the ministry, at any rate, for some time, will not be conducted in the open. Nevertheless attempts will continue to take the issue before the League Council. Soofi Abdul Hamid and Syed Ali Hussain Gardezi saw the H.C.M. on 28-4-53 and pressed him to put the matter before the League assembly party. Probably at the back of their minds the feelings. Probably at the back of their minds <sup>that</sup> the feeling was ~~the~~ the action would not be endorsed by that body.

27. The hopes which were held in the beginning that the new ministry would be able to function

smoothly for some months, at any rate, have now disappeared. apart from the issue of Nawab Qazilbash a second issue has arisen and controversy is expected to develop.

28. The general public is apathetic and is becoming more sceptical of political leaders. The common view is that power politics and not the interests of the country dictate decisions. It is also patent that the majority of the M.L.As do not realise that the country is faced with a very grave situation. They are involved in private wrangles and feuds. The break-up of the ministry at this juncture would be most unfortunate. This is a time when all intelligent and patriotic Pakistanis should sink their differences and work as a team for checking the ruin and chaos which are staring us in the face.

29. The appointment of Mian Aminuddin as the <sup>of</sup> Governor/the province has given rise to the speculation that a 92-A rule is likely to be introduced. The view that the Hon'ble Prime Minister will turn his attention to Punjab affairs **after** his visit to East Bengal and take effective steps to clean up political life is widely shared.

30. The Khatm-e-Nabuwat agitation has been suppressed though not completely. Smouldering embers are visible in almost all districts of the province although organised <sup>agitation</sup> is not likely to start for a considerable time. Distrust and suspicion about the Ahmedis was always held. The Ahrars canalized these feelings and aroused high emotion. Disillusionment has come to some extent, and the Ahrars have become thoroughly discredited. The agitation will continue openly, if at all, not by the Ahrars but by individual Mullas. The firm action taken throughout the province has broken the movement but there are factors which may kindle it again. Action



was taken against the Jamaat-i-Islami only in this province and workers of this party, particularly in Karachi, have been very active. Many thousand copies of the "Qadiani Masla" have been published in more than one language. Pamphleteering is also going on and the organised leadership of the anti-Qadiani agitation has now been assumed by the Jamaat-i-Islami. The action taken in the Punjab was only a half measure and will not pay dividends unless all active workers of the Jamaat, wherever they may be, are put under detention.

31. The removal of Khawaja Nazimuddin and Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar in the Centre and Daultana in the Punjab has provided considerable relief and public opinion has been partially appeased. The general public is, however, still sceptical and will judge the new Government only by its achievements.

32. The food situation is better although prices in the Mandis are higher this year than in the corresponding period of 1952 by about three rupees per maund. Prices are generally showing an upward trend and unemployment is on the increase. A large number of employees of the Central Government Offices in Lahore have received discharge notices. Many industrial houses are effecting retrenchment. The workers should be sent on one month's compulsory leave without pay by rotation. Industrial expansion will be restricted because of the shortage of foreign exchange. Business has been dull and the discontent of the lower level earning groups is increasing. In Lahore the action of the <sup>Martial</sup> Law authorities in removing unauthorised stalls and the action taken against hawkers has thrown out of work a very large number of people. There is much bitterness amongst them and most of them sit in the open spaces of the city pouring forth their venom against Government and preparing their plans. Some of them who had the means and

have gone out of Lahore, but many have joined the ranks of the unemployed. According to one report, prostitution owing to poverty has increased. After the Martial Law is lifted, undoubtedly demonstrations and processions will be staged and Government will come in severe criticism. Elementary problems of the country are food and employment in which field, according to popular opinion, precious little has so far been done. The fact that Khawaja Nazimuddin did not resign voluntarily when told by the Governor-General has aroused many bitter comments. The politicians should appreciate that in a democracy they ultimately derive their power from the people. In Pakistan everyone says that leaders are most chary of giving up their positions and continue in office by undemocratic methods. In a democracy elections are a means for enabling the people to put persons of their choice in power. Severe criticism is made against the Central Government as in spite of more than five years having passed even the constitution has not so far been drawn up. In a democratic society, appeasement invariably follows elections. There are other persons who consider that democracy and particularly adult franchise was foisted in this country before time. The fact that the average person is so intolerant and is incapable of taking a view beyond his narrow self should have been kept in mind. In the Punjab and Sind 92-A was enforced and the elected representatives of the people were not able to carry on the government. The panacea, according to such critics, is free and unfettered elections. Even education of the type imparted in this country is not the answer. During the Khatm-e-Nabuwwat agitation, three college professors came to notice for taking active part: two were arrested and detained. The need is not for education alone but an education which is also liberal.



33. Another weakness of the Government is that it has no mass contact. The Muslim League leaders cannot give an intelligent lead and in fact cannot face the electorate. In India the situation is probably equally difficult, but Pandit Nehru is still the popular leader. No Government can run today without the goodwill of the common man; the Zamindars and the upper classes no longer matter, at any rate, to the same extent. The bridge between the common man and the leaders is widening.

34. . For years frustration and dissatisfaction have been increasing and preying on the minds of the people. Sane thinking in this back-ground is not easy. Government publicity has been very poor. It is only by patient hard work that the wrong done by opposition demagogues and irresponsible pressmen can be undone. The lot of the poorer section of the population must be improved. At the present level of prices persons in the lower income levels are materially much worse off than before the partition. Government officials lack the zeal for work.

Sd/- M. Anwar Ali.  
Inspector -General of Police, Punjab,  
Lahore.

April 29, 1953..

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D.O.No. S/731/53

Lahore  
March 10, 1953

My dear Mr. Ahmad,

The recent events in Lahore have shown that the administrative structure needs to be revitalized in various ways. In my opinion it is necessary that a high level meeting should be called in which civil servants such as yourself, the Governor of Sind, Khan Qurban Ali Khan and others should be associated. If we have learnt our weaknesses the agitators must have learnt theirs also, and unless we take immediate steps to revitalize ourselves the enemy will next time hit much harder. We discovered, almost at our cost, that the foundations of the government structure were in some respects not very secure. The following features came particularly to notice:-

(a) The collapse was threatened not due to the strength of the agitators but due to our own weakness. The agitators comprised a small section of the population. They gained success not because they were strong but because we were vulnerable and weak. ✓

(2) Most civil servants, particularly of the lower ranks, except those in the Army and the Police, not only remained spathetic but threw their weight actively on the side of the agitators. Those who came particularly to notice were ✓

(a) The Secretariat clerks excluding the C.I.D. and the Central Police Office. They walked out of the offices on two successive days and made a defiant and threatening demonstration.

(b) The Accountant-General's Office. ✓

(c) The G.P.O.

(d) The Telephone and Telegraph Offices.

(e) Railway employees. They were responsible for doing damage to railway property, for immobilizing locomotives and breaking up the tracks near Lahore.



(f) The Electricity Department. The employees sent a notice to the Chief Engineer that unless H.E. the Governor, the Ministers and the Gazetted Officers residing in the G.O.R. Estate voluntarily agreed to have their electricity cut off the entire city would be blacked out. ✓

(3) Muslim League M.L.As and celebrities instead of coming to the rescue of government on seeing the wind blow in a different direction began to play to popular demands and in some cases actively aided with the agitators.

(4) Events showed that in Lahore there was not one popular leader, not even in the Muslim League. The city was thus under complete mob rule.

(5) Absence of a buffer between the Government and the people. The Police had to disperse crowds and to deal with the situation absolutely alone without a single public man on its side. This pathetic position did not exist even on the 13th August, 1947- so far as the British were concerned, on the last day of their rule in India. The vacuum created by the abolition of the system of zaildars, sufaidposhes,  Jagirdars, Honourable Magistrates and the ~~class~~ of so-called title-holders was badly missed. ✓

(6) Universal contempt and lack of confidence in leaders was apparent throughout the agitation. The form of the agitation was certainly anti-Ahmadia but all anti-government elements had joined hands. Those who did not agree with the agitators not only of the Central Government, the provincial Chief Minister and the Governor-General were vilely abused. In particular was the demand made that the Hon'ble Prime Minister should quite, He was called names and most contemptuous and defamatory references were made about him.

(7) The cry of "Islam in danger" raised before the partition and repeated so often since was exploited. We had to reap the fruit of playing to the reactionary elements over a long period.

(8) The tactics which the Muslim League used against the Hindus and the British were employed in the attempt to

overthrow the League Government: (a) plea of Jihad against a satanic government, (b) method of shouting <sup>slogans</sup> religious/ from house-tops at night during curfew hours to terrorise and demoralise the forces of law and order, (c) establishment of calls in Government offices, telephone exchanges etc, to get information with a view to paralysing the administration and, (d) appeal made to Government servants in the name of Islam to join hands with the agitators.

(9) Arms and the training given for the civil defence purposes were used against the forces of law and order. Telephone wires were cut, road block erected, communications interfered with, post offices burnt, omnibuses destroyed, railway trains stopped, engines in the loco shed immobilized and tracks broken.

(10) Except the Police and a small number of Government servants here and there, the civil services showed signs of complete panic and stampeded. Unless the rot is checked immediately the Police may go the same way. It has become obvious that if the Police force had behaved like other civil services the city would have been in the hands of the agitators before long.

(11) We had to reap the result of lack of a clear policy, inertia and desire to placate on the part of the leaders. "A stitch in time" policy would have averted all this trouble. Our advice about the Ahrars that they were disruptionists dangerous given since 1948 was repeatedly ignored.

(12) The plan to deal with the "direct action" menace was prepared five days after one month's notice had expired. In the olden days it used to be a practice to declare an association unlawful the moment it decided to launch civil disobedience or any other form of "direct action" activity. The agitators had collected funds, enrolled volunteers and fixed the centres of



their agitation when we set our machinery in motion.

(13) The increase in food prices, deterioration in the standard of government efficiency and general frustration prevented the saner section of the people from coming openly to our rescue.

2. The Martial Law will certainly enable the situation to be checked and to be brought under control and lawless elements will doubtless be dealt with ruthlessly. Opportunity should, however, be taken without loss of time of reviewing the position with a view to removing the causes which brought this holocaust.

3. I enclose a copy of note which I submitted to Government on 17-12-52. I have emphasised in this note how hatred is being preached insidiously against Government. In a democracy the bureaucracy cannot function without the active support of the public. This support is completely lacking.

4. I am writing to you this letter purely in a personal capacity and hope that as one who knows this province you will be able to appreciate the problem with a view to finding permanent remedies. There is a strong public opinion at this time that something positive should be done to improve the administration. I am sure that for the consummation of this object you can make a material contribution. ✓

Yours sincerely,

Sd/- M. Anwar Ali

G. Ahmad, Esquire, P.S.P.,  
Secretary to the Govt. of Pakistan,  
Ministry of the Interior, Karachi.

Statement of Mr. S. N. Alam, P.S.P., Deputy Inspector-General of Police, Lahore Range, from 17-3-1953 to 27-4-53.

The organisation **directly** responsible for the disturbance was the Majlis-i-Ahrar a note on which has been prepared by Mr. Anwar Ali, the then Inspector-General of Police. It is unnecessary for me to add anything to that note.

2. To the best of my knowledge, from time to time Mr. Anwar Ali as Deputy Inspector-General of Police, C.I.D. Punjab, has been informing Government regarding the subversive activities of Ahrars and the possible consequences, since 1948. Unfortunately, however, suitable action was not taken on the recommendation of D.I.G., C.I.D. The Ahrars made promises to Government which were never honoured and their subversive activities continued.

3. I was unaware of the latest developments in the last fortnight of February as I had <sup>been</sup> away on duty to East Bengal. I returned from Bengal on the 1st of March, 1953, at about 2 p.m. I was informed that there had been trouble in the city and the I.G. had enquired about me several times in the morning. I immediately proceeded to Civil Lines Police Station and went into a conference with the officers assembled there. Reports were received that a procession was arriving at Charing Cross. I went to Charing Cross and found the I.G. of Police, the Home Secretary and other officers, including the Deputy Commissioner and the Senior Superintendent of Police, present there. The procession arrived at Charing Cross and was stopped by the Police. The procession then dispersed.

4. On the 2nd March at about the same time in the evening another procession arrived at Charing Cross after several other small processions had converged on the Mall from different quarters. The intention of this procession was to march up to Government House. The procession was very unruly and people started making ugly demonstrations



and using abusive language, Brickbats and sticks, were also thrown. It was, therefore, decided that the procession should be declared as an unlawful assembly and dispersed by force. Accordingly, the processions was dispersed and a few people including some Police officers received injuries. Some arrests were made and a case registered at the Civil Lines Police station. Maulana Akhtar Ali Khan, who was leading the procession was also arrested.

5. Immediately after the dispersal of this procession a meeting was held in the Civil Lines Police station and it was decided that

- (a) a military officer should be with the Police as a liaison Officer so as to keep himself apprised of the situation;
- (b) section 144 Cr.P.C. prohibiting processions in Lahore city, barring the walled city area, should be enforced;
- (c) Home Secretary should address a letter to the military authorities asking for posting of troops in aid of the civil power. Details of posting were to be determined by discussion between the Military liaison officers and the District Magistrate.

6. As a result of the forceful dispersal of the mob on the 2nd March the 3rd March was comparatively a quite day and no processions worth the name were taken out. In the meanwhile, a report was received that firing had occurred in Sialkot.

7. On the 4th March a meeting was held in the office of H.C.M. and was attended by me. The situation in Sialkot was discussed and since Lahore was quite I was asked to proceed to Sialkot. I arrived in Sialkot in the afternoon. There I found that the District Magistrate had handed over the situation to the Army. I found there was no justification for

it and in consultation with the Commissioner, who was already there, I decided that the Police should take over the situation again. I reorganised the Police Force and directed patrolling in the city area. The arrangements had not quite been completed when I got a message that the Deputy Superintendent of Police, City, in Lahore had been murdered and that I was ordered by the I.G. to come back to Lahore at once. I arrived in Lahore at about 11 p.m. and proceeded straight to Kotwali City. There I met Malik Habibullah and discussed the situation with him. After discussion I found that Police officers had already been overtaxed and that it was not possible to provide any relief for them. I told Malik Habibullah to draw up a roster of duties for police officers so that relief should be provided and ordered him to go home and rest. I stayed the night in Police station Kotwali City.

8. On the 5th March, 1953, after having been around the City on patrol I arrived at Government House to make a report regarding the situation. I found that a conference was in progress and I went and sat with the Military Secretary. As soon as the conference was over, Mian Anwar Ali, the then I.G., came out and asked me to proceed immediately and restore law and order even if I had to use force. I accordingly took with me Malik Habibullah who happened to be there and went to the Civil Lines Police Station from where we took two Reserves with us. We had received a report at the Civil Lines Police station that a mob was proceeding to the Tollinton Market and had already burnt some omnibuses and that the mob was in a furious mood. When we reached opposite the Commercial buildings a mob was seen wheeling round on to the Mall from the Anarkali side. The crowd was in a violence frame of mind and by the time the Police debussed and formed up brickbats started to be hurled at them. It was apparent that very quick action would have to be taken as the distance between the mob and the Police was diminishing quite swiftly. Nearly three thousand persons had come over to the Mall side but the main body of



the column still appeared to be on the Anarkali side. The mob was asked to stop and disperse by means of signals and word of mouth shouted on the Police wireless van loudspeaker but to no effect. It was then declared an unlawful assembly and ordered to disperse. In the meanwhile a shot was fired at the Police. As it was apprehended that the Police party would be surrounded and mobbed I ordered the use of tear-gas. One of the tear-gas shells was picked<sup>up</sup> by someone from the mob and thrown back at the Police. The situation was getting critical and the mob continued to advance in an infuriated mood. The Police was thereupon ordered to open fire resulting in a number of casualties at least four of whom I saw on the spot.

9. At this juncture a frantic message was received through the Police wireless car that **another** furious crowd was collecting near Serai Rattan Chand where a large number of Lahore Omni Bus vehicles were standing. The message also said that there was apprehension that the buses would be set on fire. I along with the police reserves which had been re-inforced by another reserve brought by Malik Khan Bahadur, Superintendent of Police, Punjab Constabulary, rushed to the spot. On seeing us approach the crowd melted away towards Gawalmandi and Shahalmi Gate side. Serai Rattan Chand was found to contain twentyone Lahore Omni Bus vehicles and in view of the critical situation that was seen on the spot where two buses had earlier been burnt it was absolutely necessary that immediate arrangements should be made for their evacuation to a place of safety. The unruly crowds which stood up defiantly in front of us were kept at bay and arrangements made to evacuate the buses through the Manager of the Lahore Omni Bus Service. At that time information was simultaneously received that the Rang Mahal Post Office was being attacked by a crowd and another crowd had collected outside

Lohari Gate with the intention of attacking the Lohari Gate Police station. A military armoured car detachment which was on patrol in that area was contacted and asked to proceed to the Police station and a Police reserve under Malik Khan Bahadur, SP. Punjab Constabulary, was despatched to deal with the situation in the Rang Mahal area. Immediately afterwards another message came through that a crowd from Bhati Gate was converging on the District Courts. Having seen the last bus get through safely out of Serai Rattan Chand, I along with the remaining reserve of Police <sup>rushed</sup> on to the District Courts. On reaching there we found that either the information was not correct or the crowd had gone on to some other direction. At that very time <sup>another</sup> report was received on the mobile wireless that the Post Office of Shahi Mohalla was being attacked by a crowd. I accordingly rushed to that place. Before our arrival, however, a mob had broken open the Post Office, looted it and set fire to some movable property that was found therein. Contact with this mob could not be made as it had already dispersed inside the city lanes. On returning towards police station Lohari Gate I found that the Army was in position outside the police station but the crowd was throwing garlands and flowers at them. The whole area in front of the police station Lohari Gate and the chawk of Lohari Gate and Anarkali was strewn with brickbats. Another report was not received that a huge crowd was converging on the Ahmadiyya building on the Brandreth Road. I rushed to that place and found a very big crowd coming from the station side in chawk Dalgaran. Before the Police even could debus they were attacked by volleys of brickbats from the crowd as well as from the surrounding houses. Window glasses of the police vehicles were shattered. This further encouraged the mob and their attitude became even more violent. They were directed to disperse and warned that if they did



not do so immediate force would be used. These warnings went unheeded and tear-gas had to be restored to. This too proved ineffecting and a part of the Police was directed to charge the crowd with lathis. They were met with a volley of stones and brickbats. Some tear-gas shells which were thrown by the Police was also hurled back on them. The situation had become so ugly that there was every apprehension of the Police being mobbed and firing had to be resorted to which resulted in a number of casualties. One dead and two injured were picked up by the police but there were some others which were carried away by the mob. Sporadic brickbattling on the police force continued and it became impossible for them to get into their vehicles. Three stray shots were also fired from house -tops. The police were, therefore, formed up in two single files and marched on towards the railway station from where we eventually returned to the City Kotwali, the total number of ammunition used by the police under my command was 43 rounds. I learnt that earlier in the day the clerical staff of the Secretariat barring only the Central Police Office, the C.I.D., and the Lahore Range Police Officer had all struck work and had made ugly demonstration in the Civil Secretariat. Throughout the day incidents had occurred all over the city and police had to go into action at many places.

10. I also learnt that individual police officers had been attacked and earlier in the morning a small party of the police which had taken some dead and injured persons to the Mayo Hospital had been mobbed. Despite these heavy odds and the extremely heavy pressure which had fallen on the shoulders of the police the force on the whole had upto then stood the strain well. Their morals was intact and although on account of constant strain most of the officers and men looked haggard and extremely tired they still appeared to possess enough

stamina to be able to control the situation.

11. In the evening another high level conference was held at the Government House at which all the members of the Cabinet, the G.O.C., 10 Division and his senior military officers, the Chief Secretary, Home Secretary, I.G. Police, myself, D.M. Lahore, S.S.P. Lahore and A.D.I.G., C.I.D. were present. At this meeting it was decided that the use of force particularly firing should be let up and that violations of orders under section 144 Cr.P.C. whether relating to gathering of more than five persons or to the Curfew which appeared to be of a technical nature should be ignored. The Police was directed to use force only as a last resort when police parties or stations were attacked or when it was impossible to save life or property without resorting to firing. The G.O.C. 10 Division was asked to station more troops in the city.

12. The 6th of March was a Friday. On that day the suspension of business was complete. The railway workers cut the line to Karachi between city and Cantonment railway stations. The Electricity workers threw a challenge and threatened to cut the electricity of the Government House and the G.O.R. Estate. Telephone wires were cut and Telephone and Telegraph workers went on a sit-down strike. Widespread looting started and shops were set on fire. With the police the crowd started to play the game of "hide and seek". Goonda rule prevailed for some hours.

13. On this day posters were distributed to the effect that the police were no longer going to fire unless property or life was in danger and that the Government was prepared to convey the demands of the people against the Ahmadis to the Central Government. The effect of the posters was that the mob thought that Government had capitulated and that the Police would no longer be able to fire. Encouraged by these circumstances, the mob became more violent and even the discipline of government servants was effected. In the Civil Secretariat, except for the



clerical staff employed by the Central Police Office, the C.I.D, and the Lahore Range Office, the entire clerical staff which had already struck on the 5th of March assembled in the Secretariat compound and became rowdy and demanded that the Government should stop firing on the people or else they would burn down the Secretariat. I was telephoned by the I.C. regarding the situation and I proceeded to the Civil Secretariat and harangued with the clerks. I found that a car carrying the Chief Secretary and the Home Secretary had been surrounded by the clerks and was not allowed to proceed. Outside the premises. After some talk with the clerical staff the car was permitted to go out of the compound when the Chief Secretary gave a definite undertaking that he would do his best to represent the point of view of the clerical staff to Government and that unless he went out he could not do so on the telephone.

14. Government were inclined to declare Martial Law when they found that their services, particularly their clerical staff, had been so affected. Similarly, the Electricity Supply people and the telephone operators had threatened to strike and to cut off supplies and communications. The clerical staff of other offices also, except the Police offices, had similarly adopted a most truculent attitude. As far as the Police Force is concerned their strength had always been much below the normal strength required by Police Rules. According to Police Rule 2.2.(ii), there should be one Constable to every 450 inhabitants. Thus, on a population of 9,34,532, which according to the census figures is the population of Lahore, there should have been a Police Force of 2,076 Constables in Lahore City as against the sanctioned strength of 1667. It will be seen from the above that even for normal duties the police was quite understaffed. For an emergency of this nature the strength

of the Police Force was grossly inadequate.

15. The task of the police was rendered more difficult by indiscriminate issue in Lahore City.

The number of firearms with the population in Lahore alone was 27398 i.e. more than nine times more than in the possession of the Police. Not only the police but even the Army when they took over were fired at on several occasions.

16. Despite the above and despite the fact that the police employed had to work under difficult conditions without rest or respite, the police could still have carried on except for the impression among the people that the Army were there to protect them against the "atrocities" of the police and the impression created that the Government had capitulated and had acceded to the popular demand and had directed the police not to open fire. Martial Law was declared at about 1-30 p.m. on 6-3-53.

17. By the 8th of March the situation in Lahore had considerably eased and I was able to devote my attention to incidents in other parts of my Range. On the 8th of March at 7-30 a.m. I left Lahore for Gujranwala and took with me Inspector Rashidudin Khan and two Punjab Constabulary Reserves. At Gujranwala I discussed the situation with the Deputy Commissioner and the Superintendent of Police and other senior officers and gave directions. I also called notables of the City and had a talk with them. I found that many of them wanted that law and order should be restored but were completely devoid of moral courage to enable them come openly forward and say so either from the public platform or through leaflets. Indeed they insisted that when I talked to them I should do so behind closed doors. Among these notables were many Muslim League M.L.As. and office bearers. I also addressed the Police. Personnel in the District Police Lines. I



found their morale high and they were ready for any emergency. I also distributed some rewards to the Police officers who had done well in dealing with the agitation. I stayed the night at Gujranwala. As the situation had eased I rushed to Sheikhupura on the 9th of March reaching there at 12 noon. I again addressed the Police personnel in the District Police Lines. I found the morale of Sheikhupura Police also good and was informed that the situation was well in hand. I returned to Lahore in the afternoon and went straight to the house of H.C.M. to apprise him of the situation.

18. Having studied the situation in my Range thoroughly, on the 13th of March I wrote a note to the I.G. of Police making the following suggestions:-

- (a) We should organise publicity on a very large scale in order to bring it home to the peace-loving public that the present agitation had been directed with ulterior motives and, as such, it was derogatory to the very name of our Prophet;
- (b) Various persons and editors of newspapers should be asked to cooperate, and editorials, articles and letters to the editors written quoting the following instances:-
  - (i) At Lyallpur some women passengers in a female compartment were molested;
  - (ii) Similar instances took place in Gujranwala;
  - (iii) In Lahore and other places shops were looted with shouts of "Allaho Akbar" and in the name of "Namooos-e-Rasool".
  - (iv) In several cases people were even burnt alive;
  - (v) A Deputy Superintendent of Police, who was a Syed, was murdered in a mosque in the name of "Namooos-e-Rasool";
  - (vi) Petty shopkeepers and 'Rehriwala's who daily earned their meagre subsistence were forcibly asked to shut their shops and some of them were even looted, all in the name of "Namooos-e-Rasool".

19. It will be seen that the Police were so involved in Lahore that adequate help could not be rushed to the mofussil districts until after the promulgations of Martial Law. As soon as the situation eased in Lahore, the I.G. of Police ordered Reserves to be sent to other districts.....

such as Sheikhpura and Gujranwala.

20. As regards the question as to what action the Military took which the Police could not, I detailed below the following:-

- (i) The Military could issue any order which had the effect of law and this the Police could not do.
- (ii) The military could try any person summarily for any offence and award any sentence. This the Police could not do.
- (iii) The Military put in five Brigades in Lahore city with full armour and equipment, while the strength of the Police including Punjab Constabulary and Border Police was not more than 3000 at any time (combatant effectives).
- (iv) The fire-power of the Police consisted of . 303 rifles and muskets while the Army had automatics such as bren-guns, sten-guns, mortars, grenades, tanks, armoured cars etc.
- (v) The mobility of the Army was much greater than that of the Police Force.
- (vi) The Army knew that whatever action they took would not be enquired into while the Police personnel knew that if they opened fire even on one occasion there was bound to be an enquiry and some blame would be attached to them. Indeed this feeling was so great that I had to go to the Police lines and address Policemen on parade and assure them that whatever strong action they had taken under my orders and that I took full responsibility and they need not fear the consequence
- (vii) The army did not have to take orders from anyone except their own commanders while the Police operations had to be limited according to restrictions placed by Government.

It is significant that even after Martial Law had been declared the Army with all their five Brigades including an armoured corps unit could not enter the walled city for a period of two days.

21. The total number of ammunition actually used in the districts of Lahore Range is given in the statements of the Senior Superintendent of Police, Lahore, and Superintendent of Police, Gujranwala and Sialkot. In the Sheikhpura district no incident of firing took place.



Statement of Syed Ijaz Hussain Shah, District  
Magistrate, Lahore.

1. Since June, 1952, I had been informing Government regarding the Ahrar-Ahmedi controversy and the feelings of the general public roused by the Khatm-i-Nabuwat question. The propaganda in support of this agitation had been going on in the press and on the platform day in and day out. Relevant excerpts from my nine confidential fortnightly reports from Annexure 'A' (in sealed cover) to this statement. These are self-explanatory. These excerpts form a part of the confidential record; 'privilege' is, therefore, claimed.

2. All the parties interested in this controversy and agitation formed an 'All Parties Convention' and held several meetings thereof. An important venue of the meetings was the Wazir Khan Mosque. The Convention had been fixing the dead line for launching 'Direct Action' campaign in Karachi. The situation was precipitated in Lahore when on the 28th February, 1953, as a reaction to the arrest of some of their leaders at Karachi, the workers of the campaign held a well attended meeting outside Delhi Gate. It was announced in the meeting that with the decision of the Punjab Government to arrest the Anti-Ahmadi Movement leaders, they were forced to change their ground for the agitation to Lahore. Apprehending that they would take out a procession, I issued an order-Annexure 'B' to all these Magistrates, whose ilaqas fell within the Corporation of the City of Lahore, to contact the Station House Officers concerned and be in constant touch with the situation. They were specifically told that under no circumstances was a procession to be allowed to proceed towards Government House beyond the General Post Office, the Simla Hill and the N.W.R. Headquarters' Office. It was generally felt that if a procession was taken out at all, it would not be violent.

3. A procession was taken out and after offering some

2.

persons for arrest at the Charing Cross, the processionists dispersed. The Commissioner, Lahore Division, the Inspector General of Police, the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Lahore Range, the Senior Superintendent of Police and I actually faced the procession and dealt with it. After dispersal of the processionists a meeting of these officers was held in the Civil Lines Police Station in which it was decided to watch the situation on the following day and not to issue any order under section 144 Cr.P.C. It was felt that as the sponsors of the agitation had been arrested, there would be no more processions and the agitation would fizzle out.

4. On 1.3.53 a public meeting was again held outside Delhi Gate and a procession was taken out as on the previous day. Some persons were offered for arrest by the processionists. After these arrests had been effected, the processionists dispersed. This procession was of about the same size as on the previous day and it was noticed that all those who had offered themselves for arrest, had come from out-stations. On this occasion too the Commissioner, Lahore Division, the I.G.Police, the D.I.G.Police, Lahore Range, and the S.S.P were present with me at the spot. The Home Secretary had also arrived there. These officers including the Home Secretary again met in the evening at the Civil Lines Police Station and decided that no order under section 144 Cr.P.C need be promulgated though a draft of the order was ready with me. Even though the number of the processionists was a little larger than that of the preceding day, there were no signs of violence.

5. On 2.3.1953 Maulana Akhtar Ali Khan, Editor, 'Zamindar' led a large procession, which arrived at the Charing Cross through the usual route of Anarkali and the Mall. A comparatively smaller procession came through the Cooper Road and the Assembly Chamber. The Commissioner, Lahore Division, the Home Secretary, the I.G.Police, the D.I.G.Police and the S.S.P. were again present at the spot with me. Some of the processionists appeared to be inclined to violence and the



situation caused anxiety. The officers were surrounded by some hooligans and their assembly had to be declared unlawful. Maulana Akhtar Ali Khan and a large number of other persons, most of whom had come from out-stations, courted arrest. The officers again met in the Civil Lines Police Station late in the evening and it was decided that a situation had arisen warranting action under section 144 Cr.P.C, for the maintenance of public peace and tranquillity. It was decided that the Home Secretary should intimate to the G.O.C, 10th Division, that serious disorder was apprehended in Lahore and that it was felt that the Civil authorities might not be able to cope with the situation. The G.O.C was, therefore, requested by the Home Secretary in his letter dated 2.3.53 (Annexure C) to assist the District Magistrate with military troops. After meeting in the Civil Lines Police Station, all the officers went to the house of H.C.M where the situation was reviewed. On return from there, order under section 144 Cr.P.C (Annexure 'D') was passed a short time after mid-night.

6. On 3.3.53 the military arrived and stood by in the Jinnah Garden. On my request they patrolled important roads indicated by me. A magistrate was on duty with each patrolling party. On the basis of the Home Secretary's letter to the G.O.C, I made a reference (Annexure E) to the S.S.P for report as regards our requirements of the military aid, but no reply was received. Some processions were taken out and were dispersed on that date and though the situation was tense, it was felt that it was calming down. The military, who were standing in the Jinnah Gardens, continued to send out patrols in the company of magistrates. At 12.30 P.M. all the Hon'ble Ministers met in H.C.M's room where the Chief Secretary, the Home Secretary, the I.C. Police, the Assistant to D.I.G, C.I.D, the S.S.P. and I were also called. The situation was discussed. I suggested that Maulana Abdus Sattar Niazi who had been instigating the public for the previous two days, and was keeping himself inside the Wazir Khan Mosque at all times, should be arrested from inside the



mosque as early as possible. This was not approved. There had been lot of sinister propaganda going on against Government in almost all the mosques in Lahore but there was no counter propaganda. I wrote a letter (Annexure F) marked 'Immediate' to the Director, Public Relations, to have suitable posters and hand-bills printed without loss of time but unfortunately that was <sup>not</sup> done within reasonable time. In the evening, the I.G. Police, the H.S., the S.S.P and I drove on the Mall, Lower Mall, Circular Road, Anarkali and Naulakha and Gawalmandi areas, etc, and it was apparently calm and quite. On return to the Civil Lines Police Station, the I.G. Police apprised the H.C.M on the telephone of the situation telling him "Half of the battle had been won".

7. It was all quite in the forenoon of the 4th March except that the situation was tense and the atmosphere was choked with uncertainty. The military did not send out patrols in the afternoon. Speeches had been, however, going on in the Wazir Khan Mosque during the previous two or three days as well as on that day. A fairly large meeting of which there was no previous notice, was held outside Delhi Gate in which a speaker exhibited some pages of the holy Quran alleging that the same had been trampled over by Police officers. Another speaker told the audience that several thousands of persons had been killed by the police firing in Sialkot. Many other fiery speeches were also made. At about 5 P.M the meeting finished and the crowd headed towards Wazir Khan Mosque. It was reported that two A.S.Is and some constables had been bodily lifted from the vicinity of the mosque and carried into the mosque and probably murdered. On hearing this, the D.S.P. City took a posse of Police, out of which some constables were armed with rifles and the others with sticks, and proceeded towards the mosque. He was stabbed and murdered in the chawk. The S.S.P. and I were then present in the Civil Lines Police Station, and were informed of this by a wireless message. On receipt of this message the City Magistrate was asked to reach Kotwali at once. The I.G. Police



and the Home Secretary were contacted and they came to Police Station Civil Lines and then proceeded to the Kotwali followed by the S.S.P. The S.S.P had stayed with me for a short period during my attempt to contact the G.O.C and the Liaison Officer. The G.O.C, 10th Division, could not be contacted on the telephone by me. The Liaison Officer, Captain Nazir Ahmad, who was also not present at the Police Station at that time, was contacted on the telephone and he turned up after a short time. He was apprised of the situation and was requested by me to inform the G.O.C of the occurrence and to arrange to move out the troops to the Kotwali to meet the situation caused by the murder of the City D.S.P. After doing this I also rushed to the Kotwali and a short time of my arrival there, the G.O.C also came there and discussed the matter with the I.G. Police, the Home Secretary, the S.S.P and myself. It was decided that curfew be imposed and the order (Annexure G) was drafted by me and it was promulgated. Before the arrival of these officers, however, the body of the D.S.P had been brought to the Kotwali. Almost all the shops in the town had closed down and mobs had started moving about within the city walls and in other thickly populated areas outside the city walls, as for example, Qila Gujar Singh, Gowalmandi, Krishna Gali, Naulkha, etc, etc, Military reinforcements had also arrived outside the Kotwali by that time. A unit of the military with a magistrate was sent towards P.S. Tibbi as information was received that the P.S had been attacked but it returned after some time as the news was not correct. About a thousands hooligans locked themselves in the Wazir Khan Mosque.

8. At about 12.45 A.M, H.C.M called a meeting of the H.S, the I.G, the D.I.G, the D.M and the S.S.P at his house and the matter was discussed till about 3 A.M. The G.O.C with some of his officers also attended that meeting.

9. On the 5th March, 1953, some colleges remained closed as the students had come out of their classes. A huge procession started from the Islamia College dividing itself into two parts from Chauk Barafkhana. One part moved towards

the Mayo Hospital. It was joined by several other persons from the Gawalmandi and the Railway Road and they created a lot of disturbance in the Chhajju Bhagat crossing and inside the Mayo Hospital. The other part of the procession moved towards the Dayal Singh College from where some more students of that college and other persons joined them. That procession then divided itself into several small groups and moved <sup>about</sup> on the Nisbat Road, the Chamberlain Road, the McLeod Road, Qila Gujar Singh, etc.

10. The clerks of the Secretariat and the office of the Accountant-General struck work and were rowdy within their respective office premises. Many other Government offices were likewise affected. Posters were distributed calling on constables to lay down their arms as it was a Jihad. Well organized attempts to sabotage and to subvert the loyalty of Government had been made.

11. Many persons started coming into Lahore in connection with this agitation from the 1st March, 1953, but the arrival of some Jathas on the 3rd and the 4th and many on the 5th was conspicuous. This matter was brought to the notice of H.S and I.G by me in a meeting in the Police Station Civil Lines and on this H.S issued order to the District Magistrates of other districts to stop Jathas in their own districts and not permit the same to come to Lahore. In Lahore as soon as the Jathas violated the law by committing breach of section 144 Cr.P.C, they were put under arrest. A number of them clashed with the Police and had to be over-powered by force. One of them, which was a fairly big one, was violent and had to be lathi-charged at the General Post Office crossing.

12. I called a meeting of notables of the city in my office on 5.3.1953 at 9 A.M. They were exhorted to use their influence individually in their spheres, and to persuade the people to be calm and quiet and the shop-keepers to open their shops. Those who attended the meeting did not agree to the issue of an appeal to the public under their names.



Many cases of loot and arson and a few murders took place on that day and the whole day was highly disturbed. In the forenoon a meeting presided over by H.E. the Governor was also held in the Government House. All the Hon'ble Ministers, the Chief Secretary, the G.O.C, 10th Division, and his staff officers, the I.G. Police, the D.I.G, Lahore Range, and H.S were present. In view of the deterioration of the situation in Lahore and a general flare-up in the city, the following decisions were taken:-

(1) The curfew already imposed by the District Magistrate, Lahore, on the area prescribed in his order under section 144 Cr.P.C should be amended to provide that the hours of the curfew shall be 3.30 p.m to 6.00 a.m. on the days to which the Order applies.-

ACTION D.M.LAHORE.

(2) In view of the deterioration of the situation in Lahore and a general flare-up in the city, in the first instance, the Police should take very strong action using any amount of force that may be necessary to quell disturbances. Police patrols will be supported by Military contingents under their own Commanders.-

ACTION I.G.P/  
G.O.C. 10 Div.

(3) If the Police cannot cope with any particular sector, the senior Police Officers present should hand over charge of the situation in that sector to the Army Commander accompanying him.

ACTION I.G.P/G.O.C.  
10 Div.

(4) If the above measures fail to restore law and order and the Police cannot keep the general situation under control with this partial aid by the Military, the Military will be asked to take over charge of the city.

ACTION I.G.P/G.O.C. 10 Div.

(5) Special arrangements for the provision of food and other necessary comforts for the Police force on duty should be organized, if necessary with Military aid, at the expense of the Provincial Government.-

ACTION I.G.P.

(6) All steps should be taken to keep the morale of Police force high. They should be told that suitable awards will be given for gallantry and distinguished and conscientious discharge of duty. They should also be informed that in the case of casualty while on duty, adequate compensation will be given to the next of kin. In the case of the late Syed Firdaus Shah, Government will award 2 squares of land in a Colony District to his heirs.-

ACTION I.G.P.

(7) Efforts should be made, as far as possible, to isolate the students from the rioters.-

ACTION-  
Authorities in charge of  
the situation: respective  
Military & Police  
Commanders & Magistrates  
on duty



(8) The arrivals in Lahore should be screened at points of entry.-

ACTION I.G.P.

(9) The public spirited citizens representing all Political Parties will be addressed by His Excellency the Governor today and exhorted to use their influence to restore sanity in the city. H.M.R. will convene the meeting.-

ACTION H.M.R.

(10) A Joint Police/ Army Headquarters should be opened in the Committee Room of the Lahore Gymkhana.

ACTION IGF/GOC 10 Div

In the afternoon a largely attended meeting of the notables, Hon'ble Ministers, some military officers and Ulemas was held in the Government House and it was addressed among others by the Hon'ble Chief Minister and Maulana Maudoodi.

13. On the 6th morning all the members of the Corporation of the City of Lahore were called to the Government House. H.E. the Governor and all the Hon'ble Ministers discussed the matter. The H.S., the I.G. and the G.O.C. were also present. A decision was probably taken there to promulgate Martial Law. It was a Friday. The situation in the city and other thickly populated areas, viz., the Railway Road, the Chamberlain Road, the Nisbet Road, Qila Gujar Singh, Gokulmandi, Mozang, Baghbanpura, Misri Shah, etc, etc, had grown very ugly and out of control. The telephonic connections had been cut and it had become very difficult for vehicular traffic to cross the entire length of Anarkali and Multan Road upto Chauburji as mobs had collected in the crossings and they molested respectable pedestrians and those who drove in vehicles. Water supply was cut off in many parts of the town. A large number of students collected at the crossing of the Tollinton Market and had to be dispersed by firing. Several mobs moved about within and outside the city walls. Most of them were violent. A large number of labourers formed a big unlawful assembly and invaded the Railway Station. One air conditioned coach was burnt and signals were damaged. Trains were stopped. There were many cases of arson and loot on the Temple Road and at several other places in the town. The house



of an A.S.I. was put on fire in Gawalmandi. Many crossings and roads were blocked by hooligans. Arson and loot had started and lawlessness prevailed in the affected areas. In short the situation was completely out of control till the arrival of the military in the afternoon. Before the military had taken positions, one of their camps in the Central Model High School was fired upon and a patrolling vehicle was bombed resulting in two fatal casualties to military personnel outside Mori Gate.

14. It will appear from the above narrative that the military had been called out for assistance on the 2nd March, 1953, and a section of the army was stationed in the Jinnah Gardens on the following morning. The military patrols went out but with magistrates in several directions from the 3rd to the 6th March, 1953. On the 4th the G.O.C was apprised of the situation personally by me, the S.S.P, the H.S and the I.G. in the Kotwāli. On the 5th definite duties were assigned to the military, I.G. Police and to me as D.M in the meeting held in the Government House. Before that the military was on the spot and magistrates were regularly detailed on duty with their units in action. It was for the magistrates concerned to weigh the situation on the spots and to pass orders under section 129 Cr.P.C. It would be appreciated that it was not a case of only one unlawful assembly to be dealt with. Several unlawful assemblies were to be tackled and in most of the cases the magistrates were present with the police and the military.

15. It will not be out of place to mention here that since the partition, arms licences had been issued in Lahore indiscriminately. It was generally believed that even the law strate of the public were extensively armed and quite a large number of illicit weapons were also present in the town. In this connection I had made a report to the Commissioner, Lahore Division, by my three letters (Annexure H in sealed cover). As these are confidential references, 'privilege' is claimed. These letters are self-explanatory and give a clear

picture of the state of affairs in this regard in the Lahore district. This aspect of the case is under enquiry by the C.I.D. The fact that a large section of the public was armed and the general public had scant respect for law, contributed to the intensity of this politico-religious agitation.

16. By my order dated 28.2.1953 (Annexure B) the magistrates were asked to get in touch with the situation. Thereafter I met the Magistrates every day early in the morning and again late in the evening in the Civil Lines Police Station to take stock of the situation, to receive their reports and to give them orders. They were impressed that whenever they had to meet a situation they must do it firmly and tactfully. Some of the important duties performed by the magistrates are summarised below date-wised:-

28.2.1953.

Mr.K.M.Sadiq, Ilaqa Magistrate, New Anarkali, assisted by the Police, escorted a peaceful procession passing through Anarkali. Messrs. A.P.Gill, Ilaqa Magistrate, P.S.Civil Lines, Hasnat Ahmad, City Magistrate, and Abdul Haye Khan, Assistant Commissioner, assisted me in stopping the same procession at the Charing Cross. The other magistrates visited their ilaqas.

1.3.1953.

Mr.K.M.Sadiq, Ilaqa, Magistrate, New Anarkali P.S, escorted a procession passing through Anarkali. Ch.Nazir Ahmad Walha, Ilaqa Magistrate, Old Anarkali, then escorted the same procession through the Old Anarkali area up to the Charing Cross, where I dispersed it with the assistance of Mr.A.P.Gill, Ilaqa Magistrate, P.S.Civil Lines. Mr.Hasnat Ahmad, City Magistrate, and Mr.Abdur Rauf, Ilaqa Magistrate, Qila Gujar Singh, also came up there. S.Hasnat Ahmad stopped a small procession opposite P.S.Kotwali with the help of S.D.P.City and 30 processionists were arrested u/s 107/151 Cr.P.C. Mr. Ahmad Shafi visited the Gowalmandi P.S, where a few processions had been taken out. Before coming to the Charing Cross to attend the meeting of Magistrates in the Civil Lines



P.S, Mr. Abdur Rauf patrolled in the Qila Gujar Sing area, where small boys had formed processions. Mr. Muhammad Shafi Zafar, Cantonment Magistrate, escorted a procession marching from the Cantonment towards the city.

2.3.1953.

Mr. K.M. Sadiq, watched processions passing through Anarkali. Ch. Nazir Ahmad Walha escorted a bigger procession on the Mall up to the Charing Cross, where Messrs. Abdul Haye, Hasnat Ahmad, F.A. Saleem and A.P. Gill assisted me in stopping this procession which was headed by Maulana Akhtar Ali Khan. An attempt was first made under my orders by the City Magistrate to stop this procession near the Nila Gumbad, Mr. Muhammad Shafi Zafar, Cantonment Magistrate, escorted a procession marching from the Cantonment to the City.

3.3.1953.

The Additional District Magistrate distributed Curfew Passes firstly in his court room and later in P.S. Civil Lines. Messrs. Hasnat Ahmad, K.M. Sadiq and Nazir Ahmad Walha remained on duty in their ilaqas throughout the day.

Messrs. F.A. Saleem, Sadiq Ali Shah, Abdul Haye Khan and Feroze Khan (Tahsildar, Lahore) accompanied the Military on their rounds of patrols throughout the day. The day passed off quietly and nothing worthy of note was reported in the Magistrates' meeting except that a procession was taken out in Anarkali and was dispersed by force.

4.3.1953.

Mr. K.M. Sadiq remained on duty in New Anarkali and later in the Civil Lines Police Station. Mr. F.A. Saleem accompanied Military patrols in the morning and stayed in the Military Camp in Jinnah Gardens throughout the day. Later in the night he remained with the military on the move. Ch. Nazir Ahmad Walha again remained on duty at the Tollington Market in his ilaqa. S. Hasnat Ahmad, City Magistrate, ordered a mild lathi charge to disperse some processionists near the Mayo School of Arts. He later ordered a lathi charge in Chowk Dalgaran, where some processionists were arrested.

One shell of tear gas was also used for dispersing the agitators <sup>near</sup> Dalgaran Mosque. The City Magistrate patrolled the city and had to order the opening of fire and lathi charge inside Bhati Gate. Firing was also resorted to near the Lahore Hotel and at other places late at night. Messrs. A.P.Gill and Abdur Rauf remained on duty in the Civil Lines P.S throughout the day and the night. The Additional District Magistrate distributed Curfew Passes in the District Courts and Mr.A.P.Gill in the Civil Lines P.S.

5.3.1953.

Mr.K.M.Sadiq,Ilaqa Magistrate, New Anarkali, thrice accompanied the military from the Naulakha P.S. on its patrols. He ordered the military to fire at the Anarkali-Circular Road Crossing, when brick-bats were thrown on the patrolling party. The crowd, which had collected there, was also dispersed. Mr.Sadiq Ali Shah remained with me in the Civil Lines P.S and was deputed with the military four or five times to the Shezan Restaurant, Old Anarkali, Durrand Road and the Rattan Bagh, whence information relating to processions and burning, etc, of houses of Ahmadies had been received. Mr.F.A.Saleem reported to me at the Kotwali P.S and later remained with the military there. He attended a meeting of the Magistrates in P.S.Civil Lines at 3.P.M. Mr.Ahmad Shafi, Ilaqa Magistrate, Gowalmandi, and Mr.Abdur Rauf were deputed to accompany military patrols from the Gol Bagh. Mr. Rauf was later put on duty in P.S.Naulakha. Mr.Nazir Ahmad Walha and Syed Bashir Ahmad Bokhari reported to me in the Civil Lines P.S and they were put on duty in the Kotwali P.S where they had to stay on for the night. Mr.Hasnat Ahmad continued moving about in the city with Police and faced many situations. Mr.A.P.Gill remained on duty with the military in the Jinnah Gardens. Mr.Muhammad Shafi Zafar, Cantonment Magistrate, dispersed a procession coming from the Lahore Cantonment towards the city at the Dharampura Railway Crossing. Mr.Abdur Rauf reported for duty in the Naulakha P.S later in the evening and stayed there for the night. The Additional District Magistrate distributed Curfew Passes in



the District Courts and also attended magisterial meetings in P.S.Civil Lines. Mr.A.P.Gill remained in the Civil Lines P.S on duty.

6.3.1953.

S.Sadiq Ali Shah remained on duty with the military throughout the night. At 4 A.M. he accompanied the military to Rattan Bagh where <sup>many</sup> Ahmadi families had collected for refuge. At 10 A.M and 1 P.M he got reports and rescued two Qadiani families. Mr.F.A.Saleem first reported to me in the Civil Lines P.S in the morning. He was later deputed to disperse a mob which had collected to attack the N.W.R.Headquarters. Mr.Ahmad Shafi remained on duty with the military tackling situations in Tilei and Lohari Police Stations. He was present with the military near the Tollinton Market, where firing had to be opened to disperse the crowd. He later accompanied a military patrol to the Civil Secretariat. Pir Salahud Din, Special Magistrate, was on duty at the Lohari Gate for some time. Ch.Nazir Ahmad Walha and Syed Bashir Ahmad Bokhari remained in the Kotwali P.S, where the mob had to be tear-gassed. S.Hasnat Ahmad, City Magistrate, moved about in the city with the Police. Mr.A.P. Gill first reported to me in the Civil Lines P.S and later relieved Pir Salahud Din at the Lohari Gate P.S Mr.Muhammad Shafi Zafar, Cantonment Magistrate, remained on duty in the Lahore Cantonment. Sh.Abdur Rauf remained on duty in P.S. Naulakha. From there he accompanied the military to the Brandreth and Nicholson Roads to save certain premises from being burnt and looted.

Sd/- S.Ejaz Hussain Shah,  
District Magistrate, Lahore.  
14.7.1953.

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1. Excerpts from nine fortnightly  
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2. The District Magistrate's order  
dated 28.3.1953 to Magistrates. } .....Annexure B.
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asking for requirement of the  
military aid. } .....Annexure E.
6. Letter dated 3.3.1953 from the  
Deputy Commissioner to the  
Director of Public Relations. } .....Annexure F.
7. Curfew order dated 5.3.1953 .....Annexure G.
8. Three letters addressed by the  
District Magistrate to the  
Commissioner, Lahore Division,  
regarding irregular and  
unauthorised issue of arms  
licences in Lahore. } .....Annexure H.

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Annexure 'A' (nine pages).

Excerpt from the Confidential Fortnightly Report  
on Lahore District for the first half of June 1952.

1. General.

X

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X

(2) Speeches were made and resolutions were passed in almost all the mosques of Kasur city in favour of declaring 'Mirzais' as a separate minority and removing the Hon'ble Ch. Muhammad Zafarullah Khan from office. The growing propagation of this idea in the country and associating the person of the Hon'ble Foreign Minister with it needs continued counteracting by Government to ward off the dangers inherent in the movement.

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Excerpt from the Fortnightly Report on Lahore  
District for the second half of June 1952.

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1. General. The Ahrar sponsored movement against the Mirzais has been the main feature of the period under review. Promulgation of orders u/s 144 Cr.P.C. prevented the holding of public meetings, but a resolution demanding the removal of Hon'ble Ch. Muhammad Zafarullah Khan from the Foreign Ministership and declaring the Mirzais as a separate minority community, was read in some mosques in Lahore and Kasur. At a few places critical remarks and speeches are reported to have been made in the mosques, while one or two cases of definite infringement of Government orders in this connection are being examined.

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Excerpt from the Confidential Fortnightly Report  
on Lahore District for the first half of July 1952.

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1. General.

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The Ahrar-Ahmadis controversy continued unabated with the Ulama in general lending support to the former on the question of "Khatam-i-Nabowwat". The man in the street feels utterly disgusted over these disruptionist activities and is watching with interest the Government's ability to eradicate these evils once for all. There has been no untoward incident anywhere in this district as a result of this controversy.

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Excerpt from the Confidential Fortnightly Report on Lahore District for the second half of July, 1952.

1. General. The Ahrar-Ahmadi controversy in Lahore culminated in the ugly scenes witnessed on the 27th July outside Lakshmi Building, Macleod Road, when the session of the Provincial Muslim League Council was on. An Ahrar sponsored crowd of about 500 persons, who had earlier been shouting the usual slogans and had taken out a mock funeral of the Hon'ble Ch. Muhammad Zafarullah Khan, became violent and broke the police cordon. A light lathi charge by the police had little effect and the demonstrators would not allow the outgoing League Councillors to pass. At this stage the mob became extremely violent and the police had to resort to the use of tear gas. This dispersed the crowd but when the League Councillors began leaving in their cars, the demonstrators pelted brickbats at them and on other wayfarers. As a result some of the inmates of the cars and about 46 policemen were injured, while a number of cars were badly damaged. Finally, the crowd disappeared at about 10.30 P.M. After another mild lathi charge had been made and 126 of the rioters had been arrested, a case was duly registered by the police and is being investigated. The order u/s 144 Cr.P.C. had to be reimposed and all other precautionary measures were taken to maintain law and order.

Earlier at the Jumma prayers the saner section among the Ulema had refrained from referring to this controversy while some of them had advised the people not to take the law into their own hands.

Demonstrations led by some local Ahrar workers were also made in this connection in Kasur city where some undesirable element among the public indulged in shouting slogans in a very objectionable tone. The situation, however, remained under control.

The intelligensia on the whole was appreciated the resolution of the Muslim League Council on this subject and the determination of the authorities to curb lawlessness. The general impression is that the Ahrar are exploiting the question of "Khatm-i-Nobawwat" by playing upon the sentiments of ignorant masses, and aided by the majority of 'cheap' Maulvis. The resultant hooligans tends to develop into dangerous lawlessness and must be nipped in the bud in the vital interests of law and order.

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Excerpt from the Confidential Fortnightly Report on  
Lahore District for the first half of August, 1952.

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1. GENERAL. The anti-Ahmadi controversy and the usual demands in this connection were the chief theme of the Khutba delivered in almost all the prominent mosques of Lahore on the occasion of Friday prayers. A public meeting under the auspices of the All Muslim Parties Convention, Punjab, was held outside Mochi Gate on the 9th August, in which the main trend of the speeches concentrated on the three demands put forward by the Organization relating to the Ahmadis for acceptance by the Government. A deputation consisting of Syed Muhammad Ahmad, Khatib Masjid Wazir Khan; Master Taj-ud-Din Ansari; Sh. Hissam-ud-Din, B.A.; Muzaffar Ali Shamsi of Jamaat-e-Shian, Lahore, and Murtaza Ahmad Maikash, is reported to have left Lahore for Karachi on the 10th August, to wait upon the Hon'ble Prime Minister to press the said demands. Except for the incitement of the "Ulema" aided by the Ahrars, the movement lacks public support generally, since the saner element is averse to anything but constitutional methods in solving questions of this kind.

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Excerpt from the Confidential Fortnightly Report on  
Lahore District for the second half of August, 1952.

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1. GENERAL. The storm of anti-Ahmadi agitation appears to have passed its height. Both the 'Ulema' who had sought to gain some power out this campaign, and the Jamat-i-Islami who had tried to exploit the situation towards their own political ends by extending a helping hand to the Ahrars, have sensed their weak position. The new trend of propagating a more peaceful and constitutional method of continuing the demands, after fanning a good deal of trouble, is a clear sign of defeatism on their part and is likely to wane the undesirable enthusiasm of the illiterate and ignorant sections of the public. The Karachi-returned deputation has not expressed its complete dissatisfaction with the result of their meeting with H.P.M., and Government's firm stand in the matter is much appreciated by the saner element.

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Excerpt from the Confidential Fortnightly Report  
on Lahore District for the first half of October, 1952.

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1. GENERAL:

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(2) The anti-Ahmadi agitation is still smouldering and sporadic references to it are made by Khatibs at Jumma prayers. Meetings under the auspices of the so called 'All Muslim Parties Convention' were held outside Mochi Gate in Lahore on the 3rd October and in Idgah Maidan, Kasur City, on the 6th October, the audience being 3000 and 2000 respectively. The usual demands were repeated with particular emphasis on the removal of the Hon'ble Ch. Muhammad Zafarullah from the Cabinet.

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Excerpt from the Confidential Fortnightly Report  
on Lahore District for the first half of February, 1953.

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1. GENERAL.

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(2) The Majlis-e-Amal of the All Parties Muslim Convention have given an ultimatum that if their demands in relation to Ahmadis are not accepted by the 22nd of February, they<sup>would</sup> launch a 'direct action', the form of which has not been defined. Fiery speeches calculated to excite the fanatical section of the audience were made in this connection. The extent of the active followers of the movement is difficult to judge at the moment, but in the event of the slightest appearance of an ugly situation, strong counteracting measures are needed to preserve peace and order.

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Excerpt from the Confidential Fortnightly Report  
on Lahore District for the second half of February, 1953.

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1. GENERAL. The main subject of public attention which has rather worried the right thinking element and the peace-loving and generally frustrated masses has been the bustling activity sponsored by the Ahrars and the so called 'Ulema' against the Ahmadis which has culminated in the 'Direct Action' which has been launched in Karachi. With the news coming in on the 27th evening, an incomplete hartal was observed in Lahore on the 28th and a meeting of about 500 persons was held outside Akbari Gate after which 25 persons were garlanded and marched in a procession to court arrests. They walked through the Circular Road, Anarkali and the Mall and were proceeding towards Government House when they were stopped at the Charing Cross. Thirty persons including Maulvi Ghulam Din were arrested. At that place about 6,000 persons had collected. During the night between the 27th and 28th 4 or 5 Ahrar leaders were put under arrest.

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CONFIDENTIAL/URGENT .

Will all the Magistrates whose ilaqas fall within the area of the Corporation of the City of Lahore, please contact the S.H.Os of the police stations concerned in connection with the All Parties Convention agitation? I will be available at one of the following two telephones:

Court Room 4365

Residence 3358

The magistrates should not hesitate to consult me if they feel that there is some doubt about the action to be taken if a situation is created by the hooligans. Under no circumstances is procession to be allowed to proceed towards Government House beyond the General Post Office, Simla Pahari and N.W.R. Headquarters Office.

Sd/- S.Ijaz Hussain Shah  
District Magistrate, Lahore.

28-2-53.

No.3586. Dated 28-3-53.

Copies to:-

City Magistrate  
Mr. Ahmad Shafi  
Mr. A.P. Gill  
Mr. Abdul Haye  
Ch. Nazir Ahmad Wahla  
Mr. M.A. Leghari  
Kh. Mahmood Sadiq  
Sh. Abdur Raouf  
Mr. Bashir Ahmad Bokhari.

S.S.P. for information.



D.O.No.289/A/BDSB.

Punjab Civil Secretariat,

Dated, Lahore, the 2nd March, 1953

As outbreak of serious disorder is apprehended in  
and it is felt that the civil authority might not be able.  
with the situation, I am desired by the Provincial  
ment to address you and request for the aid of troops to  
the District Magistrate, Lahore, in the prevention and  
cession of disorder. The number of troops, the period for  
they would be employed on this task and the manner in which  
would be posted would be communicated to you or to the  
er nominated by you by the District Magistrate Lahore. As  
is not enough time <sup>to make</sup> this request through the Central  
ment, this letter is issuing direct to you.

I am,  
Yours sincerely,

Sd/- S.Ghias-ud-Din Ahmad  
Home Secretary to Govt. Punjab.

General Muhammad Azam Khan,  
C. 10 Div Lahore Cantonment.

90-94/A/BDSB., dated Lahore, the 2nd March, 1953.

A copy is forwarded, for information and immediate action

- (1) the District Magistrate, Lahore.
- (2) the Commissioner, Lahore Division.
- (3) the Senior Supdt. of Police, Lahore.
- (4) the Deputy Insp.-Genl. of Police, Lahore Range.
- (5) the Inspector-General of Police, Punjab, Lahore.

Sd/- S.Ghias-ud-Din Ahmad  
Home Secretary to Govt. Punjab.

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Government of the Punjab.

Order u/s 144 Criminal Procedure Code.

WHEREAS it has been made to appear to me that on account of strained sectarian feelings a situation has arisen in which there is sufficient ground to proceed as hereinafter appearing and immediate prevention is desirable with a view to prohibit an assembly of five or more persons from collecting within the Corporation limits of the City of Lahore excluding the area surrounded by the Circular Road and such direction is necessary in order to prevent a disturbance of public tranquillity within these limits:

NOW, THEREFORE, I Sayyed Ijaz Hussain Shah, District Magistrate, Lahore, in exercise of the powers contained in Section 144 Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, do hereby prohibit within the aforesaid limits gathering of five or more persons in any public place and carrying of any arms or other articles capable of being used as a weapon of offence or defence by members of any such assembly.

This order shall take effect forthwith and shall remain in force for a period of two months.

THIS order shall not apply to any gathering of persons under any law for the time being in force or to a genuine marriage or mourning procession or to a purely religious assembly within the acknowledged places of such assemblies.

THIS order shall be given wide publicity by:-

- (i) beat of drum;
- (ii) pasting of a copy of the order on the notice board of (a) the Deputy Commissioner's Court, (b) Office of the S.S.P. Lahore, and (c) the tahsil offices;
- & (iii) Publication in some of the daily newspapers printed and published at Lahore.

Given order my hand and the seal of the Court this 3rd day of March, 1953.

Sd/- S. Ijaz Hussain Shah  
District Magistrate, Lahore.

Dated, Lahore,  
the 3rd March, 1953.

No. TU/I dated 3.3.1953.

A copy is forwarded to the:-

1. Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab, Lahore.
2. Secretary to H.E. the Governor of the Punjab.
3. Home Secretary to Government, Punjab, Lahore.
4. Commissioner, Lahore Division, Lahore.

for information.

Sd. S. Ijaz Hussain Shah  
District Magistrate, Lahore.

No. TU/2 Dated 3.3.1953.

A copy is forwarded to all concerned.

Sd. S. Ijaz Hussain Shah  
District Magistrate, Lahore.

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ANNEXURE 'E'.

SECRET  
IMMEDIATE.

D.O.No.181-Confdl.  
Office of the District Magistrate,  
Lahore.

3rd March, 1953.

My dear

Will you please refer to D.O.No.389/BDSB dated the 2nd March 1953, from the Home Secretary to Government, Punjab, to Major General Muhammad Azam Khan, copy forwarded to you under endorsement No.390-94/A/BDSB?

2. I shall be grateful if you will kindly let me know as quickly as possible the number of troops and the period for which they would be required so that I may inform the G.O.C. 10 Div., Lahore Cantonment, accordingly.

Yours sincerely,

Sd/- S.Ijaz Hussain Shah

Mirza Naseem-ud-Din,  
Senior Superintendent of Police,  
Lahore.

No.182-Confdl.

A copy is forwarded, demi-officially, to I.U.Khan, Esq., CSP, Commissioner, Lahore Division, for information.

Sd/- S.Ijaz Hussain Shah  
District Magistrate, Lahore.

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ANNEXURE 'F'SECRET  
IMMEDIATE.

D.O.No.183-Confdl.

Deputy Commissioner's Office, LAHORE.

Dated, Lahore, the 3rd March, 1953.

My dear.

I feel that a large number of persons have joined the present agitation on account of misunderstanding caused by false propaganda carried on by the agents of enemies. You will agree with me that an agitation is apt to get momentum in the name of religion. The present meaningless agitation is admittedly of that type and we must have solid counter propaganda. I wonder if you will consider the advisability of having about ten thousand copies of the Government communication printed in Urdu for distribution in the town. Also a few hundred may be printed on big placards and posted in conspicuous places of the city. If you agree with my suggestion, this job may be got done as quickly as possible. I am sure it will have a salutary effect.

Yours sincerely,

Sd/- S.Ijaz Hussain Shah.

Syed Nur Ahmad Sahib,  
Director Public Relations,  
Punjab, Lahore.

No.184-Confdl.

A copy is forwarded, demi-officially to:-

1. I.U.Khan, Esquire, CSP. Commissioner, Lahore Division.
2. S.Ghias-Uddin, Esquire, CSP, Home Secretary to Government Punjab, Lahore.

Sd/- S.Ijaz Hussain Shah

Dy. Commissioner, Lahore.

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ANNEXURE 'G'ORDER

UNDER SECTION 144 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, 1898.

WHEREAS it has been made to appear to me that on account of disturbance involving loss of human life, serious injury to persons, loot and arson, a grave situation has arisen in which there is sufficient ground to proceed as hereinafter appearing and immediate prevention is desirable, such direction being necessary in order to prevent danger to human life, safety and disturbance of public tranquillity, riot and affray within the Corporation of the City of Lahore in the area enclosed by starting from Ravi Road - North-Western corner of Lady Wellington Hospital to outside Eazali Gate and then turning towards West on the road behind Khalsa High School cutting the Gandhi Mori and Lahore Road to the junction of Lower Mall on to the Lower Mall - Multan Road - Bahawalpur Road and then turning on the Queens Road upto Charing Cross, on Montgomery Road (excluding Punjab Legislative Chambers) to Abbot Road and Empress Road to Lahore Railway Station and direct on to the Circular Road to the North Western corner of Lady Wellington Hospital;

NOW, THEREFORE, I Syed Ijaz Hussain Shah, District Magistrate, Lahore in exercise of powers contained in section 144 Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 and in supersession of the orders promulgated under this provision on the 4th Day of March, 1953 do hereby order as under:-

Part I:- That all people shall refrain from appearing on any road, street, lane, bye-lane, thoroughfare and any public place in the aforesaid area between the hours of 3-30 p.m. to 6 a.m. on the 5th-6th of March, 1953 and between 6 p.m. to 6 a.m. on nights from the 6th of March to 11th of March, 1953 both days inclusive.

Part II:- That five or more persons shall not collect in any public place or carry any arms or other articles capable of being used as weapon of offence or defence at any time of the day or night within the aforesaid area for a period of two months with effect from 3-30 p.m. on the 5th of March, 1953.

This order shall not apply to the Police and Military personnel on duty or to genuine funeral gatherings or to Government servants possessing authentic identity cards issued by the Government or to persons who are specially permitted in writing by the District Magistrate or the Additional District Magistrate, Lahore..

This order shall be given wide publicity by:-

- i) Beat of drum;
- ii) Pasting of a copy of the order on the notice boards of
  - (a) the Deputy Commissioner's Court,
  - (b) Office of the Senior Supdt: of Police, Lahore; and
  - (c) the Tehsil Offices; and
- iii) Publication in some of the daily newspapers printed and published at Lahore.

Given under my hand and the seal of the Court this 5th day of March, 1953.

Sd. S. Ijaz Hussain Shah  
DISTRICT MAGISTRATE, LAHORE.  
5-3-53.



From

S. Iqbal Hussain Shah, Esquire,  
District Magistrate, Lahore.

To

S. Fida Hussain, Esquire, C.S.P.,  
Commissioner, Lahore Division,  
Lahore.

Memorandum No. 806-Confidential A.L.C.,  
Dated Lahore, the 5th September, 1952.

Subject:- Issue of Arms Licences in Lahore on the basis of  
bogus Police Reports.

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Continuation of my secret memorandum No. 773-Confidential A.L.C., dated the 19th August, 1952, on the subject noted above.

2. The scrutiny of arms licences issued in the Lahore District after partition has further revealed **that** the Arms Licensing Branch of my office alone was not abetting in forgery and cheating in the matter of the issue of arms licences on the basis of bogus Police Reports. Hundreds of applications for the grant of arms licences have since been traced, which were duly forwarded and recommended by the Senior Superintendent of Police, Lahore. It appears that one Nazir Ahmad Khan, an Assistant sub-Inspector of the Punjab Constabulary, who had no concern whatever with the administration of the Police Thanas in the Lahore District, used to append on such applications his recommendation in English or Urdu without disclosing to which branch of the Police he belonged. The clerks in the office of the Senior Superintendent of Police, Lahore then added an endorsement for-warding and recommending the applications which was duly signed by some <sup>gazetted</sup> officer of the Police office. It was on the basis of this Police report that these licences for guns and rifles were issued by the Additional Deputy Commissioner or the Additional District Magistrate, Lahore. Besides, this gang added on applications for arms licences recommendations in the names of the Station House Officers of the various Police Stations in the Lahore District without the knowledge of the Station House Officers concerned.



Such applications were also duly recommended by the Senior Superintendent of Police, Lahore, and the licence finally sanctioned by the Additional Deputy Commissioner or the Additional District Magistrate, Lahore. This gang appears to have been so active and successful that during some months they managed to obtain from 500 to 1,000 licences on the basis of Police reports which were obviously false and forged. It is curious that the officials of the office of the Senior Superintendent of Police, Lahore recommended such applications knowing full well that the police officials who had appended their reports were either not posted to the police Station in the jurisdiction of which the applicant resided or had no concern with the case. It is also curious that they failed to discover that the recommendations of the Station House Officers were forged. They are always familiar with the handwriting of their Station House Officers and I have no doubt in my mind that they knew that the recommendations on the applications were forged. The number of such licences already traced runs into a couple of thousand cases and I anticipate that several hundred more will come to light.

3. As a result of the tightening of the Rules and the close checking of licences at that time of renewal, several licences appear to have gone underground. I apprehend that they will have their licences renewed in other Districts, which is permissible under the Rules, I would request, therefore, that Government may be approached to issue instructions to all District Magistrates in the Punjab, directing them not to renew arms licences issued by the District Magistrate, Lahore, unless they are satisfied that the licences has either genuinely taken up residence in another District or has been transferred there in his official or non-official capacity. This will ensure that the licences who have gone underground, appear in my office for the renewal of their licences and my Personal Assistant and I will be enable to scrutinize their cases. This is particularly desirable in view of the fact that some Pathan licences have not been traced on the addresses given in their applications.

Sd/- S. Ijaz Hussain Shah,  
District Magistrate, Lahore.

Statement of Mirza Naim-ud-Din, B.A.,  
as Senior Superintendent of Police, Lahore,  
relating to the Lahore Disturbances.

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I N D E X.

<u>Sl. No.</u>	<u>Subject.</u>	<u>Page No.</u>
1.	Responsibility for the Disturbances.	1 - 3
2.	Circumstances leading to the declaration of Martial Law.	4 - 22.
3.	Adequacy or otherwise of measures taken to prevent and deal with Disturbances, with Appendices 'A' and 'B'.	23 - 27.
4.	Extract from Weekly Confidential Diary of Lahore District for the week ending the 7th February, 1953.	28.
5.	Extract from Weekly Confidential Diary of Lahore District for the week ending the 14th February, 1953.	29.
6.	Extract from Weekly Confidential Diary of Lahore District for the week ending the 21st February, 1953.	30-31.
7.	Letter No.13821-SB., dated the 5th July, 1952, from SSP Lahore to the DIG, CID, seeking advice for posters issued by Ahrars demanding that the Ahmadis be declared a minority community.	32.
8.	Memorandum No.12973-SB., dated the 19th June, 1952, from SSP Lahore to DIG, CID, seeking advice for posters issued by Ahrars demanding that Ahmadis be declared a minority.	33.
9.	Copy of Wireless Message No.201835 from S.P.Gujranwala to SSP Lahore, informing that Sh.Haqqamuddin and Master Taj Din Ansari are wanted in case FIR No.199 dated 20.6.52 u/s 188 PPC, who should be arrested.	34.
10.	Home Secretary's Endorsement No.8547-56-BDSB dated the 23rd July, 1952, desiring the withdrawal of orders u/s 144 prohibiting the public meetings of the Ahrars and Ahmadis.	35.
11.	Memorandum No.25068-SB., dated the 20th October, 1952, from SSP Lahore to DIG, CID, requesting that the speeches made in a meeting of ALL Muslim Parties Convention held on 3.10.52 outside Mochi Gate should be carefully examined.	36.
12.	Memorandum No.15599-SB., dated 26th July 1952, from SSP Lahore to DIG/CID, seeking directions for action to be taken against speeches made at Barkat Ali Muhammeden Hall in All Muslim Parties Convention Punjab on 13.7.52.	37.
13.	Memo.No.9756/BDSB dated the 11th August, 1952, from DIG/CID to SSP, Lahore, in reply to the above letter.	38.
14.	Memorandum No.6110/SB., dated the 14th February, 1953, from SSP Lahore to DIG, CID, informing about the decision of the Majlis-e-Amal to observe a Hartal on the arrival of the	39.

Hon'ble Prime Minister of Pakistan  
to Lahore on 16.2.53 and fixing black flags  
on shops etc.

Page.

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|-----|---|-----|
| 15. | D.O.No.389/A/BDSB dated the 2nd March 1953, from the Home Secretary to Government Punjab, to G.O.C. 10 Div. Lahore Cantt, requisitioning Military Aid to help the D.M. in the prevention and suppression of disorder. | 40. |
| 16. | Copy of the Urdu announcement of the HCM and his Ministry regarding their sympathy with the Khatme Nawbuwat Movement in connection with their demand for the removal of Ch. Zafar Ullah Khan from the Foreign Office. | 41. |
| 17. | Note regarding casualties.  | 42. |
| 18. | List of arms and ammunition issued, consumed and sanctioned for each police station during disturbances.  | 43. |
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The disturbances of March, 1953 were the direct outcome of a movement now popularly known as "Khatm-e-Nabuwwat" sponsored entirely by the Ahrars. This Organization in pre-partition days were staunchly Congress minded and keenly opposed to the Muslim League and Pakistan, further their loyalties were easily switched over from one political party to another for their personal advancement. They found themselves completely eclipsed on partition. For a long while they could not raise their heads, but eventually took up the SHARIAT question in 1949. This was a small beginning with little support but identified the Ahrars again. Henceforth their activities were directed against the Ahmadis in one form or the other. Their initial attacks were mild and did not receive much support from any party, despite their attempts to woo these parties. They also declared that they would now politics and became a religious party only. They, however, continued to press their attacks on Ahmadis, accusing them of getting preferential treatment and disloyalty to Pakistan. Ch. Muhammad Zafar Ullah Khan began to be vehemently and shamefully attacked by the Ahrars. During the elections in March, 1951, they promised to support the Muslim League wholly if 'Ahmadis' candidates were dropped. Since these candidates were defeated the Majlis-e-Ahrar regarded it as a personal triumph and celebrated Yaum-e-Tashakkur in Lahore for three days in May, 1951. Their processions were given rousing receptions and they at once climbed to fame and popularity as deliverers since Ahmadis had been excluded from the Assembly. They now realized their strength to be able to stand alone by using religious issues and pressed persistently ahead with their venomous hate propaganda against Ahmadis gaining

strength with each public meeting. They joined hands on religious matters with the Jamaat-e-Islami and their cause got a greater fillip. Their villification daily increased in aggressiveness till stray murderous attacks were being made on Ahmadis in the Province. Under the aegis of the Anjuman Khatm-e-Nabuwwat they started and intensified their villification of Ahmadis.

They then advocated and enforced their social boycott of Ahmadis. Indeed they became so aggressive that a severe warning had to be administered to them. This had little effect and eventually the Police had to take very elaborate measures to prevent major catastrophies. In May, 1952, Master Taj-ud-Din Ansari and Sh. Hassam-ud-Din were arrested at Sargodha for defying orders promulgated u/s 144 Cr.P.C. and sentenced to 6 months R.I. each. The party found that unless they had the support of other religious bodies and political parties they were not likely to succeed in their efforts against the Government. With this object in view they called an All Muslim Parties Convention in June, 1952, in Lahore. Leading religious and influential luminaries numbering approximately 60 were invited to attend from all parts of the country. They had also enlisted the support of the Islam League to defy Government orders. The spirit of defiance thus created grew and led to ugly incidents in Multan and Lyallpur and firing had to be resorted to at Multan when a Police Station was attacked. Ahmadi shops were looted at Lyallpur and pressure was brought to bear to remove Ahmadis from local bodies such as two Ahmadi School Teachers of Wazirabad Municipality.

Their social boycott was further intensified and Ch. Zafar Ullah Khan shamelessly villified. The Multan incident, however, was set back for them. They then approached the Ex-Chief Minister Mian Muntaz Muhammad Khan Daultana for the release of their two leaders Master Taj-ud-Din Ansari and Sh. Hassam-ud-Din on a solemn undertaking that they would remain peaceful



and would in fact even protect the Ahmadis. This promise was not kept and their insidious propaganda continued and Muslim Leaguers began lending their active support. Henceforth they defiantly and with greater courage continued ~~their~~ agitation from platform pulpit and press in Daily Zamindar. Extracts from minutes of meetings and poster were constantly sent to the C.I.D. for disposal and important issues discussed in the Weekly Confidential Diaries. They began enlisting volunteers, raising funds by the sale of sacrificial skins and issue of rupee notes. Their volunteers were made to sign a pledge to the effect that they would be prepared to make any sacrifice involving life and property if called upon to do so.

In January, 1953 with the ostensible excuse to consider the recommendations of the B.P.C. Report a gathering of Ulemas was convened at Karachi. A resolution was passed for the Ahmadis to be declared a minority and to launch a DIRECT ACTION MOVEMENT. Maulana Maudoodi of the Jamaat-e-Islami addressed a public meeting soon after in Lahore and demanded the acceptance of the Ahrars' demands, failing which a very serious situation would develop. Various dates were given as the dead line for DIRECT ACTION due to internal differences on this point and eventually 23rd February, 1953 was settled on. This fact was also reported to the C.I.D. explaining the seriousness of the situation and the magnitude of the conflagration for suitable action which was not taken at once. Extracts from my Weekly Confidential Diaries for the week ending the 7th, 14th and 21st February, 1953 are attached. Before any fixed policy was evolved the date had already arrived and though temporarily delayed, DIRECT ACTION MOVEMENT was finally launched on 28.2.1953.

The relevant files and other material on the subject are available from Punjab C.I.D.

11. Circumstances leading to the declaration of Martial Law.

On the 27th February, 1953, I was sent for by the Deputy Inspector General of Police, C.I.D, who informed me that Government had decided to round up leaders of the All Muslim Parties Convention. In pursuance of this decision the CID rounded up a number of them on the same night with the assistance of Lahore District Police. Some, however, absconded.

Anticipating that the All Muslim Parties Convention meant mischief on a considerable scale, I requisitioned reinforcement to the existing strength of the Lahore District Police from the Punjab Constabulary. I got six platoons of the Punjab Constabulary, in addition to two platoons posted at the headquarters of every division i.e. Civil Lines. Old Anarkali, Naulakha and Kotwali. Apart from it, the Tear Smoke Unit of the Punjab Constabulary was also requisitioned. The Tear Smoke Squad of the District Police was also standing by at the Police Station Civil Lines. The Mounted Police Contingents of the Constabulary and the District Police were also ordered to stand by. I ordered the Station House Officers in a meeting to immediately convene meetings of respectables of their jurisdictions and to urge them to use their good offices in their localities in maintaining law and order. The S.H.Os. consequently held meetings in their police stations. I ordered the Deputy Superintendent of Police, C.I.A., to round up known goondas and about 40 of them were rounded up.

Trouble really commenced on the 28th of February, On that day Hartal was observed and apprehending the breaches of the law, I posted pickets at strategic points having due regard to the protection of Ahmadis' life and property. Pickets in adequate number were established near Shezan Hotel, Shah Nawaz Medical Stores, Rattan Bagh, Ahmadiya Building, Tollinton Market, Laxmi Building etc. These pickets were armed and were manned by the strength



from the Punjab Constabulary assisted by the District Police.

Small bands of Ahrar workers who were joined by the interested riff-raffs roamed throughout Lahore forcing reluctant shop keepers to close their shops. In the afternoon, a procession of about 5/6 thousand persons formed outside Delhi Gate and marched on to the Civil Secretariat. I reinforced the Secretariat Gaurd with another armed reserve from the District Police Lines. One armed mobile Police Reserve was placed at the disposal of the City Magistrate who accompanied the procession. The District Magistrate immediately posted other Magistrates as well. On the way the procession changed it mind, deviated from its scheduled route and instead turned on the Mall with Government House as its objective. The processionists were crying themselves hoarse with anti-Government, anti-Police and anti-Ahmadi slogans. The Inspector General of Police, the Home Secretary and the District Magistrate also reached Charing Cross and it was decided by all of them to halt the procession at Charing Cross which was the most suitable place for this purpose. The striking force of 6 platoons was at once removed to Charing Cross and lined up. The Inspector General, the Home Secretary, the Commissioner and the District Magistrate were themselves present. The procession was halted and 34 persons who appeared to be the Leaders were arrested under Section 107/151 Cr.P.C. and the rest of the mob was dispersed. The decision to take action u/s 151 only was taken by all officers unanimously. As the mob surged towards Charing Cross, Shops on the Mall were closed, traffic came to stand still and law abiding people shut themselves up in the houses and shops. The mob was mostly composed of the riff-raff and hooligans but had high tone of religious sentiments. When the Mall Road had been cleared, the Force was removed to Civil Lines. A meeting was convened soon after in Police Station Civil Lines at which the

Inspector General of Police, Commissioner, Home Secretary, District Magistrate and myself were present. Home Secretary presided. It was decided that promulgation of Section 144 was not yet necessary. The events of the day were reviewed.

Civil Lines was chosen as the Central Control for operations. Wireless Cars remained moving about on patrol throughout the day to collect and transmit intelligence. A senior officer was always present in Civil Lines for receiving information and sending out striking forces and informing senior officers like the Inspector General etc. Some private vehicles were also commandeered and some were obtained from the Superintendent of Police, Technical. The idea was to keep the force as much mobile as possible.

The situation on the 1st March was as on the previous day. Partial hartal was observed on that day. ✓ Small processions were taken out throughout the day but Police always reached the spot in quick time and serious incidents were averted. As Section 144 had not yet been promulgated, Police was rushed to places where processions were taken out, as precautionary measures.

In the morning a rumour was set afloat that Maulan<sup>a</sup> Akhtar Ali had apologized to the Government and had deserted the agitators. Furious at this, the public besieged his house on Meleod Road but with the timely arrival of a posse of Police damage to life and property was averted and the processionists dispersed on an assurance by the Maulana's family that he was not in the house. At about the same time Maulvi Ahmad Ali who had ✓ formed a big procession outside Delhi Gate was arrested under Section 3 P.P.S.A. and 32 persons were arrested under Section 107/151 Cr.P.C. The crowd was hostile and furious and damaged one of the Police vehicles with a hail of brick bats. Another procession was intercepted in its march to the Government House opposite the High Court on the Mall by the Additional



Superintendent of Police, Lahore, who arrested 29 persons under Section 107/151, after which the remaining crowd melted away. Yet another procession was intercepted while marching on to the Government House by the Additional Superintendent of Police, Lahore, on the Mall and he arrested 23 agitators under Section 107/151. Similar small processions were taken out throughout the city and when they saw the Police contingents arriving they would melt away and after the departure of the police reform themselves into processions. This hide and seek continued throughout the day and Police remained on the run all this time. In the afternoon a main procession was again taken out from Delhi Gate which adopted the same route as on the previous day and marched on to Charing Cross. Anticipating this huge march the goonda element and riff-raffs stood on the way waiting for it and joined it along the route when it approached them, swelling it to formidable numbers and giving it the character of a mob intent on taking the law into its own hands. The real agitators lost their identity in this meeting mass. Shops were again closed, business came to a stand still, traffic was paralysed and law abiding people shivered in apprehension of their own safety. Again the procession headed towards Charing Cross. The Inspector General of Police, Home Secretary, Deputy Inspector General of Police, Lahore Range, the Commissioner and the District Magistrate (some Magistrates as well) and some <sup>Senior</sup> CID Officers were present. After shouting itself hoarse for some time in denunciation of Ahmadis, Government and the Police but finding the Police firm and ready to face the challenge if they attempted to break the Police cordon the procession stood against the cordon. The crowd demanded persistently that all of them should be arrested. This was not feasible in the opinion of all officers. The crowd stood shouting and demonstrating and the Police stood its own ground. It was therefore, decided that as many as possible may be

removed from the scene in Police Lorries and dropped at a considerable distance from Lahore, without being formally arrested, as arrest would make them hero and also there was not enough accommodation to detain them in custody. Accordingly this was done. It was after about an hour that the patience of the crowd started crumbling and it started gradually thinning and finally melted away. The Police acted with restraint and remained unmoved by this demonstration. After this the Inspector General held another meeting in Police Station Civil Lines with the Home Secretary in the chair. Senior CID Officers, Commissioner and District Magistrate and myself also attended. The situation of the day was reviewed. After the meeting Assistant to the Deputy Inspector General of Police, CID, was working in Civil Lines <sup>till</sup> late at night. Maulana Akhtar Ali Khan came to the Police Station late at night and had a talk with the Assistant to the Deputy Inspector General of Police, CID, after that he went away.

On the 2nd the situation continued to be the same, but was well in hand. The number of Police pickets were however increased from 5 to 8. The three new pickets were posted at Prince's Hotel (at the back of the Assembly Chambers), Simla Hills and the General Post Office. They were placed under the command of S.I. Muntaz Ali, Mr. C.F. Haq, Assistant Superintendent of Police, Lines, and Raja Hukam Dad, Inspector Chunian. In the morning Maulana Akhtar Ali went to Wazir Khan Mosque where he delivered an address clarifying his position and reiterating his determination to stand by this agitation. He also announced that he would court arrest in the afternoon. I went to City Kotwali at about 11 a.m. and saw Akhtar Ali Khan coming in his car towards Landa Bazar. Sometime in the afternoon rumours began to pour in Lahore that there had been extensive police firing in Sialkot. The mischief mongers distorted and exaggerated the news out



of all proportions and gave currency that women had been fired upon and police officers had entered into mosques with their shoes on and had been deliberately guilty of sacrilege and had manhandled the inmates of the mosques. Feelings thus ran high with these rumours and tension mounted. Numerous small processions were taken out throughout the day and were dealt with by the Mobile Police patrol parties immediately. The processions invariably dispersed on seeing a Police party and as soon as the police had left would reform themselves. Arrests of prominent agitators continued to be made under Section 3 of the PPSA. In the afternoon Maulana Akhtar Ali led a procession 10,000 strong. This procession converged on the Mall from two directions, one from McLeod Road emerging near the Assembly Chambers and the other from the usual route on the Mall. Arrangements were, therefore, made to hold the mob at two places. When the mob was still on its way information was received that some part of the mob wanted to proceed to the house of the Hon'ble Chief Minister and a part of the force concentrated at Charing Cross was despatched post haste to the Hon'ble Chief Minister's house. The crowd was even more than ever before hostile and rowdy. It was halted at Charing Cross with a cordon of Police which was turned out in strength of 8 reserves, of which two were armed with rifles and the remaining with lathis. The Armed reserves and the Tear Gas Squads were standing by on the spot for necessary operations if firing had got to be resorted to. The Inspector General of Police, Home Secretary, some senior CID Officers in uniform and the District Magistrate were again present. Maulana Akhtar Ali Khan was arrested and immediately taken away by me in a Police Jeep to Police Station Cantt(North). I was advised to remove him from the scene as in his presence the crowd was every moment getting more rowdy. On reaching P.S.Cantt, I rang up Police Station Civil Lines and contacted Asstt. to the D.I.G., CID, who told

no that I was required in Civil Lines immediately and that CID Officers were being sent to Police Station Cantt. to take charge of Maulana Akhtar Ali Khan. Accordingly I came back at P.S. Civil Lines. That evening again, it was decided to remove the main agitators to some distant place and accordingly the orders were carried out. During the course of the arrest of the Maulana the crowd attempted to break the Police cordon which resulted in injuries to 11 police officers including a Superintendent of Police and two Deputy Superintendents of Police. As a result of this 41 persons were arrested for assault and rioting. Case FIR No. 64 was registered at Police Station Civil Lines. The Police also had a Lathi Charge on that occasion.

Soon after a meeting was again held in Civil Lines in the presence of the Inspector General. The Home Secretary presided. Commissioner, District Magistrate, senior CID Officers and myself also attended. The day's situation was again reviewed. G.O.C. 10 Division who was invited for the first time was represented by his G.I. After deliberations it was decided that some detachments of the Army should also move in as stand by. The Home Secretary handed over a formal requisition for the Army in aid of Civil administration in the form of a semi-official letter addressed to the G.O.C. 10 Division (copy attached). The Army agreed to post a whole time Liaison Officer at Police Station Civil Lines. It was also decided that section 144 be promulgated by the District Magistrate throughout the Corporation Area of Lahore excluding the walled city bounded by the Circular Road. The walled city was excluded as the Inspector General thought inside city was always crowded and it might not be strictly possible to enforce the restriction.

Later there was a meeting at the house of the Hon'ble Chief Minister where the Inspector General of Police apprised the Hon'ble Chief Minister of the



situation and with the measures which we had taken (referring to the requisitioning of the Army in aid of civil administration and the promulgation of section 144 Cr.P.C.).

The situation remained well under control on the 3rd. News of firing in Sialkot on the 2nd had already reached Lahore and the Ahrar workers had deliberately given currency to rumours that Maulvi Muhammad Yusuf, a prominent Ahrar worker, had been killed. Section 144 was promulgated by the District Magistrate and by mid-day sufficient publicity had been given to this order by the Public Relations Department. Army contingents moved into Jinnah Gardens. They went out on mobile patrols and were on every occasion accompanied by a Magistrate specially deputed by the District Magistrate. I personally went to their Headquarter in the Jinnah Gardens and contacted the officers there. On this day Captain Nazir Ahmad, Field Security Officer of the 10 Division reported at Civil Lines as their Liaison Officer. A wireless set was specially installed at Civil Lines of the same frequency as that of the Army Contingent in Jinnah Gardens. Under order of the Inspector General, the existing strength was reinforced by 8 platoons from the Border Police, 2 from the Police Recruits Training Centre and one from the Police Razakars. The 8 Border Police platoons were distributed one each to each one of the pickets to share duty of the Constabulary reserves which were working without any relief, while the Police Recruits Training Centre and Police Razarkar reserves were kept standing by at Civil Lines. The CID was collecting intelligence through their City Intelligence Staff and I was constantly in touch with the CID. The transport with us was also reinforced by the arrival of 8 Border Police lorries which had come with their reserves. Ambulance Cars had also been requisitioned from the Civil Defence Department.

Some un-important processions were taken out in the walled city as well as in the area in which section 144 had been promulgated. In Anarkali 31 persons were arrested under section 188 Cr.P.C. for defying this ban after their refusal to disperse. Police always reached the spot in time on receiving information of the movements of processions and invariably the processions dispersed helter skelter on seeing a Police party approaching. A defiant procession coming from Nila Gumbad on the Mall was dispersed by lathi charge by Mr.M.A.K. Chaudhary, Assistant Superintendent of Police. Another crowd of a few hundred persons proceeding towards Charing Cross was halted by the Police Party led by the Inspector General of Police. I was also with that party. The mob dispersed after a mild lathi charge. Yet another procession of about 100 persons heading towards the Government House was halted by the same Police party and dispersed after a mild lathi charge. An excited mob of about 80 persons was moving towards the Charing Cross from Meleod Road via Montgomery Road and they were halted by Inspector Agha Sultan Ahmad of Naulakha who asked them to disperse but they in reply stoned the police party on which Inspector Sultan Ahmad fired three rounds. In the evening the Inspector General of Police led a cavalcade of Police vehicles full of armed <sup>police</sup> with the District Magistrate and myself. This cavalcade patrolled through the main thoroughfares of Lahore. The Home Secretary was also with us. On the whole, the day was comparatively much quieter and it was believed that the agitation had been suppressed.

Up to this time, a remarkable feature of the agitation was that an overwhelming majority of the agitators arrested under Section 107/151 Cr.P.C came from outside district like Gujranwala, Lyallpur, Sialkot, Jhang, Okera, Sargodha, Mianwali, Hazara, Gujrat and Azad Kashmir. It was thus clear to me that this was not a localised but a wide-spread movement, embracing every part of the Province and that the Lahore Police was having to tackle with a problem which had assumed far greater propaganda than had been generally anticipated.



As usual Inspector General of Police had again apprised

the situation of the day to the Hon'ble Chief Minister in the evening.

The 4th of March dawned with a vicious whispering campaign of rumours that the agitation had affected every nook and corner of the Province and that Police had perpetrated atrocities by firing on defenceless assemblies in various parts of the province. Tension reached high and Ahrar workers in their relentless propaganda campaign appealed to the religious fervour of people from all shades of walks of life and succeeded in working up popular feelings to a pitch where it became sheer frenzy. Processions were taken out from early morning and one which had surrounded Ahmadiya Building was dispersed after a mild lathi Charge by A.S.I. Muhammad Akram incharge of the Ahmadiya Building Picket. Volunteers from other districts continued to pour in by rail and road. A batch from Sargodha was dispersed near Naulakha Police Station by S.I. Muhammad Hanif. About 110 Ahrar volunteers who were proceeding towards the town on Brandreth Road were met by a party led by Sayed Masnat Ahmad, City Magistrate, Malik Khan Bahadur, Superintendent of Police and the late Syed Firdaus Shah, Deputy Superintendent of Police, City. The City Magistrate ordered the procession to disperse but his warning had no effect and they reached Chowk Dalgarn. Here they were tear-gassed but even then they refused to go and they squatted on the ground. A mild lathi charge also could not disperse it. In the end they were lifted bodily, loaded into trucks and dispersed in that way. It was this incident which was distorted by malicious Ahrar propagandists into an incident in which a child had been alleged to be shot dead by the Police and in which the Police was said to have trampled on the Holy Qur'an. This rumour with its dangerous potentialities spread like wild fire and shops which had opened were immediately closed. From hostility, public feelings against the



administration turned into hatred. More processions were taken out simultaneously throughout Lahore in various localities and they were dispersed at places by a show of force and at others by resort to lathi charge. Maulana Abdus Satter Niazi had taken his position in the Wazir Khan Mosque which had become the nerve headquarter of the agitation.

At about 1 p.m. when I was in Police Station Civil Lines I received information from various police stations that military patrols were not moving about. I rushed to the Military Headquarters in Lawrence Gardens at about the same time and told them that their patrols were not visible. The Officer commanding the Company told me that they had received orders that they should stop sending out patrols. They were, however, in contact with their Div. Headquarters to obtain necessary permission to revive patrols. The District Magistrate was very keen that the patrolling must continue.

At about 4.30 p.m. a mass meeting of about 5000 persons was addressed by agitators outside Dalhi Gate. Their speeches were inflammatory and they made pointed and repeated references to a child being shot dead and the holy Quran being trampled upon by police officers early in the day. They formed a procession and proceeded towards Wazir Khan Mosque and were intercepted by Assistant Sub-Inspectors Manzurul Haq and Muhammed Sadiq who were on duty with a posse of police near the mosque. In the meantime Deputy Superintendent of Police, City, received information on the telephone that these two Assistant Sub-Inspectors had been mobbed and kidnapped by the processionists and taken inside the mosque. The Deputy Superintendent of Police with an armed reserve led by S.I. Muzaffer Khan of P.S. Kotwali immediately rushed to the spot. He met a furious and menacing mob near the mosque and asked about the whereabouts of the Assistant Sub-Inspectors. The mob surrounded the Deputy Superintendent of Police, removed him into the mosque and



stabbed him to death, inflicting about 52 injuries. snatching his revolver and the muskets of two of the men accompanying him and also inflicting injuries on S.I. Muzaffar Khan. This information was received by me and the District Magistrate on wireless at Police Station Civil Lines. The information was conveyed to the Inspector General who immediately reached Civil Lines along with the Home Secretary and other officers. A majority of the strength concentrated in Civil Lines was at once removed with transport to Kotwali. The Army Liaison Officer was not available though we looked for him. The District Magistrate, who had also been present at the Civil Lines most of the day with me, wanted to contact G.O.C. but he was not available. He, however, contacted the Liaison Officer who arrived and was apprised of the situation and asked to contact the G.O.C. All officer proceeded to the Kotwali at once. Soon after the arrival of the Police Party in the City Kotwali it became dark. Some people were shouting slogans at the top of their voices from their house tops. Curfew was imposed with immediate effect. Immediately on reaching the Kotwali three Mobile Patrol Parties were sent out in different directions. The Inspector General of Police was in command of the situation and directed all operations. After some time information was received that Police Post Bhati Gate had been besieged by a violent mob coming from the side of Aphini Road. The Inspector General of Police at once despatched a Police party headed by Agha Muhammad Ali Khan, Assistant Inspector General of Police. This party contacted the mob near the police post and dispersed them after firing some rounds. This party which had a Wireless Car with it received information of another mob which had besieged Police Station Lohari Gate. In the meantime G.O.C. 10 Division arrived there with his party and had a meeting. A military unit had by that time arrived outside the Kotwali. In the meantime deafening and nerve racking noises of anti-Government

and anti-Ahmadi slogans were heard from every direction. Crowds began to come up on the roads in defiance of curfew. On the Nisbat Road a crowd was dispersed by Inspector Agha Sultan Ahmad who fired 4 rounds. In Gawalmandi the Sub-Inspector dispersed two mobs and had to open fire on both the occasions. The Inspector General himself (accompanied by District Magistrate) led a Police party which opened fire at a crowd heading towards City Kotwali from the direction of Crown Bus Stand and Lande Bazar. Some casualties were affected. Information regarding incidents of arson started pouring in. Police Post Moghi Gate was brick batted and the Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police had to open fire to disperse the rioters. The Inspector-General of Police handed over the investigation of the murder of the late Deputy Superintendent of Police to the C.I.D. An Army Patrol also went out at the time from City Kotwali on Police trucks to Tibbi. At the same time I received reliable information that some miscreants were planning to assault the house of Ch. Bahawal Sher, City Inspector. I immediately arranged for the evacuation of his family to a quarter in the City Kotwali. At about 11 p.m. the Deputy Inspector-General of Police, Lahore Range, arrived at Kotwali from Sialkot and he immediately took command. He ordered Malik Habib Ullah, Asstt. to the D.I.G. of Police, CID, to draw up a chart of duties because he saw that the Lahore District Police Officers had been fatigued to breaking point and could no longer go on without rest. The Central Control was established at City Kotwali. The Deputy Superintendent of Police, C.I.A., was placed in charge of City Kotwali. Three Deputy Superintendents of Police were posted to work in relays as Central Control Officers. Six Gazetted Officers were deputed to move out in command of striking forces at one time. I was asked by the Deputy Inspector General of Police to go and rest but I stayed on in the Kotwali because I wanted to keep myself posted with minute to minute happenings. At about 1 in the



night I received a telephonic message from the District Magistrate that I was wanted at the house of the Hon'ble Chief Minister where a high level meeting was being held. This meeting was attended by the Inspector General of Police, the Home Secretary and the District Magistrate. The G.O.C. 10 Division also attended on request. The Inspector-General put the G.O.C. in full picture of the happenings up to date and discussed with him how Army should move in. This meeting broke off early in the morning. From there I went again to the Kotwali. I met all the officers on duty and was told that after late midnight there had been no other serious incident. I felt relieved.

The Agitation reached its height on the 5th. Military resumed mobile patrolling and Magistrates went out with their patrol parties. Riots became more violent and there were reports of incendiarism and looting from some parts of Lahore throughout the day. Determined efforts were made to sabotage the loyalty of the Force by distribution of Urdu cyclostyled posters among the Police personnel, particularly Constables, calling upon the policemen to lay down their arms because this was a JEHAD. I attended a meeting in the Court Room of the District Magistrate to which he had invited prominent public figures of all shades of political opinion. The consensus of opinion of this meeting was that the situation was out of their hands and they could not come to the aid of the administration because the public was in a state in which it was not prepared to listen to reasons. Maulana Masood Ghazanvi was also invited to this meeting and he stood up to say that we were tackling this problem on incorrect lines. This was a provincial problem and should be tackled by the Government on the same level instead of dealing with it as a local disorder. At about 10 a.m. I went to Government House where a meeting was called by His Excellency. Inspector General

was present in that meeting who explained to the House the exact position of the day. There I was constantly receiving telephonic messages from Kotwali Centre reporting serious cases of incendiarism, looting and lawlessness which were communicated by me to the Inspector General in the course of the meeting. After the meeting the Inspector General of Police told me to see him in his office. I followed the Inspector General to the Secretariat a little later and found the Main Gate of the Secretariat closed. The Sub-Inspector incharge of the Guard opened the lock and said that all the clerks had struck work. This was somewhat amazing. I had hardly reached the porch in front of the Hon'ble Chief Minister's Room when Mr. Riaz-ud-Din Ahmad, Deputy Secretary Finance came to me and said that the life of Mr. M.M. ~~Ahmad~~ <sup>✓</sup> was in danger because he was an Ahmadi. I told him that Mr. Ahmad should be removed to another room and should ultimately leave the Secretariat. I found that except for the Central Police Office, the C.I.D. and other Police Offices, all the clerical staff had struck work and had come out shouting slogans and expressing concern at the firing. Even at that time I could hear Police firing from two directions. The Inspector General and the Chief Secretary had also come out from their offices and they had been surrounded by the clerks whose attitude was any thing but respectful. I explained the situation of the City to the Inspector General and then came back. During the day attempts had already been made at storming Police Stations and individual Police officers were assaulted. Police Officers who had gone to the Mayo hospital with dead bodies for postmortem examination were threatened by menacing crowds who were after their blood, and were rescued in time. The furious mobs demanded to take over dead bodies to take out funeral processions. The mobs on this stormy day used lethal weapons. One Head Constable received a bullet wound. Attempts were also made to set fire to and harass the families of Police officers



because the Police was the only agency of the Government which stood between it and the mob rule. The agitation assumed the character of a popular uprising against the Government in power. By now I realized that the police of granting liberal arms licences to the public had definitely been a cause for their encouragement. Such fire arms were not only used against Police but later on against Army as well. The insurgents were working on a well laid plan to paralyse the Government by burning Post Offices, removing Railway tracks, burning Omni Buses and constructing road blocks, thus hitting at the means of communications. Their most important triumph was subverting the loyalty of a vast majority of Government Servants. The Civil Secretariat, Accountant General's Office and other important offices were affected. Even the students had taken active part in joining the movement. Interruption was noticeable in telephone talks.

Under these circumstances Police went all out for suppressing this mad orgy of lawlessness with the maximum of force. Police always reached places of more serious crimes promptly and on a number of occasions arrested looters red handed. Police patrol parties were wireless fitted and while on patrol were informed by the Wireless Control at Kotwali or Civil Lines of another occurrence to deal which they rushed. It was a triumph of Police vigilance and promptitude that serious cases of incendiarism and loot were so few when we think of how wide spread the uprising was. The Anarkali, Commerical Building, the Mall and other Commerical Centres remained in tact on account of prompt action taken. The casualties on this day were far higher than the previous day. The firing was determined and effective. All ranks remained loyal, steadfast and firm. Every officer worked beyond his capacity infused with the spirit that it was that alone to stood between the Government lawfully established and chaos. There were innumerable crimes

of most serious nature which were averted and never took place, because Police was always at hand and vigilant.

In the evening there was again a meeting at the Government House in which it was decided that Police should ignore slight technical breaches of 144 and that firing should be restricted. The message was conveyed to the Kotwali Control from the Government House. I was not called to that meeting.

I am certain that if Government had not rescinded its policy and directed that firing should be restricted, Police would have controlled the situation. No amount of propaganda succeeded in subverting the loyalty of the Force.

Challenging crowds swarmed around the Kotwali and after the orders from Government House for restricted firing, Police was at a loss what to do. Firing was resorted to late in the night immediately outside the Kotwali to repel these advancing crowds. By now the fresh orders that firing should be opened only in extreme cases on a very restricted scale had reached the farthest out-post of the police and it left the scattered force in utter confusion. That evening I made a round of the entire city along with the District Magistrate. I halted at every picket and spoke to the men and toned up their morale by giving them a word of good cheer. Deafening noises of slogans were heard from all directions from house tops. Throughout the night this went on. Azaans were given from house tops and it looked as if a huge procession might emerge from any corner. This kept the nerves of the men on duty on an edge and they never knew any rest for a continuous stretch of about 48 hours.

On the morning of the 6th the Kotwali was from early morning surrounded by swarms of angry crowds and processions were converging from all directions towards Wazir Khan Mosque. All Government Offices suspended work. Loco and Carriage Workshops closed down and the labour came out in full numbers in sympathy with the movement.



The Kotwali was stoned and every thing pointed at an attempt at storming the Kotwali. The crowds demanded that senior police officers who had opened fire be handed over to them. We had orders to open fire only on a very restricted scale in extreme emergency. This would have been futile. Tear Gas shells were, therefore, fired from the roof of the Kotwali regularly which kept the crowds at some distance. As soon as the tear gas blew over the crowds again approached the Kotwali and surrounded it. I arrived at Kotwali at about 7 a.m. and was followed by the Inspector General of Police after about half an hour. I discussed the situation with the Inspector General and told him that the situation was desperate and the weak-kneed policy of the Government was demoralising even the Police Force which was the only part of the Government machinery standing by it. I, therefore, urged him to explain this to His Excellency and the Hon'ble Chief Minister. I told him that if Government did not revise its policy I would resign. The Inspector General agreed with me and we both went to Government House where a Cabinet Meeting was held which was also attended by Genl. Muhammad Azam Khan, Home Secretary and the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Lahore Range. As we came out of Kotwali, Agha Muhammad Ali Khan met us on the way and the Inspector General ordered him to take command of the situation and to be very careful of the situation. I did not actually sit in the meeting but stayed out to be readily available if the Inspector General needed me. His Excellency the Governor had sent for M.L.As. and League Councillors who started arriving. Meanwhile I was getting information from the Kotwali that the situation was worsening every moment. I requested the Inspector General to press <sup>very</sup> for a quick decision as every moment was very precious. At that time the electric system failed.

III. Adequacy or otherwise of measures taken to prevent and deal with disturbances.

The Sanctioned Strength of the Lahore Headquarters Police Stations is 1667 Foot Constables. The strength present on 1-3-53 was roughly 1273 excluding Police Lines. This shortage was due to personnel being on deputation to other departments, under training in Recruits Training Centre, vacancies and so on. I have frequently represented that the existing sanctioned strength was wholly inadequate having regard to the increase in the population of Lahore after partition. The census figures as available to us show the population of Lahore as 9,34,532. Working on the formula of one Constable for every 450 inhabitants, as laid down in Police Rule 2.2(2) there should be 2076 Constables in Lahore. Long before the disturbances I had submitted a re-organisation scheme for the Lahore Headquarters Police demanding an increase of about 1000 Constables.

The strength of Lahore Headquarters Police Stations as it stood on 1-3-53 is at Appendix 'A'. As Police Station Civil Lines was the nucleus of all Police activity, I will take up the case of this Police Station. Appendix 'B' shows the routine duties in this Police station. It will be seen from this appendix that out of the existing strength of 67 men, 20 were left over after allotting men for routine duties. With the start of trouble even the routine duties increased manifold. There was a concentration of about 9 reserves in Police Station Civil Lines and a large number of senior officers. A staff of 1-1-4 was detailed on transport whose duty it was to see that petrol was issued in time and transport was always ready at hand when required. The number of dak orderlies had to be increased to 4. 1-1-4 were looking after the large number of senior officers who were present in Civil Lines. Out of the remaining strength men were sent out for patrolling, collecting intelligence and as personal escorts for officers.



I knew fully well that the existing strength of Lahore District Headquarters Police was wholly inadequate and I, therefore, requisitioned reinforcements from the Punjab Constabulary. Before the start of trouble 2 reserves each had been stationed at every Divisional Headquarters, i.e. Civil Lines, Waulakha, Kotwali and Old Anarkali for routine night patrolling. One reserve each was allotted to these Divisional Headquarters from the District Police Lines. In addition to this a force of 6 Punjab Constabulary reserves was standing by at Police Station Civil Lines, to be used as striking force. 5 more Punjab Constabulary reserves were posted one each at the five pickets up to 2-6-53. These pickets dealt with processions and the incidents within their jurisdiction. These arrangements continued up to 2.3.53. On the evening of 2-3-53 I submitted to the Inspector General of Police that I would need still more men. Consequently the next day I got four more reserves from the Punjab Constabulary, out of which three were stationed at pickets on new points. I also got 8 reserves from the Border Police which were distributed to the 8 pickets increasing the strength of each picket to two reserves. Afterwards two more points for pickets were created and here two platoons each were stationed. 2 Reserves from the Recruits Training Centre and one from the Police Jaumi Razakars were also received on the 3rd March. These were kept as part of the striking force. On account of the existing situation, more small pickets had to be posted at vulnerable points from the District Police Strength from the Police Lines.

Of the small strength of the District Police which was left in Police Stations men were taken out by Police Station Staff when they went out for patrolling to deal with minor incidents where it was not necessary to have a Punjab Constabulary striking force.

The existing transport of the District Police was augmented by the transport of the Punjab Constabulary

After the 2nd more vehicles were obtained by commandeering public vehicles and requisitioning some from the Civil Defence, Superintendent of Police, Technical, and Border Police.

The strength deployed was inadequate as compared with the manpower employed by the army subsequently for this very purpose. Whatever force was available was always turned out at a moment's notice and invariably reached the spot on receipt of information with the least delay and dealt with the situation promptly. There were a number of cases of arson and looting in which the accused were caught red-handed because the Police reached the spot with promptitude. Many other serious incidents were averted by the timely arrival of the Police. Besides the striking force, Mobile Patrols were constantly on the move throughout the headquarters.

The Army had the superiority over us in man power, arms and transport. The army was turned out in considerable strength. They had unlimited powers to reinforce their existing transport by means of commandeering any public vehicle they liked. When Army took over they were ordered to go all out for suppressing the disorder and to use the maximum of force in doing so. They never paused for a moment to think of the consequences, because they never feared their conduct being called into question subsequently and their being made subject of enquiries later on. The orders given to them were firm and there was absolutely no departure from them. This was unfortunately not the case with the Police to whom orders were constantly changing. The army enjoyed vast magisterial powers of summary trials and inflicting deterrent punishments within a short time of the occurrence.

( NAIM- UD- DIN)

Superintendent of Police.



<u>Sanctioned strength of Headquarters Police Stations.</u>	<u>Insprs.</u>	<u>S.Is.</u>	<u>ASIs.</u>	<u>HCS</u>	<u>FCs.</u>
<u>Present on 1-3-53.</u>	5	27	80	154	1667
Motwali	1	1	4	15	112
Ticbi	-	1	4	12	80
Lonari	-	1	2	9	70
Maulakha	1	2	6	12	124
Misri Snah	-	1	2	8	123
Old Anarkali	1	1	6	10	60
New Anarkali	-	1	7	12	77
Dowalmandi	-	1	5	8	61
Civil Lines.	1	1	5	12	67
Qilla Gujjar Singh	-	1	6	8	52
Aosang	-	1	6	8	42
Moghalpura.	-	1	3	7	66
North Cantt.	1	1	2	7	45
South Cantt.	-	1	3	9	63
Ichhra	-	3	3	9	67
Baghbanpura.	-	1	4	8	64

	Total.	5	19	68	152	1173
Received from Police Lines.		-	-	-	-	100

Grand Total.	5	19	68	152	1273
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Sanctioned )						
Present )	Lines.	1	6	7	31	240
-do-	Miscellaneous.	8 *	26	23	76	292

\* &amp; 2 Sergeants.

Sd/-

Orderly Sergeant,

For Supdt. of Police(Senior),  
Lahore.

Appendix. 'B'POLICE STATION CIVIL LINES.

	<u>SI.</u> <u>1</u>	<u>ASIs</u> <u>6</u>	<u>HCS</u> <u>12</u>	<u>FCs.</u> <u>100</u>
Sanctioned Strength.				
Present on 1-3-53.	1	6	12	67

ROUTINE DUTIES.

Duty Officer.	-	1	-	-
Nonarrirs.	-	-	4	1
Naib Courts.	-	-	-	2
Record Room	-	-	-	1
Lock Up Guard.	-	-	-	4
Wak Orderly.	-	-	-	1
Office Orderlies(by rotation).	-	-	-	3
Main Gate Reserve(by rotation).	-	-	-	3
Investigation Staff.	-	-	-	5
Station House duties.	-	-	-	2
Patrol House.	-	-	-	1
Mess.	-	-	1	2
Casual Leave.	-	-	-	6

Total.	-	1	5	31
Balance.	1	6	12	67
	-	1	5	31

Balance at Civil Lines.	1	4	6	20
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Sd/-

Station House Officer,  
Civil Lines.  
11.7.53



Extract from Weekly Confidential Diary for the week ending the  
February, 1953, of the Lahore District.

X

X

The main activities this week have been on the part of the  
His-e-Amal of the All parties Muslim Convention against the  
Ahmadis. They have given an ultimatum that their demands for the  
removal of Ch. Zafar Ullah from office and the declaring of Ahmadis  
a minority must be settled by 22.2.1953. After this date they  
will launch their "Direct Action". During the week they have been  
holding meetings and enthusing their audience to whole-heartedly  
join in this campaign. Their speeches have been fiery and calculate  
to strongly move the minds of the fanatical and religious minded  
people. So far their gathering have been small comprising a few  
hundred, the biggest being about 1500 at a meeting held on 7.2.53  
at Paniwala Talaab in the City. These audiences have certainly been  
strongly moved at the time of the meeting. No great activity though  
has been reported later after their stirred emotions had time to cool  
down. Activities to enlist volunteers prevail but so far no accurate  
estimate can be made as to the number. Two things are evidence  
either their following is very small and they are trying to be  
impressing by appealing to their hidden volunteers to be ready  
for every sacrifice after 22.2.53, hoping thereby to coax some more  
into coming forward, or they have an underground organization that  
has already enlisted a respectable number. So far efforts to  
earnest accurate information regarding the latter have not proved  
successful. At present there does not appear to be a live interest  
by other political groups towards them and they seem to be going  
ahead along and making a great noise about it. From general  
appearance there does not seem to be support at this juncture,  
but it is abundantly clear that they will be able to muster  
sufficient number to start the ball rolling from 23.2.53. The  
reaction of the people can only then be judged in the light of  
counter action. Counter action by the authorities will have to be  
carefully planned to prevent the people being forced on to their  
side.

X

X

X

Extract from Confidential Weekly Diart of the Lahore District  
the week ending the 14th Februrary, 1953.

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X

X

The Majlis-e-Amal have pursued their intentions to carry out their direct action. The visit of the Hon'ble Prime Minister of Pakistan to Lahore on 16.2.53 influenced them to stage a hartal and black flag demonstration as peacefully as possible as a preliminary indication of what is likely to follow from 22.2.53 onwards if their demands were not met. Accordingly they held meetings towards the end of the week and thousands flocked to these meetings. The audience numbered from 10,000 to 20,000. During one of these meetings on Misbat Road, the misbehaviour of two Ahmadis living in the locality, came very close to murder and arson, but fortunately the angry mob was influenced otherwise. Even so this incident has gone an exceedingly long way in throwing the balance completely against the Ahmadis, and a complete hartal of the whole city has followed. Abdul Aziz a former chaprasi from Amritsar and now a petty shop-keeper and his son Majid who has recently been discharged from the Mental Hospital were indiscreet enough to stone the meeting causing injury to a small girl. The situation grew serious and worsened due to the aggressive attitude of the two culprits. Saner council averted an ugly ending.

Authentive figures are not available but volunteers are estimated to be about 2,5000 so far.

The Majlis-e-Amal are pressing ahead hard now. They intend going to Karachi for the final stages and launching their "Direct Action" at Karachi and Lahore on 23.2.53. The general public have tacitly shown their agreement with this cause even though they have no wish to appear in the arena in a violent manner or to indentify themselves as dissenting from the "Khatme-Nabuwwat" principle. The really violent work has been left entirely to a small band of Ahrar Razakars, who with the greatest of ease can pick-up support in snow-ball fashion from all kinds of elements ready for excitement. This opposition cannot and should not be under estimated and will assume serious proportions as so many side issues will come into play.

x

X

X



Extract from the Confidential Weekly Diary of the  
Lahore District for the week ending the 21st February,  
1953.

X

X

The week under report has been one of bustling activity sponsored by the Ahrars. Meetings all over Lahore have been held with great frequency and have not differed materially from what has already come on record. These meetings, however, have been very small affairs drawing only a few hundred persons. There has not been the huge gatherings that marked the meetings held towards the end of last week. Nevertheless the interest has been kept up and the burning question of 'Khatm-e-Nabuwwat' has all along been the force behind the issue. The question whether the general public are prepared to fully endorse the Ahrar programme of 'DIRECT ACTION', if it should involve any violent operations is still not certain. Volunteers have undoubtedly increased a very great deal and during Friday prayers another appeal was made for more volunteers and funds. There has, however, been indication that people are not coming forward with the same degree of enthusiasm as was noticed a week or so ago, while the persistent insistence for volunteers and funds seems to be a factor that all is not what the sponsors desire and they are a good deal uncertain of their grounds still. Maulana Hoodi has warned that no action should be attempted without the decision of the Central Council of Action and has withdrawn his volunteers.

The postponing of the date of 26.2.53 and the departure for Karachi of the leading lights has shaken the confidence of the public. Those inclined to this issue and prepared to carry out 'DIRECT ACTION' are now feeling they have been double-crossed and their subscriptions have been swallowed. There is a feeling prevailing and gaining ground that the Ulema will exploit them and eventually bring them down. No incidents occurred after the events on 26.2.53 and up to date the atmosphere has been peaceful.

This issue has become the focal point of so many issues at present taxing the patience and self-sacrifice of the man in the street. The increase in unemployment, economic hardship, food problem are actually of greater concern than declaring the Ahmadis a minority or dragging Ch. Zafar Ullah Khan from his ministership. All these matters intertwined with a religious principle so close to the heart of every Muslim are bursting out pent up feelings on the side that appears to be weakest. There is little doubt that had the other issues not existed or been settled this question would have met a lingering death.

X

X

X

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From

Mirza Naim ud Din, B.A.,  
Senior Superintendent of Police,  
Lahore.

To

The Deputy Inspector-General of Police,  
C.I.D. Punjab, Lahore.

No: 13821-SB., dated Lahore the 5th July, 1952.

Memorandum.

I send herewith two posters issued by the  
Ahrars and demanding that Ahmadis be declared a  
minority community.

Another poster from the Secretary,  
Federation of Lahore Associations is also enclosed.

Advice in the matter is sought.

Sd/- NAIM-UD-DIN,  
Senior Superintendent of Police,  
Lahore.

From

Mirza Naim ud Din, B.A.,  
Senior Superintendent of Police,  
Lahore.

To

The Deputy Inspector-General of Police,  
C.I.D. Punjab, Lahore.

No: 12973 SB, dated Lahore the 19th June, 1952.

Memorandum.

I send herewith posters issued by the  
Ahrars and demanding that the Ahmadis be declared a  
minority community.

Advice in this matter is sought.

Sd/- Naim-ud-Din,  
Senior Superintendent of Police,  
Lahore.



Copy of wireless message No: 201835 from the Superintendent of Police, Gujranwala to the Senior Superintendent of Police, Lahore.

SH. HASSAMUD DIN B.A. AND MASTER TAJ DIN ANSARI  
ABSCONDED AFTER DELIVERING SPEECHES IN A PUBLIC MEETING  
AT GUJRANWALA IN CONTRAVENTION OF ORDERS U/S 144 CRPC(.)  
THEY ARE WANTED IN CASE F.I.R. NO. 199 DATED 20-6-52  
U/S 188 PPC (.) KINDLY HAVE THEM ARRESTED AND INFORM  
THROUGH SIGNAL (.)

TE.

No: 13078-89-SB Dated 21-6-52.

Copy to all G.Os and Inspectors for necessary  
action.

Sd/- Naim-ud-Din,  
Senior Superintendent of Police,  
Lahore. 21-6-52

No: 13095- SB., Dated 23-6-52.

Copy to D.I.G./ C.I.D.

Sd/-Naim-ud-Din,  
Senior Superintendent of Police,  
Lahore. 23-6-52

CONFIDENTIAL.

Copy of a wireless signal dated July 21, 1952 from the Home Secretary to Government Pb., addressed to all District Magistrates and Superintendents of Police and repeated for information to Commissioners of Divisions and Deputy Inspectors General of Police in the Punjab.

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IN VIEW OF ASSURANCES GIVEN BY THE MAJLIS-E-AHRAR-E-ISLAM PAKISTAN TO THE HON'BLE THE CHIEF MINISTER AND HIS ACCEPTANCES OF THE ASSURANCES PLEASE WITHDRAW ORDERS UNDER SECTION 144 Cr.P.C. PROHIBITING PUBLIC MEETINGS OF THE AHRAR AND AHMADIS.

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No: 8547-56-BDSB dated Lahore, the 23rd July, 1952.

Copies are forwarded for information and necessary action to the:-

- (1) Commissioner, Lahore Division, Lahore.
- (2) Deputy Inspector-General of Police, Lahore Range, Lahore.
- (3) District Magistrate, Lahore.
- (4) Senior Superintendent of Police, Lahore.

Sd/- S.Ghias-ud-Din,  
Home Secretary to Government, Punjab.



SECRET.

From

Mirza Naim-ud-Din., B.A.;  
Senior Superintendent of Police,  
Lahore.

To

The Deputy Inspector-General of Police,  
C.I.D. Punjab, Lahore.

No: 25068-SB., dated Lahore the 20th October, 1952.

Memorandum:

Reference a meeting of All Muslim  
Parties Convention held on 3-10-52, Outside Mochi Gate,  
Lahore.

The speeches are mainly against Ch: Muham-  
-ammad Zafarullah Khan and the Ahmadis, which are  
objectionable and may also be actionable. These  
speeches in original taken by the C.I.D. Stenographer  
may be carefully examined.

Sd/- Naim-ud-Din.,  
Senior Superintendent of Police,  
Lahore.

SECRET

From

Mirza Naim ud Din., B.A.,  
Senior Superintendent of Police,  
Lahore.

To

The Deputy Inspector-General of Police,  
C.I.D., Punjab, Lahore.

No: 15599-SB., dated Lahore the 26th July, 1952.

Memorandum.

The proceedings of the All Muslim Parties Convention Punjab held at Barkat Ali Muhammeden Hall on 13-7-52 as recorded give ample evidence of speeches calculated to create hartred and strife against the Ahmadies. This also is in contravention of the District Magistrate's Orders u/s 144 Cr.P.C. The original proceedings are with the C.I.D. I write for directions as the action that would be desirable in this case.

Sd/- NAIM-UD-DIN.,  
Senior Superintendent of Police,  
Lahore.



No.9758/BDSB

CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION DEPARTMENT, PUNJAB.  
Dated Lahore, the 11th August, 1952.

To

The Senior Superintendent of Police,  
Lahore.Memo.

Please refer to your Memorandum No: 15599-SB,  
dated the 26th July, 1952.

2. The speeches delivered at the All Muslim Parties Convention at Lahore on 13-7-52 were examined in this Office. Although some of the speeches<sup>were</sup> found to be actionable under P.P.S.A. etc., it was decided that the offending speakers should not be proceeded against judicially. As regards the contravention of D.M. Lahore's orders u/s 144 Cr.P.C., it was decided at a conference held under the chairmanship of the Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab, on 5-7-52 that the convention should not be interfered with in any way. A copy of the proceedings of this conference was forwarded to D.M. Lahore under endorsement No: 181-ST(HS)/51, dated 5-7-1952.

3. In view of what has been said above, no further action is required to be taken.

Sd/- Habib Ullah Malik,  
for Deputy Inspector-General of Police,  
C.I.D. Punjab.

From

Mirza Naim-ud-Din, B.A.,  
Senior Superintendent of Police,  
Lahore.

To

The Deputy Inspector-General of Police,  
C.I.D., Punjab, Lahore.

No: 6110/SB., dated Lahore the 14th February, 1953.

Memorandum.

It has been reported that the Majlis-e-Amal in a camera meeting have decided to observe a peaceful 'HARTAL' on the arrival of the Hon'ble Prime Minister, on 16-2-53. They intend fixing black flags on shops etc. We should, in any event be prepared for a 'BLACK FLAG' demonstration.

It has been reported that their DIRECT ACTION will start at Karachi when Sahibzada Faiz-ul-Hasan of Ahlo Mahar Sharif will be the first man to court arrest on 23-2-53. It is, therefore, quite apparent that they have decided to make a definite start on 23-2-53. So far nothing can be said about the number of volunteers; their highest hopes are centred around the fact that once they make a start, however small it may be, volunteers will very quickly come forward.

Sd/- Naim-ud-Din,  
Senior Superintendent of Police,  
Lahore.

No: 6111-SB., dated Lahore the 14th February, 1953.

Copy to the Deputy Inspector-General of Police,  
Lahore Range, Lahore, for information.

Sd/- Naim-ud-Din.,  
Senior Superintendent of Police,  
Lahore.



## PUNJAB CIVIL SECRETARIAT.

Dated Lahore the 2nd March, 1953.

My dear

As outbreak of serious disorder is apprehended in Lahore and it is felt that the Civil authority might not be able to cope with the situation, I am desired by the Provincial Government to address you and request for the aid of troops to help the District Magistrate, Lahore, in the prevention and suppression of disorder. The number of troops, the period for which they would be employed on this task and the manner in which they would be posted would be communicated to you or to the officer nominated by you, by the District Magistrate, Lahore. As there is not enough time to make this request through the Central Government, this letter is issuing direct to you.

I am,

Yours sincerely,

Sd/- S.Ghias-ud-Din Ahmad.  
Home Secretary to Government, Punjab.

Major General Muhammad Azam Khan,  
G.O.C. 10 Div. Lahore Cantt:

No.390-94/A/BDSB, dated Lahore, the 2nd March, 1953.

A copy is forwarded, for information and immediate action to:-

1. The District Magistrate, Lahore.
2. The Commissioner, Lahore Division.
3. The Senior Superintendent of Police, Lahore.
4. The Deputy Insp. Genl. of Police, Lahore.
5. The Inspector General of Police, Punjab, Lahore.

Sd/- S.Ghias-ud-Din Ahmad.  
Home Secretary to Government Punjab.

وزیر اعلیٰ پنجاب اپنی اور اپنی وزارت کی طرف سے اعلان

کرتے ہیں۔ کہ ان کی حکومت "تحفظ ختم نبوت" کے لیٹرون سے فوری  
گفت و شنید کے لئے تیار ہے۔ اور وہ عوام سے درخواست کرتے ہیں کہ  
ملک میں امن و امان قائم رکھنے میں وہ انکا خاصہ بٹائیں۔ وہ عوام کو  
پورا اطمینان دیتے ہیں۔ کہ پولیس اور فوج کوئی تشددانہ کارروائی  
بالخصوص فائرنگ نہیں کریں گے۔ تاوقتیکہ انکو کسی کے جان و مال کی حفاظت  
کے لئے ایسا کرنا پڑے۔ صوبائی حکومت مرکزی حکومت سے گفت و شنید  
کر رہی ہے۔ اور میان ممتاز محمد خان دولتان بحیثیت صدر صوبہ مسلم لیگ  
پاکستان کی صدارت کے سامنے پنجاب کی عوام کی طرف سے اپنی تائید کے  
ساتھ مطالبات فوری توجہ کیلئے پیش کراتے ہیں۔ کیونکہ یہ قوم کے  
مشفقہ مطالبات ہیں۔ صوبائی حکومت کا ایک وزیر تیارہ کے ذریعہ کراچی  
ان مطالبات اور تاکید کے ساتھ آج ہی بھیجا جا رہا ہے۔ بعد ہماری  
ہرزور سفارشات سے کہ چودھری ظفر اللہ خان کو وزارت سے فوراً مستعفی ہونیکے  
لئے مجبور کیا جائے۔



### CASUALTIES.

In all 138 persons including one complainant and 6 Police Officers have been listed in all the hospitals. Up to and including the 6th March, 1953, 114 persons from the public were admitted as injured of which 14 died subsequently. 11 persons were killed by the Police during firing on 4.3.53 and 5.3.53 and have been accounted for in magisterial inquiries. The figures, therefore, stand at 25 killed and 100 injured.

These figures do not include casualties on the side of Police, which were 1 D.S.P. killed, 3 S.Ps., 2 D.S.Ps and a number of other ranks injured. One Head Constable received a bullet wound in his arm which was fired by a member of a violent mob. One Sub Inspector was grievously injured. These figures also do not include casualties on the side of Ahmadis or at the hands of Ahmadis.

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STATEMENT OF MAJOR GENERAL MUHAMMAD AZAM KHAN  
ON THE CONDITIONS AS THEY EXISTED BEFORE THE  
DECLARATION OF MARTIAL LAW IN LAHORE.

1. On request from the Punjab Government, I ordered the Offg Comd 103 Bde, Lt-Col. Sardar Abdul Aleem Khan (Bde responsible for Internal Security Duties in Lahore) and my GSO-I Lt-Col. Mohd Sherin, to attend a conference with the Punjab Government officials, i.e. I.G. Punjab Police, D.I.G. Police Lahore, Home Secretary Punjab, and Commissioner Lahore Division at the Civil Lines Police Station at about 2130 hours on 2nd March 53. This was the first time that the army representatives at Lahore were officially contacted by the Civil authorities during the "Direct Action Movement".
2. At the conference, Home Secretary Punjab, briefly described the situation in Lahore in which he explained that serious riots which the police might not be able to control were expected and he therefore requested for troops to be sent to Lahore to assist in maintaining law and order if required. He gave a letter to my GSO-I addressed to me (Major General Muhammad Azam Khan, G.O.C. 10 Division), formally requesting for the assistance of troops in "Aid of Civil Power". At the conference, it was agreed that one Bn of Inf was to be concentrated in the Jinnah Garden at about 0700 hrs on Mar '53 and would patrol the main streets other than the walled city area.
3. Accordingly, the 1st Baluch Regt was concentrated in the Jinnah Gardens by 0700 hrs on 3rd Mar '53. Patrols from this Bn were sent into the town outside the walled city area during the 3rd Mar '53 in accordance with the agreed plan. One link troop from 6 Lancers (armoured Cars) 1953. The link troop (4 armoured cars and a rifle troops mounted) and Inf patrolled the area mutually arranged with the civil

Contd sheet...2.



authorities.

4. Small parties of agitators were met and dispersed without having to resort to firing. By the afternoon the situation seemed to be well under control and the link troop of 6 Lancers was, therefore, withdrawn to the Cantonment at 1600 hrs on 3 Mar '53. At 0900 hrs, 4 Mar '53, in consultation with the D.C./S.S.P Lahore, 1st Baluch Regt less a company was withdrawn to the Cantonment, because the police had got the situation under control.
5. On the morning of 4 Mar '53, the link troop of 6 Lancers was however, ordered to move to town again so as to patrol the area specified, with the Inf Company of the 1st Baluch Regt. The armoured cars and Inf in carriers carried out intensive patrolling in Lahore (other than the walled city area) throughout the day. No processions came in their way.
6. On 4 Mar '53, at about 2000 hrs the civil authorities asked for further Military reinforcement as a result of Wazir Khan Mosque incident, the Police having been <sup>e</sup>severely man-handled by the mob (having lost one DSP killed and some police personnel with arms missing). Accordingly, 1st Baluch Regt (less one coy which was already in Jinnah Garden) was ordered to move and concentrated in Jinnah Garden. One coy of 1st Baluch Regt was sent to the Police Station KOTWALI at about 2000 hours at the request of the Police who expected the Police Station to be attacked at any moment.
7. I personally paid a visit immediately to the KOTWALI at about 2030 hrs the same evening after having sent one coy of tps to their help at the KOTWALI. A few rounds were fired by the Police for the first time near KOTWALI and the situation was restored and mob dispersed. When the I.G. Police and D.C

Contd sheet no. 3.

Lahore were satisfied about the situation I returned to the Cantonment after going round certain other parts of Lahore where every thing seemed quiet.

8. Although curfew had been imposed by District Magistrate Lahore in certain areas at night time, yet the demonstrators in large groups freely moved about and violated the curfew orders. At 0230 hrs on 5 Mar '53, I, accompanied by the Offg Comd 103 Bde (Lt-Col. Sardar Abdul Aleem Khan) attended an emergent meeting called by the Hon'ble Chief Minister (Mr. Mumtaz Daultana) at his residence where various measures to control the situation were discussed. The Chief Minister asked for the troops to carry out patrolling as a mere 'Show of force' but did want them to take any further action at this stage, i.e. he did not want to permit the use of force by the troops to disperse unlawful mobs. This was the general trend of his policy which was later in the morning confirmed in the Cabinet meeting held by H.E. The Governor of Punjab at the Government House on the same day.
9. The situation, however, continued to be tense. Two more coys of 3rd Pathan Regt were moved to the town (one to Gol Bagh and the other to Police Station NAULAKHA) at 0600 hrs on 5 Mar 1953. The remainder of 3rd PATHAN REGT were also ordered to move to Gol Bagh area immediately. At this stage, two Bns of 103 Bde has been deployed in "Aid of Civil Power" assisted by 6 Lancers. The Bn HQ of 103 Bde also moved to Jinnah Garden area by 1300 hrs on 5 Mar '53.
10. In the forenoon of 5 Mar '53, a meeting of the Punjab Cabinet presided over by H.E. The Governor of Punjab, was held at the Government House which, I, also attended. The following decisions were taken at this meeting:-

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- (a) "In view of the deterioration of the situation in Lahore, and a general flare up in the city, in the first instance, the Police should take very strong action using any amount of force that may be necessary to quell disturbances. Police patrols will be supported by military contingents under their own commanders.

Action - I.G. Police /GOC 10 Div.

- (b) If the Police cannot cope with any particular sector, the senior Police Officer present should hand over the change of the situation in that sector to the army commander accompanying him.

Action - I.G. Police/GOC 10 Div.

- (c) If the above measures fail to restore law and order and the Police cannot keep the general situation under control with this partial aid by military, the military will be asked to take over charge of the City".

Action - I.G. Police/GOC 10 Div.

11. By 1700 hrs, 5 March 1953, the situation became worse as processions were taken out in different part of the city regardless of the restrictions imposed by the Distt Magistrate under Sec 144 Cr.P.C in certain areas (excluding walled city area).
12. At 1800 hrs, I held a conference at GYMKHANA CLUB, which was attended by Offg Comd 103 Bde, I.G. Police, D.I.G. Police, Lahore, Chief Secretary Punjab, D.C. and S.S.P. Lahore. The latest developments in the situation were reviewed and measures to meet it were discussed. So far no change of policy was given by the Punjab Govt who still depended on Police and their own measures to restore the situation. The army continued to do patrolling in the areas specified i.e. outside the walled city. Section 144 Cr.P.C. was not promulgated in the

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walled city area.

13. Although it had been decided at the Cabinet meeting held by H.E. The Governor of Punjab on the 5 March 53, that the police should take very strong action by using any amount of force that may be necessary to quell the disturbances, yet in practice the police were unable to do so either due to conflicting directions being given at various time or any other reasons best known to them. However neither did the police ask army partols to accompany their patrols.
14. The troops continued to patrol the main thoroughfares in the city outside the walled city area according to the policy laid down by the Punjab Cabinet on 5th March, 1953, and the processionists dispersed when confronted with military patrols. Cases of arson, loot and stabbing were reported on 5 March 1953. Whenever timely information was received by the troops, action was immediately taken to put out fires, prevent looting and evacuate threatened families to safety and give protection to all others who were in need of protection.
15. On 6 March 1953, the Punjab Govt was still unwilling to hand over the situation in Lahore to the army control, although they saw the things had gone for beyond their control. The Civil administration had completely broken down. The P & T Deptt, A.G's Office, Railway Workshops, station and traffic staff etc had struck work. Trains were not moving out of Lahore, the telephone and telegraph system was not operating and P & T personnel were threatening the Ministers at Govt. House. Essential Services also threatened to stop work and cut off water and electricity connections etc. Miscreants attempted even to put out of action the Radio Station Lahore. The line was soon repaired by the army. Personnel of Bata Shoe Co, Ordnance Clothing Factory also struck work. Govt prestige had gone and morale was very low.

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16. At the meeting held at the Govt. House on the morning of 6th March, 1953, I asked H.E. The Governor of Punjab to intervene and ask his Government to hand over the situation to the army for restoration of law and order. He, however, said **that** he had no power to order the Government to do so, although he agreed that it should be done. The Cabinet and Hon'ble Chief Minister still remained undecided regarding the handing over of the situation to the army. Mere patrolling by the Police or Army or combined could not give an answer to the problem.
17. I apprised GHQ of the prevailing situation during the Cabinet meeting at about 1100 hours and told them that if the situation was handed over to me by the Punjab Govt. immediately, I will be able to restore law and order, as further delay would otherwise lead to terrible loss of life and property the biggest disaster to the Nation.
18. To make matters worse, the Hon'ble Chief Minister, (Mr. Muntaz Daultana) issued a statement at about 1200 hours on 6 March '53 that his Cabinet had accepted the demands of the agitators and he was sending a Minister to press the same upon the Central Government. This was given as an information at the Cabinet meeting and on this factor he based his hopes that the situation would improve. This information came to us as a surprise at the meeting. This statement did not help matters but on the contrary encouraged the agitators to intensify their violent activities. In the forenoon of 6 March, cases of stabbing, arson of property including Government property (Post Offices Buses etc) and looting of shops particularly arms shops were reported. Luckily, information regarding the attempted looting of arms shops was received by the troops in time and they were able to reach the spot within a few minutes and prevented looting of arms and ammunition. Troops continued to render assistance to besieged families and shop keepers, who were threatened by violent mobs.

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19. The Punjab Government still unwilling to hand over the situation to the army and hoped that the statement issued by Hon'ble Chief Minister at noon on Friday, the 6th March 1953, would restore law and order. The statement, however, failed to create the desired effect and instead, the violent mobs continued to advance in various directions. There was complete chaos in the town, whilst we were still at the Government House Cabinet meeting. Frequent requests were coming in for army help from DCs of Districts who were losing control of situation due to lack of clear cut policy from the state Government.
20. At about 1245 hrs, final instructions were received by me from ✓ the Defence Secretary, Government of Pakistan, that the Hon'ble Prime Minister of Pakistan had authorised me (GOC 10 Division) to declare Martial Law and to take over the administration of the city of Lahore. Consequently, Martial Law was declared in Lahore Corporation Area at 1330 hrs on 6th March 1953.
21. The entire staff of the Punjab Secretariat had gone on strike ✓ and held meetings inside Secretariat Building, locked the main entrance and disallowed their senior officers to leave the Secretariat. Efforts were being by senior officers to restore the situation but without success. Similarly all other essential services were also in the same state including P & T Railway, Accountant General's Office - factories etc. The situation thus became most alarming. On account of general lawlessness in which Goondas were prominent, the life and honour of the citizens of Lahore was in grave danger with civil administration completely paralysed.



SUMMARY.

1. Government of Punjab did not take me into confidence when they were expecting the "Direct Action" situation to develop and even after the "Direct Action" had actually taken place for some days. On 2nd March '53, it was the first time that I was apprised of the situation when the Punjab Government formally requested for military aid.
2. Whatever help the Government wanted was given to them immediately. There were no occasions when the army help was sought and it was not given immediately.
3. The situation as regards agitation was allowed to develop over a long period and reached such a state between the 4th and 6th March '53, that the army had to be ordered by the Centre to take over the charge of Lahore Corporation area against the wishes of the Punjab Government. The policy adopted by the Punjab Government, allowed no scope for the army to take an effective action until the declaration of Martial Law which came in the nick of time to save the city from a terrible disaster.
4. When the army took over control, law and order was restored in the shortest possible period and with the minimum of casualties (within 24 hrs) at the cost of 11 killed and 49 wounded considering the magnitude of violence and lawlessness that had taken shape in Lahore.
5. From the moment, we had the first warning on 2nd Mar '53, the army was standing by to come in "Aid of Civil Power" at 1 hour's notice, and our military Exercise fixed for 3rd to 5th March '53 was cancelled and troops were brought back to Lahore Cantonment from RAIWIND-KASUR. The first lot of troops were moved into Lahore from the Cantonment on 3rd March '53, (0700 hrs) as required by the Punjab Government.
6. In addition to restoring law and order in Lahore, my troops (10 Division) were also sent to the following places in the Punjab in "Aid of Civil Power".

<u>Places.</u>	<u>Date.</u>	<u>Strength.</u>
SIALKOT.	Early morning 4 Mar '53	One Coy.
LYALLPUR.	night 4/5 Mar '53.	One Bn.
MONTGOMERY.	5 March 1953.	One Coy.
OKERA.	5 March 1953.	One Coy.
DHEIKHUPURA.	F/N 10 March 1953.	One Bn.

For train escorts . 6th Mar to 10 Mar 53 One Bn.

7. Such a large scale mob violent could not have been worked up so suddenly between 2-4 March '53. The policy of allowing too much latitude to agitators over a long period resulting in loss of control by the Government and Police and without declaration of Martial Law, the situation could never have been restored without terrible losses in life and property which even then may not have answered the problem effectively.
8. Half hearted measures and lack of clear cut (and sometime conflicting) policy, in the restoration of law and order can only spell disaster and it was only the timely imposition of Martial Law by the Central Government that came as a blessing to save the situation.
9. Section 144 PC was not proclaimed over the walled city area which gave the miscreants every opportunity to carry out the most poisonous propaganda and prepared the ground for the biggest mob violence and dangerous movement on an alarming scale.

Sd/- Muhammad Azam Khan

Major-General,  
Comd, 10 Division,  
(Muhammad Azam Khan).

Dated 22 July, 1953.



M E S S A G E

From: HOME SECY PB 061250

To: All Dcs in Punjab.

Please give immediate and wide public to the following appeal issued by Hon'ble Chief Minister PB on behalf of himself and his colleagues. As the Chief Minister of Punjab makes this announcement on the behalf of himself and his Ministry that the Government is prepared to open immediate negotiations with the leaders of the Tahafuz-e-Khatam-e-Nabuwat movement and they appeal to the masses that they should help them in the maintenance of law and order in the country. They assure the public that the army and police will not take any repressive steps unless they are absolutely essential for the protection of any one's life and property. The Provincial Government is in touch with the Central Government and Mian Mumtaz Khan Daultana in the capacity of the President of the Provincial Muslim League is putting up these demands on behalf of the people of the PB. with his support because they are the whole nation's demands a Minister of the Provincial Government is proceeding to Karachi by Plane with these demands and support of the Chief Minister and the other Ministers of the Punjab today to get her with their strong recommendation that Ch. Zafarullah Khan should be asked to resign forthwith.

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The genesis of the Anti-Ahmedi Agitation would be found in the history of the Majlis-i-Ahrar. Until the partition the Majlis-i-Ahrar maintained its nationalist and anti-communal attitude and continued to oppose the partition of India on the basis of the two-nation theory. It functioned as the hand-maid of the Indian National Congress. It was supported by the Unionist Party in its anti-League activities in the Punjab. However, events moved fast after the dissolution of the Khizar Cabinet in March, 1947, when communal frenzy seized the province and certain well known Ahrars were set upon by a non-Muslim mob and severely assaulted at Amritsar. The Congress and the League were left to determine the future of the sub continent; all other political organisation including the Ahrar realised their futility and reached in the background.

The partition came in August, 1947. Widespread violence, privation and suffering came in its wake. The Muslims in the East Punjab were hounded, hacked and driven to West Punjab. Even anti-League Muslims such as the Ahrars were not spared. Some of the Ahrar leaders decided to stay on in India, while others came over to Pakistan. For some time the "Vira Hotel" now called "The Central Pak Hotel" on the Meleod Road, Lahore, became the rendezvous for the meetings of these veteran Ahrar workers and their non-Muslim contacts, who visited Pakistan from time to time. Some of the Ahrar leaders dispersed to outlying places in the Punjab and suspended their activities. These included Syed Atta Ullah Shah Bokhari, Maulvi Muhammad Ali Jullundari, Master Taj-ud-Din and Sahibzada Faiz-ul-Hassan. They now showed their readiness to dissolve the party and give up its political complexion. For this purpose they called a meeting of the Working Committee at Khangarh in the Muzaffargarh district where Syed Atta Ullah Shah Bokhari had taken refuge in November, 1947. No final decision was taken. The erstwhile heroes were seized with defeatism, confusion, panic and fear.



Another meeting was held in Lahore/December, 1947. Master Taj-ud-Din was in the chair. No final decision was taken on this occasion either. However, All Pakistan Majlis-i-Ahrar was founded and the Working Committee elected.

3. The Ahrar leaders who had so far been feeling shy to face the public, made their first public appearance and affirmations of the loyalty to the Muslim League in May, 1948, when they held a conference in Lyallpur. They said little except the enforcement of the Shariat Law. They made references to Ahmedies. The references were, however, innocuous and mild. This they did in order to win public sympathy and support. ✓

4. From the very start of its organisation long before the partition, the Majlis-i-Ahrar has been bitterly opposed to the Ahmedies. It used to hold public meetings at which its speakers indulged in strong criticism against the founder of the Ahmedi Community and their faith. It also published many pamphlet and other literature in that connection. Shortly after the partition, the Ahrar leaders announced that on the political front they had decided to merge their party with the Muslim League whereas on the religious side they would continue their activities separately.

5. The Ahrars were blustering every now and then against the Muslim League as before. They showed aggressiveness in their attitude. Their meetings with the Indians made it necessary to detain Syed Makhdum Shah Banauri and Sheikh Hissam-ud Din. They were arrested in July and September, 1948 respectively. It is interesting to observe that in October 1948, Syed Atta Ullah Shah Bokhari addressed a meeting at Lahore asserting that the Ahrars had no differences with the Muslim League. He advised Ahrar volunteers to join the Pakistan National Guards and to help in organizing defence of Pakistan. The game was to win confidence first and to launch an attack later. The Ahrar spokesmen blew hot and cold in the same breath in their desperate attempts to woo the Muslim League on the one hand and ingratiate themselves with ✓

the public on the other, with a view to gaining political ascendancy.

6. The first biggest gathering of the Ahrars since the partition was held in Lahore in January, 1949, when they held an "Ahrar Defence Conference". It is significant that although the name "Defence Conference" was used, only one resolution out of nine related to the subject of defence. The most important resolution which was passed on this occasion was that the Ahrars would henceforth cease to be a political body and would function only as a religious group. They gave out that if necessary they would use in future the League front for political work.

7. The Ahrars felt that the response accorded to their efforts to woo the League was very poor. They realised that there was now only one way to maintain their entity and that was to organise Tablighi conference. In the circumstances, they held a series of Tablighi conferences at various places in the Punjab in 1949, strongly denouncing Ahmedies in their extremely objectionable speeches. They criticised Ahmedies in general and the Head of the Ahmedia Community and the Hon'ble Sir Ch. Muhammad Zafar Ullah Khan in particular.

8. The Ahrar leaders attended a conference in Madressa Talim-ul Quran at Rawalpindi. It was at this conference that they demanded for the first time that the Ahmedies should be declared a minority community. This demand was made public and Government asked to concede it at a meeting held in Pindi Dadan Khan in May, 1949. From the onwards the demand became a regular feature of Ahrar meetings. Criticism of Sir Zafarullah Khan and the founder of the Ahmedya faith became virulent and ill-will began to spread. Public response was good. It became obvious before long that if the Ahrars wanted to rehabilitate themselves, they had only to continue this activity. It was here that they found it scarcely necessary to seek the help of the league and they could easily survive as an independent party.



9. In October, 1949, the Ahrars gave out that the relations between Nawabzada Liqat Ali Khan and Sir Muhammad Zafarullah Khan had become strained. They exploited this situation under the notion that if they agitated for the removal of Sir Zafarullah Khan from the Cabinet they would not arouse the wrath of the Government and would probably be left free to continue their activities.

10. The Muslim League veered round and accorded preferential treatment to the Ahrars. This was evident from the fact that the Working Committee of the Pakistan Muslim League which met at Karachi in December, 1949, among other things, to draw up a list of political parties which were taboo to the members of the Muslim League omitted to include the name of Majlis-i-Ahrar from the list. It is interesting that the list, which contained as many as 19 names of political parties taboo to the members of the Muslim League, was conspicuously silent about Ahrars. The exclusion of the name of Majlis-i-Ahrar in spite of its black and anti-League record created an impression amongst its members that the party had at last rehabilitated itself and that it had won the confidence of the Muslim League. It was a big achievement indeed in view of the fact that Ahrar leaders had been notorious (a) for taking money from the Congress and (b) denouncing the League and the demand for Pakistan. Even during the Kashmir agitation in 1931 the Ahrars were alleged to have sold the Muslim of Kashmir by taking money. They kept aloof from the Shahidganj Agitation allegedly for a consideration which they received from the Sikhs.

11. In October, 1949, the Ahrars denounced the decision of Sir Francis Mudie in allotting crown land to the Qadianis for developing a township.

12. About the end of 1949, the Ahrars started a school at Multan for imparting instructions to prospective agitators against Ahmedies. Maulvi Muhammad Ali Jullundari was appointed as its Nazim-i-Alla.

13. The assumed religious complexion of Ahrars brought

Them in contact with the Jamaat-i-Islami. The bond between the Ahrars and the Jamaat-i-Islami continues until today. It would be observed elsewhere in this note that the Jamaat-i-Islami played a very important part in giving a fillip to the direct action agitation, launched by the Ahrars.

14. The Ahrars continued their Tablighi conferences through the years 1950 and 1951. Militant speeches were delivered at these conferences and resolutions passed demanding (a) declaration of the Ahmedya Community a minority community, (b) removal of Sir Zafar Ullah Khan from the Central Cabinet, (c) removal of Ahmedies from key-posts and (d) declaration of Rabwah as an open city for other communities. In one of the speeches delivered at these meetings, Syed. Atta Ullah Shah Bokhari claimed that if Mirza Ghulam Ahmad had made a claim to prophethood in his lifetime, he would have killed him with his own hands. It was alleged that Pakistan's failure in Kashmir was due to treachery of the Ahmedies.

15. The Ahrars reprinted a large number of copies of Maulana Shabir Ahmad Usmani's book "Alshahab" justifying the assassination of two Ahmedies at Kabul. This also started pamphleteering and writing militant articles in their party paper "Azad". A list of Qadiani officers serving in the Pak armed forces was published by the Ahrars in August, 1950 in the "Azad".

16. The Ahrars are colourless people possessing a most shifty nature. They align themselves with the various political groups of opposite camps whenever it suited their purpose. They try to exploit the internal dissensions existing in the Muslim League. At one time they supported Mamdot, when he was the Chief Minister, then the Advisors and finally Mian Mumtaz Muhammad Khan Daultana. They always went with the wind and supported the party in power.

17. As a result of virulent anti-Qadiani propaganda, done by the Ahrars, a very dangerous situation was created. Incidents occurred in the Montgomery and Rawalpindi districts. At Okara one Ahmedi was stabbed. Ahmedi preachers were waylaid and their



faces blackened. Loud-speakers were fitted in the mosques which blared for days an on and advocating hatred and spreading venom against the Ahmedies. A murder took place at Rawalpindi in which the victim was an Ahmedi. Earlier a young P.A.M.C. doctor was killed in Quetta. These disturbing and disconcerting incidents led to repeated warnings being administered to the Ahrars by various high officials of the Government including H.E. Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar, the Chief Adviser, the Chief Secretary and the Inspector General of Police. The Ahrars were very quick to make solemn promises which they broke very boldly without any compunction of conscience. Tension continued to mount.

18. The Ahmedies started counter propaganda. They took up the challenge in 1950 and 1951 and began to organise counter meetings. They held meetings at Sialkot, Lyallpur and Multan, which were obstructed by Ahrar volunteers.

19. The allegation that the Ahrars owed merely lip service and allegiance to Pakistan was corroborated substantially by their behaviour towards an Indian Goodwill Mission which visited Lahore under the leadership of Mr. Bhim Sen Sachar about the end of 1950. Ahrar leaders held secret meetings with the members of the Mission. Some of them were alleged to have given out that if the Hindus were to come back to West Pakistan, they would bring prosperity in their wake.

20. Elections in the Punjab were last held in March 1951. The Ahrar leaders gave out that they would support Muslim League Candidates only, if they were not Ahmedies. Nevertheless a number of tickets were issued to Ahmedi-Candidates. However, none of the Ahmedi candidate could succeed. The Ahrars celebrated their defeat by observing "Yom-i-Tashakkur" at Lahore on three successive days in May, 1951. They also took out a procession of Ahrar volunteers. The public gave a rousing reception to the procession indicating that they were happy at the exclusion of Ahmedies from the Assembly. The Ahrars were hailed as deliverers. They exploited their

growing popularity by holding numerous conference throughout the province. Ulterior motives were imputed to Ahmedies in connection with the Rawalpindi Conspiracy Case and the concentration of Indian troops on the borders of Pakistan. It was alleged that General Nazir had joined the conspiracy because he was not loyal to Pakistan being an Ahmedi. Some Shrar speakers blamed the Ahmedies for the aircrash in December, 1950, in which General Iftikhar lost his life. The tension following the concentration of Indian troops on our borders was exploited by the Ahrars by holding defence conferences which too were used for the purposes of propagating against the Ahmedies. The usual demands put up by Ahrars were repeated at these conferences.

21. It would be observed that the first stage of fear and uncertainty on the part of Ahrars ended with the Muslim League resolution in December, 1949, when they were not included in the list of organisation which were declared closed to League members. The second stage ended with the open participation of Ahrar workers in the electioneering campaign of the Muslim League early in the year 1951. The credit of Ahrars as political party was not only established but recognised. The tone of their politics became distinctly more aggressive as they entered the next phases.

22. The Ahrars began to use various tactics in order to disturb Ahmedi meetings. The meetings of Ahmedies held at Sialkot and disturbed by Ahrars are typical of the technique used by them. They contacted local Khatibs asking them to instigate public opinion against the holding of public meetings by Ahmedies. They also held meetings under the aegis of the Anjuman Tahafz-i-Khatme-Nabuwat at which the Ahmedies were vilified. Finding that the authorities did not acceded to the Ahrars demand for banning the Ahmedi Conference, Ahrar agitators tried to create pandemonium at the meeting by raiding slogans of "Banaspati Nabi Murdabad", Marzayon ke jalsa band kar do", "Kuffar ke jalsa band kar do". The conference came to an abrupt end. Nevertheless, the Ahmedis returning home from the



conference were brick-batted by these agitators. Anti-Ahmedia meetings were held at various places in the Punjab. At one of these meetings which was held in Jhang in March, 1952, Maulvi Muhammad Luqman advocated for the first time, the social boycott of the Ahmedies and their expulsion from Pakistan. Sh. Hissam-ud-Din, speaking at a meeting held in Lyallpur, criticised the working of Pakistan embassies, blamed the Foreign Minister for the partition of Palestine and for the Red Cliff Award which put the Gurdaspur district in India. A mock funeral was taken out at Gujranwala representing Sir Zafarullah Khan. Ahmedies were blamed of having opposed the partition of India. Maulvi Bashir Ahmad, President, Majlis-i-Ahrar, Faisalpur, wrote on the local Jamia mosque that the Mirzais were heretics and were in the circumstances liable to be killed according to the Islamic Shariat.

23. I would appear that the Ahrars were becoming more and more aggressive. They had by now developed the audacity of breaking up Ahmediya meetings by force. They were looking for an opportunity to force a show down. They had completely rehabilitated themselves by the beginning of 1952. On the one hand they gave out that they would support the Muslim League in its political activities, but on the other they claimed that they would have a free hand in the campaign against the Ahmedies. It is interesting to observe that in spite of their overtures to the Muslim League, some Ahrar workers demanded in February, 1952, that agitation should be launched for the release of Abdul Gaffar Khan, a potential supporter of the Indian Congress is general and Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru in particular in their opposition to the creation of Pakistan. In this very month, the Ahrars decided to hold Tablighi conferences in the Punjab, Sind and N.W.F.P., giving out that their object was to create public opinion against the Ahmedies in order to declare them as outcasts.

Muhammad Ali Jullundari was detailed to organise a

programme of conferences in the Punjab, Lal Hussain Akhtar in Sind and Ghulam Ghaus Sarhaddi in the N.W.F.P.

24. It was now a matter of common knowledge and the Ahrars were aware that the control of the agitation in districts was passing to the hands of riffrafs and irresponsible persons. This being so, the Government promulgated section 144 Cr.P.C. prohibiting the holding of meetings throughout the Province in June, 1952. However, prominent Ahrars leaders held meetings at Sargodha and Gujranwala in the month of July, 1952. This resulted in the arrests of Master Taj-ud-Din, Sh. Hissam-ud Din and Sahibzada Fauz-ud-Hassan. The first two were convicted and sentenced to six months rigorous imprisonment each. On this, Ahrars decided to hold meetings in mosques instead of in the open. In Lahore, a committee consisting of the following members was set up to draw up details for civil disobedience should it become necessary:-

1. Muhammad Jehangir.
2. Meraj-ud Din.
3. Dr. Sabar Multani.
4. Khawaja Abdul Rahim Tahir.

25. Meanwhile, a representation was put up to Mian Muntaz Muhammad Khan Daultana requesting him to release these leaders and lift the ban on Ahrar meetings. Some of the Ahrar workers blamed Khawaja Nazim-ud Din for this repressive policy. An approach was also made to the Islam League requesting them to lend their support in the event of Government orders being defied. Mian Muntaz Muhammad Khan Daultana allowed the representation, released the Ahrar convicts and lifted the ban on meetings in July, 1952.

26. On the 13th of July, 1952, the Ahrars held an All-Parties Muslim Convention in the Barkat Ali Muhammadan Hall, Lahore. This they did in order to enlist the sympathies of all Muslim Parties and broad-base the agitation. About 300 representatives of various Muslim Parties attended the convention. The majority of them were Ahrars. Prominent



among them were the following:-

1. Mufti Muhammad Hussain, Khatib, Jamia Mosque, Nila Gumbad Lahore, incharge Madrassa Ashrafia..... Jamiat-ul Ulama-i-Islam.
2. Maulana Baha-ul Haq Qasmi. -Do-
3. Maulvi Matih-ul Haq, Imam Jamia Masjid, Model Town, Lahore. -Do-
4. Maulana Abdul Halim Qasmi, Imam Masjid, Temple Road and Incharge Madrassa Hanfia, Lahore. -Do-
5. Maulana Ahmed Ali Khatib Jamia Masjid, inside Sheranwala Gate, Lahore. -Do-
6. Malik Nasraullah Khan Aziz, 7 Park Lane, (Jamaat-i-Islami). Mozang, Lahore.
7. Maulana Amir Hussain Islahi, Shah Jamal Park, Ichhra, Lahore. -Do-
8. Maulana Abdul Hasnat Syed Muhammad Ahmed Qadri (President Jamiat-ul Ullam-i-Pakistan.
- 8<sup>A</sup>. Maulana Muhammad Bakhsh Muslim, Imam Masjid outside Lohari Gate, Lahore. Jamiat-u- Ullam-i-Pakistan.
- 9.. Maulana Ghulam Muhammad Terranam, Benden Road, Lahore. -Do-
10. Maulana Daud Ghaznavi, M.L.A., Lahore. Jamiat Ahle-i-Hadis.
11. Maulana Muhammad Ismail of Gujranwala. -Do-
12. Maulana Muhammad Zakir, M.L.A., Jhang. 2  
Tanzim Ahle-Sunnat-Wa Jamaat.
13. Maulana Nur-ul Hassan Shah Bokhari of Multan. -Do-
14. Hafiz Kifayat Hussain, Nisbat Road, Lahore. (Adara Tahafaz-i-Haqooq-i-Shia).
15. Maulana Muzaffar Ali Shamsi, Nisbet Road, Lahore. -Do-
16. Maulvi Ghulam Din, Imam Masjid, Engine Shed, Lahore. (Hizb-ul Ananaf.)
17. Maulana Muhammad Areeb Panhavi of Baghoanpura, Lahore. (Hizab-ul Ahnaf)
18. Pir Qamar-ud Din of Sial Sharif, Jhang. (Jamait-ul Mashaikh)
19. Pir Ghulam Mohy-ud Din of Golra Sharif. -Do-
20. Syed Atta Ullah Shah Bokhari (Majlis-i-Ahrar)
21. Maulana Ghulam Ghaus Sarhaddi. -Do-
22. Maulana Muhammad Ali Jullundari. -Do-
23. Qazi Ahsan Ahmed Shujahabadi. -Do-
24. Khalid Mahmood, M.A, Sialkot. -Do-

25.	Taj Muhammad of Lyallpur.	(Majlis -i-Ahrar)
26.	Muhammad Unis Khatib Jamia Masjid, Lyallpur.	-Do-
27.	Khawaja Jamel-ud-Din Butt, President, Majlis-i-Ahrar, Lyallpur.	-Do-
28.	Mufti Zial Hassen of Montgomery.	-Do-
29.	Mufti Muhammad Amin of Toba Tek Singh.	-Do-
30.	Malik Muhammad Aslam Hayat, Advocate, Lahore.	-Do-
31.	Ghazi Muhammad Hussain, Salar-i-Azem of Tandlianwala.	-Do-
32.	Sardar Muhammad Sheffi of Usmanwala.	-Do-
33.	Sana Ullah Bhutta of Lahore.	-Do-
34.	Ch. Mehraj-ud-Din, Salar-i-Majlis Ahrar, Lahore.	-Do-
35.	Maulana Lal Hussain Akhtar of Karachi.	-Do-
36.	Maulvi Sardar Muhammad of Lyallpur.	-Do-
37.	Hafiz Muhammad Abdullah of Montgomery.	-Do-
38.	Syed Abu Zar Shah Bokhari son of Syed Atta Ullah Shah Bokhari.	-Do-
39.	Abdul Ghafoor Anwari of Multan.	-Do-
40.	Bashir Ahmad of Sheikhpura.	-Do-
41.	Abdul Majid, Editor Weekly Muslman, Sargodha.	-Do-
42.	Son of Pir Jamaat Ali Shah of Sialkot.	Independent.
43.	Maulana Abdus-Sattar Khen Niazi, M.L.A.	-Do-
44.	Qazi Murid Ahmad, M.L.A. Sargodha.	(Muslim League)
45.	Allamma Alla-ud Din Saddique.	Independent.
46.	Maulana Murtza Ahmad Maikash, Lahore.	-Do-
47.	Maulvi Ghulam Khan of Rawalpindi.	-Do-
48.	Maulana Muhammad Ibrahim of Sialkot.	-Do-
49.	Qari Abdul Majid of Sheikhpura.	-Do-
50.	Qaiser Mustafa, B.A.L.L.B, Lahore.	(Islam League)
51.	Maulana Mazhar Ali Azhar, Lahore.	(All Pakistan Democratic Party).
52.	Haji Din Muhammad of Lahore.	(Independent)
53.	Nawab Ahsan Ali Khan of Malerkote	(All Pakistan Shie Conferen <sup>ce</sup> )
54.	Hafiz Muhammad Sadiq of Sialkot.	(Independent)
55.	M. Khalil-ur Rehman of Hudhiera, Lahore.	-Do-
56.	Atta Muhammad Chohan of Dera Ismail Khan.	-Do-



Central Muslim League to bring their pressure to bear upon the Government that the demands referred to above should be accepted. In another resolution, the action of the Police in which a procession taken out in connection with the Khatam-i-Nabawat, had been lathi charged, was condemned categorically. A Council of Action was formed of representatives of the nine Muslim parties present at the convention. It was laid down that in future the demands tabulated by the parties vis-avis the Ahmedies would be pressed by the Council of Action.

29. A meeting of the Council of Action referred to above was held in the office of the Majlis-i-Ahrar outside Delhi Gate on the 22nd of July, 1952. This membership of the Council of Action was revised at this meeting. The following Council of Action was officially formed:-

<u>Srl. No.</u>	<u>Name.</u>	<u>Name of organisation.</u>	
1.	Master Taj -ud-Din Ansari.	Since arrested.	Ahrar.
2.	Maulana Muhammad Ali Jilundri.	Ditto	Ditto
3.	Maulana Abdul Haleem Qasami.	..	Jamait-ul Ulema-i-Islam.
4.	Mufti Muhammad Hassan.	..	Ditto
5.	Maulana Abdul Hasnat Muhammad Ahmed.	Since arrested.	Jamait-ul Ulema-i-Pakistan.
6.	Maulana Ghulam Muhammad Tarannam.	Ditto	Ditto
7.	Maulana Dawood Ghaznavi.	..	Jamait-ul Ahli-i-Hadis.
8.	Atta Ullah Haneef.	..	Ditto
9.	Maulana Muhammad Arshad Penahvi.	Since arrested.	Hizb-ul Ahnaf.
10.	Maulana Ghulam Din.	Ditto	Ditto
11.	Maulana Nasar Ullah Khan Aziz.	Ditto	Jamait-i-Islami.
12.	Maulana Amin Ehsan Eslahi.	Ditto	Ditto
13.	Hafiz Kifayat Hussain.	..	Adara-i-Tahafaz-i-Haqooq-i-Shia.
14.	Muzaffar Ali Shamshi.	Since arrested.	Ditto
15.	Pir Qamar-ud Din of Sial Sharif.	..	Jamait-ul-Mashaikh
16.	Pir Mch-y-ud Din of Golra Sharif.	..	Ditto
17.	Maulvi Noor-ul Hassan, Bokhari.	Since arrested.	Tanzeem Ahle Sunnat
18.	Maulna Muhammad Zakir, M.L.A., Jhang.	Ditto	Ditto
19.	Allama Alla-ud Din Siddiquee.	..	Independent.
20.	Maulana Akhtar Ali Khan.	Since arrested.	Ditto

1. Murtza Ahmed Khan Maikash.

..

Independent.

Karachi also began to show interest in the agitation.

The following visitors came from Karachi to Lahore:-

1. Whitisham-ul Haq Thanvi.
2. Abdul Hamid Badayuni.
3. Syed Suleman Nadvi.

30. In July, 1952 the spirit of defiance infused in the masses by the Ahrars led to ugly incidents at Multan and Lyallpur. At Multan an infuriated mob pulled down the fencing of the Kup Police Station and brick-batted the police staff. Ultimately the police had to open fire and disperse the mob. On this, the agitators made unfounded and malicious allegations against the Sub Inspector of Police and the Additional Deputy Commissioner, who was present at the Police Station and demanded their suspension. An Assistant Superintendent of Police was also among their targets. Mr. Justice Kyani, who conducted an enquiry, vindicated the firing by the police, but in spite of this Ahrar leaders continued the villification and accused the Government of repression. In Lyallpur, Ahmedis shops were looted. The Municipal Committee at Wazirabad passed a resolution removing two lady Ahmedis school teachers from the Municipal service. There was a considerable tension at Gujranwala where posters urging the social boycott of Ahmedies were exhibited. Objections were raised against the burial of Ahmedies in Muslim grave yards at Sargodha and Gujranwala. Separate utensils for Ahmedies were kept at food shops in Gujranwala with a view to indicating that they were untouchables. Individual cases of intimidation and bullying were reported from various parts of the province. This resulted in a number of Ahmedies discarding their religion. Some of them sent their families to Rabwah. At several places the agitation was led by irresponsible and frolicsome unchins and others. A dog with a collar bearing the name of 'Sir Zafarullah Khan' was paraded through the streets at Qasur.

31. Some of the Ahrar leaders expressed crocodile contrition after the Multan firing. Some of them went to the late Chief Minister who agreed to release Master Taj Din Ansari,



Sh.Hissam-ud-Din and others on their giving an undertaking to issue a statement that the Ahrars would remain peaceful and would actually go to the extent of protecting the Ahmedies. This being so orders promulgated by Government under section 144 Cr.P.C. were withdrawn. As before the Ahrars did not honour their undertaking. They continued to preach hatred against the Ahmedies. All this culminated in the awful incidents which took place in March last.

32. So far the Ahrars had been sponsoring and supporting the agitation against the Ahmedies single handed without any active support of the Muslim League. In July, however, there were indications that the Muslim League was planning to support them in the acceptance of their demands. The prominent Muslim Leaguers who offered their support to the Ahrars in this connection were the following:-

1. Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan of Muzaffargarh, M.L.A.
2. Pir Mohy-ud Din Lad Badshah of Makhad, M.L.A.
3. Pir Muhammad Sarwar Bodla of Dera Ghazi Khan, M.L.A.
4. Mian Jalal-ud-Din Bhandara of Montgomery, M.L.A.
5. Rana Ghulam Sabir of Okera, M.L.A.
6. Mr. Manzoor Hussain, Advocate of Gujranwala.
7. Ch. Khadim Hussain of Sheikhpura.
8. Ch. Abdul Ghani of Sheikhpura.
9. Mir Abdul Qayyum of Lahore, M.L.A.
10. Maulvi Muhammad Zakir of Jhang, M.L.A.

33. The League bodies at Gujranwala, Lyallpur, Sargodha, and the Lahore Civil Lines <sup>urged that a meeting of the League Council</sup> should be called for the purpose of discussing the controversy. Their demands was accepted. Accordingly, the League Council held a meeting in the Lakhshmi Mansions on the Meleod Road, Lahore on the 26th July, 1952, Mian Muntaz Muhammad Khan Daultana, the Chief Minister, attended the meeting. As the Provincial Muslim League was not competent to accept the demands, it was resolved that the Central Muslim League should be approached, recommending that the demands should be considered and an appropriate action taken. It is interesting to observe in this connection



that the demands for the declaration of Rabwah as an open city to all shades of Muslims was never pressed any further subsequent to the adoption of this resolution. An unruly mob appeared in front of the Lakhshmi Mansions and brick-batted the building and cars of the leaders, giving vent to their protest against the decisions taken at the meeting. A significant feature of the resultant pandemonium was that some Muslim League workers including councillors supported the demonstrators. Case FIR No. 231 dated 27.7.52 u/s 307/147/148/149/342/440-332/353/452 PPC and 31 P.P.S.A. was registered at Gowalmandi Police Station in this connection. 130 persons were arrested and sent up in this connection by the Lahore C.I.A. All of them were acquitted by the court.

34. The leaders who had participated in the League Council meeting at Lahore referred to above, made another effort to raise the issue at the meeting of the All Pakistan Muslim League, held in Dacca in October, 1951 but their efforts proved abortive.

35. Maulana Zafar Ali Khan and his son Maulana Akhtar Ali Khan of the "Zamindar" Lahore, are known for their anti-Ahmedi sympathies. A good deal of publicity was given by them in the "Zamindar" from time to time against Ahmediat and its founder. When the All Parties Convention was held in Lahore in July, 1952 the "Zamindar" issued a special number, dated the 25th July, 1952. One thousand copies of the "Zamindar" were purchased by the Ahrars and distributed free. The "Zamindar" published two purloined letters written by Sir Zafarullah Khan with a view to showing that he was misusing his official position. Various articles were written in the "Zamindar" against the Ahmediya religion. On the 16th August, 1952, when a meeting of the Council of Action was held in the office of the "Zamindar" Maulana Akhtar Ali Khan was appointed as Secretary of the Finance Committee set up by the Council of Action. The accounts were operated under the joint signatures of Maulana Abul Hasnat Muhammad Ahmed and Maulana Akhtar Ali Khan. In August, 1952, Maulana Akhtar Ali Khan made an appeal to the public requesting them to make over sacrificial skins to the Khatm-e-Nabawat organisation. Skins worth Rs. 7,500 were received by the organisation as a result of this appeal. Subsequently, Maulana Akhtar Ali Khan printed one-rupee notes worth Rs. 25,000 for the purpose of raising a fund amounting to Rs. one crore for financing anti-



Qadiani activities. The printed notes are reported to have all been purchased by the public.

36. After the meeting of the Council of Action in Lahore district, branches were set up. Though the Council of Action was made up of representatives of all Muslim parties, yet Ahrars dominated its deliberations both in the Provincial and District branches. In fact the Council of Action was used as a camouflage for the activities of the Ahrars. It was very clever of the Ahrars that the activities, though dominated by them, were no longer conducted under the name of Majlis-i-Ahrar. Meetings continued to be held at various places in the Province and public sympathies enlisted in support of the demands. A protest day was observed all over the Province on the 3rd October, 1952. Imams of various mosques were approached asking to sponsor resolution supporting their demands.

37. The Council of Action set up a Sharai Committee consisting of the following members:-

1. Maulana Muhammad Hassan of Jamia Ashrafia.
2. Mufti Muhammad Adris of Jamia Ashrafia.
3. Maulana Abul Hasnat Muhammad Ahmed Qadri.
4. Maulvi Abdul Qadir.
5. Maulvi Daud Ghaznavi.

38. The object of the formation of this committee was to give a Fatwah on the issue of the anti-Ahmedi demands. In the circumstances, the Sharai Committee gave the following Fatwah at a meeting of the Council of Action held in the office of the "Zamindar" at Lahore on the 14th October, 1952:-

"Those Mirzais who regard Mirza Ghulam Ahmed of Qadian as a prophet or a reformer (Mujadid) or an Imam were Murtads and a Murtad was liable to be killed according to the Islamic Shara. That Government which did not put into effect this order of the Islamic Shara became Ghalī.

If such a Government persisted in failing to carry out the order of the Islamic Shara there was justification for boycotting it".

39. Luckily, the Fatwah was not made public. The intention of its authors was to publish it when the actual agitation would start. It has not been published up to this day.

40. The Council of Action held a meeting in the office of the "Zamindar" on the 27th October, 1952. Fourteen out of twenty one members of the Council attended the meeting. Maulana Daud Ghaznavi suggested that the Council of Action should launch a movement for the social and commercial boycott of Ahmedies. He also suggested that the movement should be started at Karachi after holding there a meeting of all Muslim Parties Convention. Sahibzada Faiz-ul Hassan made a counter proposal to the effect that the movement should be launched in the Punjab instead of Karachi. Maulana Abul Hasnat Syed Muhammad Ahmed Qadri and Maulana Akhtar Ali Khan suggested that the Government should be approached as a last bid for an amicable settlement of the issue. The suggestion was, however, opposed by Sahibzada Faiz-ul Hassan and Sh. Hissam-ud Din, remarking that it was absolutely futile to knock at the door of the Government.

41. A Committee was formed consisting of Maulana Abul Hasnat Syed Muhammad Ahmed Qadri, Maulana Daud Ghaznavi, Master Taj Din and Sahibzada Fauz-ul Hassan with the object of watching and directing the course of the agitation. Sahibzada Faiz-ul Hassan was entrusted with the task of raising a strength of 50,000 volunteers, who should stake their all for the success of the movement under the command of the Council of Action. By the month of February, 1953 as many as 8840 volunteers were enrolled throughout the Province. Lyallpur, Sialkot, Gujranwala and Lahore contributed the largest number of volunteers who played a prominent part in the furtherance of the movement subsequently. The uniform of a volunteer consisted of a red shirt khakhi slacks or salwar or pyjama with a khaki beret. When the Ahrar office searched during the Martial Law in Lahore, a large number of steel helmets were recovered. The object in enrolling volunteers was to have a large number of men on hand in the event of a serious clash with Government. A volunteer was required to sign a printed pledge as under:-

P.T.O.



The office of the Council of Action was also set up in his house. His telephone was used not only for local but also for trunk calls.

46. As the period of notice for launching direct action agitation was to expire on the 22nd February, 1953, Master Taj Din Ansari, Abul Hasnat Muhammad Ahmed Qadri, Muzaffar Ali Shamsi and Syed Ataullah Shah Bokhari went to Karachi on the 20th February with a view to interviewing the H.P.M. for the last time and telling him that in case he insisted in his previous attitude they would actually start the agitation on the 26th February. Maulana Akhtar Ali Khan remained in constant communication with Master Taj Din and other Ahrar leaders who had gone to Karachi, over the telephone at Lahore. Master Taj Din wrote to him a letter to say that he should lead the agitation and continue to send Razakars to Karachi. On the receipt of these instructions two batches of volunteers were despatched by Maulana Akhtar Ali Khan, and Maulana Ghulam Ghaus Sarhadi—one under Sahibzada Faiz-ul Hassan and the other under Ghazi Ilyas-ul Din on the 25th and 27th, respectively. The one which left on the 27th was intercepted by the Punjab Police at Lodhran. On this Ghulam Ghaus Sarhadi was handed the charge of the Lahore office, making him an acting President. When the round-up was made on the 28th, Maulana Ghulam Ghaus went underground. He has not been traced so far. While underground he directed the agitation in a rather militant way. He wrote a letter to Niazi on the 7th March, 1953, which contained the following noticeable passages:-

- (i) Hold three and not less than two meetings in the Wazir Khan Mosque daily.
- (ii) Get "batteries" so that in case electricity is cut off power may be available for loud speakers.
- (iii) Insist on Hartals and suspension of government work.
- (iv) Calling of Azans at night will prove effective and useful.
- (v) During non-curfew hours batches of four persons should be sent out. The first batch should be sent out tomorrow.
- (vi) It is necessary to warn all concerned that they should not be carried away by announcements, posters and newspapers advocating the contrary point of view.

47. For two months, meetings were held almost daily in Lahore in the office of the Majlis-i-Ahrar. Lahore was divided into zones

and they were allotted to different workers for the purpose of organising the agitation.

The Ahrar leaders claim that they went in a deputation and met Khan Liaqat Ali Khan, Khawaja Nazim-ud Din both as Governor General and Prime Minister, Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar both as Governor of the Punjab and Minister of Industries, Hon'ble Sardar Bahadur Khan, Hon'ble M.Mushtaq Ahmed Gurmani, Hon'ble Ch.Muhammad Ali, Mr.Fazlur Rahman, Mian Mustaz Muhammad Khan Daultana, Mr.Chundrigar and others. According to C.I.D. reports, the following meetings were held in 1952:-

(i) In June, 1952, Qazi Ehsan Ahmed Shujaabadi and Muhammad Ali Jullundari, President and Joint Secretary of the Punjab Majlis-i-Ahrar, on return from Karachi claimed to have met Ch. Khaliq-uz-Zaman, Mr.Muhammad Hashim Gazdar, Mufti Muhammad Shafi, member Board Islamiat, Karachi, Maulvi Ehtisham-ul Haq Thanvi and M.Abdul Hamid Badayuni, Sadr Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Pakistan. They also claimed to have met Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar and Khawaja Nazim-ud Din. They invited the Prime Minister to preside at a public meeting which they had called at Karachi but their request was not accepted.

(iii) On the 16th August, 1952 a deputation consisting of Master Taj-Din, Sh. Hissam-ud Din, Maulvi Syed Ahmed and M.Murtaza Ahmed Maikash met Khawaja Nazim-ud Din, Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar and Mr.Fazlur Rahman. They had submitted a memorandum to the Prime Minister. The meeting lasted for an hour and a half. Master Taj Din gave out his turn that the H.P.M. wanted Sir Zafar-Ullah Khan to resign of his own accord. On the other hand, Sir Zafarullah Khan was not prepared to resign and wanted to be removed otherwise. The Central Government was, however, not prepared to take this step as Sir Zafarullah Khan was popular in Britain. M.Murtaza Ahmed Maikash, Editor of the Azad said that Khawaja Nazim-ud Din had congratulated them for maintaining peace and order. He said that the Prime Minister told them that warnings had been issued to government officials not to preach their religious beliefs and that any government servant who would not obey these orders would be dealt with severely.



(iii) On the 21st January, 1953, the following met the Prime Minister and put forward their demands:-

M. Abdul Hamid Badayuni.

M. Taj Din Ansari.

Syed. Muzaffar Ali Shamsi.

M. Athar Ali of East Pakistan.

M. Lal Hussain Akhtar.

M. Abu Jafar Muhammad Saleh.

The deputationists said that they would launch an agitation if the demands were not conceded within a month (it is strange that the Karachi C.I.D. passed on this information to us in the Punjab in a letter, dated the 9th March when Martial Law had been declared).

(iv) On 16th February, 1953, Master Taj Din Ansari, M. Abul Hasnat Muhammad Ahmed and M. Muzaffar Ali Shamsi met Khawaja Nazim-ud Din at Lahore. Later they said that the Prime Minister had told them firmly that he could not accept the demands. He also disapproved of the Hartal. Khawaja Nazim-ud Din told the deputationists that the Council of Action was playing in the hands of his enemies.

(v) On 18th February, 1953, Maulana Akhtar Ali Khan met the H.P.M. at Karachi and spoke to him about the demands of the Council of Action. He was not satisfied with the interview and said that the demands were not likely to be accepted.

(vi) At Karachi on 22nd February, 1953, Master Taj Din Ansari and other members of the Council of Action interviewed Khawaja Nazim-ud Din, according to them for four hours. The Prime Minister told them that the demands were not going to be accepted.

Sd/- Muhammad Hussain,  
Superintendent of Police, (D).,  
C.I.D. Punjab, Lahore. 7.7.53.

The role of the Jamaat-i-Islami in the  
'direct action' agitation of the Ahrars.

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The invitation to Jamaat-i-Islami to send representative to attend the All-Muslim Parties Convention was received on the 2nd July, 1952. Abul- Ala-Maudoodi called a meeting of the Majlis-e-Shoora on the 11th July. About ten persons attended and two resolutions were passed, the first demanding that the Ahmadias should be treated as a minority community and the second that Sir Zafrullah Khan should be removed from his office. It was affirmed that Foreign Office officials were utilised for the purpose of propagating the Ahmadiya creed throughout the world and particularly in the Middle East countries. In the meeting of the convention on the 13th two members of the Jamaat were nominated to attend as its representatives. From the 24th July, 1952, to the 14th February, 1953, the representatives of the Jamaat-e-Islami attended five ( out of a total of about fifteen) meetings of the Council of Action.

The anti-Ahmadi agitation had reached a high pitch, and all other political activities were almost eclipsed. The Jamaat-e-Islami was trying in those days to arouse public opinion on the constitution issue. Maudoodi, however, discovered that the public attention was focussed on the Ahrar demands and little interest was being evinced in the subject of the constitution. In November the Jamaat-i-Islami observed a Dastoor week in which much propaganda in favour of an Islamic constitution was made. Maudoodi feared that unless he endorsed the demands of the Ahrars the public might show no interest in his propaganda. He, therefore, called a meeting of the local Majlis-e-Shoora and got a resolution passed demanding the declaration of the Ahmadis as a non-Muslim minority community. This demand was added to the eight demands which the Jamaat-e-Islami had previously made. Maudoodi was not sure in his mind whether the Ahrars were sincere; and in fact at one time apprehended that the



anti-Ahmadi agitation had been let loose with the connivance of the Muslim League for the purpose of obscuring the constitutional issue. This is why his representatives in the Council of Action took comparatively little interest.

A gathering of the Ulemas of Pakistan took place in Karachi from the 11th to the 16th January, 1953. The object was to consider the recommendations of the B.P.C. report. Maudoodi attended the meeting. Among others a resolution was passed urging that the Ahmadis should be declared a non-Muslim minority and that in the Punjab where the Ahmadis had some strength one seat in the Provincial Assembly should be reserved for them. After the meeting of the Ulemas the Council of Action also met for three days. Maudoodi attended the three meetings and, according to him, cautioned the members of the Council that it was not advisable to give a notice to the H.P.M. threatening direct action. As, however, the Ahlars were in majority he could not press his point. On return from Karachi, Maudoodi addressed a public meeting outside Mochi Gate, Lahore, on the 30th January in which he said that unless the government accepted the anti-Ahmadi demands a very serious situation reminiscent of 1947 disturbances would arise.

On the 28th February a meeting was held in Maudoodi's house in Lahore which was attended by Abdus Sattar Niazi, Khalil Ahmad, Maulvi Daud Ghazvi and Sanaullah Bhutta. Niazi wanted Maudoodi to openly align himself with the agitation. Maudoodi condemned the round up of Khatm-e-Nabuwat agitation leaders but said that the time had not come to defy government openly. He maintained that the intelligentsia did not understand the anti-Ahmadi issue and that, therefore, it was necessary to first start a publicity campaign for the purpose of clarifying the issues. He promised to issue literature and it was in accordance with this promise that the first edition

of the well known Qadiani Masla was issued on the 5th March. Several editions were issued later and in all thirty-five thousands copies of the Urdu edition have so far been distributed. The Masla has been translated in Sindi, English and Bengali.

In early March, Khawaja Nazir Ahmad of the "Civil & Military Gazette" met Maudoodi and asked him to advise whether a statement issued by the Ahmadi Khalifa would allay the suspicion held by the public about his community. Upon this Maudoodi drafted a statement which Khawaja Nazir Ahmad took to Rabwah. In the statement the Khalifa was asked inter alia to declare:-

- (i) that a Muslim who did not accept Mirza Ghulam Ahmed as a prophet was a good Muslim and not a Kafir;
- (ii) that a Muslim who did not regard Mirza Ghulam Ahmad as a Nabi was a true Muslim and Ahmadis would not refuse to join his funeral prayers; and
- (iii) that the Ahmadis would not refuse to give their daughters in marriage to other Muslims as they did at present.

The Khalifa, however, declined to append his signatures to it.

In the "Tasneem", dated 1st March, 1953, Maudoodi issued a statement. The decision of the Majlis-e-Shura was published and government was severely criticised for using violence and repression against the people who were only making just and reasonable demands. This article was made the subject of a charge by the Martial Law authorities later.



## APPENDIX I

All-Pakistan Mailis-i-Ahrar.Office bearers:

- |   |                         |
|---|-------------------------|
| 1. Master Taj Din Ansari.....                                   | .... President.         |
| 2. Muhammad Ali Jullunduri } ....                               | .... Vice-Presidents.   |
| 3. Ghulam Ghauns of Hazara }                                    |                         |
| 4. Sh. Hissam-ud Din, Lahore.....                               | .... General Secretary. |
| 5. Syed Makhdum Shah Banauri of Kohat...                        | .... Secretary.         |
| 6. Ghazi Muhammad Hussain of } .....<br>Tandlianwala, Lyallpur. | .... Salar-e-Ala        |
| 7. Mehraj-ud-Din, Mozang, Lahore.....                           | .... Naib-Salar.        |

Working Committee

1. Syed Ataullah Shah Bokhari, Multan.
2. Sahibzada Faizul Hasan, Alomahar, Sialkot.
3. Qazi Ehsan Ahmad Shujabadi.
4. Nawazada Nasrullah Khan of Khangaarh.
5. Abdul Rehman of Miani, District Sargodha.
6. Sabar Multani, Faiz Bagh, Lahore.
7. Mufti Abdul Qayyum, Peshawar.
8. Abdul Salam of Hazara.
9. Dr. Muhammad Umar of Sukkur.

N.B:- The above-mentioned seven office bearers are also ex-officio members of the Working Committee.

## APPENDIX II

## Punjab Majlis-i-Ahrar

Office bearers:

1. Qazi Ehsan Ahmad Shujabadi.... President.
2. Maulvi Abdul Rahman Mianwi.... Vice-President
3. Maulana Muhammad Ali Jullundri.... Genl. Secretar
4. Mehr Abdul Rahim Jauhar of Jhelum.....Secretary.
5. Muhammad Shafi of Mozang, Lahore.... Treasurer.
6. Ch. Mehraj-ud-Din of Mozang, Lahore.... Salar-e-Suba.

Working Committee.

1. Sh. Fazal Karim, Rawalpindi.
2. Maulana Muhammad Ramzan, Mianwali.
3. Sh. Muhammad Amin, Gujranwala.
4. Sh. Ahmad Din, Sialkot.
5. Bashir Ahmad Razwani, Okera.
6. Maulana Ahmad Din, Sheikhpura.
7. Maulana Ghulam Qadir, Jhang.
8. Haji Muhammad Jehangir, Lahore.
9. Hafiz Muhammad Sharif, Multan.
10. Syed Ghulam Murtaza Shah, Rahim Yar Khan.

N.B: The above-mentioned six office bearers  
are also ex-officio members of the Working  
Committee.



## APPENDIX III

## LAHORE MAJLIS-I-AHRAR

Office bearers:

1. Haji Muhammad Jehangir, Jehangir Book Depot,  
Lahore. ....President.
2. Khawaja Muhammad Ismail, Gowalmandi, ....} Vice-President
3. Maulana Muhammad Ibrahim of Mozang, Lahore }
4. Ghazi Abdul Majid, Proprietor }  
5. Batala Machinery, Brandreth Road, } .....General Secret  
Lahore. }
5. Muhammad Ayyub of Farooq Ganj.....Propaganda  
Secretary.
6. Sh. Muhammad Sharif, Punjab Leather  
Company, Anarkali, Lahore... ....Treasurer.
7. Mir Muhammad Husain, Mozang, Lahore.....Salar.

Working Committee.

1. Hakim Muhammad Zulquarnain, Beadon Road, Lahore.
2. Shams Din, Jwahri Mohalla, Lahore.
3. Muhammad Tufail, Amritsari, Gow-almandi, Lahore.
4. Muhammad Yusuf, Mozang, Lahore.
5. Badar Din, Ichhra, Lahore.
6. Muhammad Hanif, Baghbanpura, Lahore.
7. Dr. Sabar Multani, Faiz Bagh, Lahore.
8. Muhammad Shafi, Chohatta Mufti Baqar, Lahore.
9. Sh. Lal Din, inside Mochi Gate, Lahore.

N.B:- The above-mentioned seven office bearers are  
also ex-officio members of the Working Committ

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